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1 Chapter 1: Introduction
Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1. Background 
This thesis intends to contribute by examining to what extent choices that firms make 
regarding their incentive compensation design (i.e.choice of performance measures, 
choice of performance targets, and the choice of incentive intensity) are informed by 
agency theory. The dominant approach to executive compensation design within the 
field of financial economics is typically the ‘optimal contracting approach’ (Bebchuck 
et al., 2002; Core et al., 2005). Here, executive compensation is designed in order to 
minimize agency costs (i.e. the sum of contracting costs, monitoring costs, and costs 
due to residual divergence of interests) that arise du  to the separation of ownership 
and control. Moreover, the executive compensation pla should induce executives to 
take and retain the position (i.e. meet or exceed executives’ opportunity cost) and 
provide incentives for executives to expend effort and select actions best aligned with 
shareholders’ interest. The optimal or efficient contract is the contract that maximizes 
the net expected economic value for shareholders after gency costs (e.g. payment to 
employees) (Core et al., 2005). Overall, the board is viewed as serving shareholders’ 
interests with the executive compensation scheme design d to serve this objective.      
The bonus payment of about $200 million to executives of the financial products 
division, which were heavily involved in the record-breaking loss of $62 billion for 
the American International Group Inc. in the fourth quarter of 2008, contributed to the 
currently popular perception of executives receiving excessive pay only loosely 
related with performance.1 (Wall Street Journal, 2009). The provision of excessive 
compensation tenuously related with prior performance is explained by Bebchuck et 
al. (2002) and Bebchuck & Fried (2003; 2004) through a managerial power approach. 
Boards, rather than acting perfectly in the interests of shareholders, are captured by 
executives, while the reputational concerns of directors and market forces such as 
product markets or the market for corporate control2 are not sufficiently powerful to 
                                               
1 The attention that these payments received from both the press and politicians was further motivated 
by the government bailout of $170 billion that American International Group Inc. recently received.  
2 Redistribution of profits from shareholders to executives has no significant impact on the operational 
efficiency of firms, appropriation of rents has a non-significant impact on firm value which only result  
in a non-significant increase in takeover risk and losses incurred after removal from office are limited 
because of ‘golden parachutes’, future prospects on the managerial labor market relies more on current 
 
2 The incentive effects of performance measures and trget setting 
constrain the bargaining power of the agent (Bebchuck et al., 2002; Bebchuck & 
Fried, 2003; 2004; Weisbach, 2007). The primary constraints on executive 
compensation are the upper bounds determined by public perceptions (defined as 
‘outrage costs’).3 Bebchuk et al. (2002) and Bebchuck & Fried (2003; 2004) speak 
about ‘camouflage’ as the propensity of managers to minimize the ‘outrage costs’ by 
means of obscuring and legitimizing their extraction of rents.4   
Bebchuk et al. (2002) and Bebchuck & Fried (2004) consider the widespread use of 
incentive packages that do not filter out factors that affect performance beyond the 
manager’s control as an illustration of suboptimal compensation that originates from 
the influence that executives exert on the executive compensation design.5 In this 
respect, Bebchuck et al. (2002) and Bebchuck & Fried (2004) refer to the prevalence 
of option plans that enable managers to reap benefits from performance increases due 
to industry or market trends (windfalls) instead of the use of indexed and/or 
performance-vested stock options. Bertrand & Mullainathan (2001) show that 
executive compensation responds to movements in oil prices, changes in industry-
specific exchange rates for firms in the traded goods sector, and year-to-year 
differences in mean industry performance. Moreover, they find that compensation is 
as sensitive to a lucky dollar (where luck is defind as changes in firm performance 
beyond the CEO’s control) as to a general dollar. Garvey & Milbourn (2006) show 
that performance benchmarks are used asymmetrically n executive compensation, i.e. 
executives are rewarded for good luck, but are to some extent insulated from bad 
luck.6 Moreover, Bebchuck & Fried (2003; 2004) predict that managers will extract 
more rents in situations and structures in which they ave more power. Consistent 
with this, Bertrand & Mullainathan (2001) document that better governed firms pay 
                                                                                                                             
firm performance than rents extracted, and rent extraction is unlikely to impede the firm’s access to 
equity capital, but only slightly raise the cost of equity (Bebchuck & Fried, 2003; 2004).   
3 Core et al. (2008) find no evidence of executive compensation decreasing following negative press 
coverage.   
4 Rents are defines as the excess compensation executives are able to extract because of their positional 
power relative to what executives would have received under a contract maximizing shareholder value.  
5 Hall & Liebman (1998) refer to the near complete absence of such mechanisms as a puzzle while for 
Abowd & Kaplan (1999) it represents an open question why executives are rewarded for doing nothing 
more than riding waves of strong bull markets. However, Murphy (2002) argues that the likelihood of a 
given stock to earn returns in excess of an index is far lower relative to likelihood of a non-indexed 
option to expire in the money, imposing more instead of less risk on the risk-averse recipients. Core et 
al., (2005) decompose the firm’s return in a market return (Rmarket) and a firm-specific return (Rfirm - 
Rmarket) where the market component reflects pay, not incentiv s.       
6 Likewise, Bebchuck & Fried (2002) refer to firms lowering the strike price of stock options when the 
stock price falls below the original exercise price, but firms rarely raise strike prices in rising markets.      
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less for luck. Garvey & Milbourn (2006) report that the asymmetry in the response of 
compensation to good versus bad luck is stronger when corporate governance is 
weaker. Core et al. (1999) show that CEO compensation is greater when corporate 
governance is less effective. Moreover, this excess pay is negatively associated with 
subsequent firm operating and market performance. 
Overall, Bebchuck et al. (2002; 2004) believe that t e managerial power perspective 
provides a superior explanation for patterns and practices of executive compensation 
relative to an optimal contracting perspective. However, optimal incentive contracting 
and managerial rents are not mutually incompatible n the sense that evidence of 
managerial power exerted does not rule out optimal contract design (Murphy, 2002; 
Weisbach, 2007). More particularly, in many settings where managerial power exists, 
contracts can anticipate and try to minimize these costs and therefore may in fact be 
written optimally (Core et al., 2005).7 Evidence of managerial power thus does not 
rule out the possibility that firms contract optimally. Only to the extent that excess pay 
following from the exertion of managerial power is a sociated with poor performance 
(as for example documented by Core et al., 1999), one provides evidence of 
managerial power beyond optimal contracting (Core et al., 2005).    
1.2 Outline  
This thesis consists of three empirical essays. Overall, this thesis aims to gain further 
understanding of the extent to which agency theory can help to explain specific 
patterns and practices of compensation design. This enables management accounting 
researchers to acquire deeper insight into the potential and boundaries of agency 
theory, and therefore to more accurately disentangle a ency theory from managerial 
power as alternative, though not necessarily competing, explanations for management 
accounting phenomena.  
At this point, I will briefly discuss the main findings of the three essays. 
My first essay is entitled The interplay between target setting and performance 
evaluation. First, this study examines the information that the firm incorporates in 
setting sales targets for their store managers. The firm employs an incentive system 
                                               
7 An optimal or efficient contract refers to a contract that maximizes the net expected economic value 
for residual claimants after transaction costs (e.g. contracting costs) and payment to agents given th 
contract environment. Optimality does not imply first-best efficiency.  
 
4 The incentive effects of performance measures and trget setting 
composed of quarterly bonus awards, contingent on sales target deviations, and an 
annual salary increase, contingent on subjective appraisal scores. The subjective 
appraisal scores convey information about the ability of store managers to comply 
with prescribed directives. The firm sets next-period sales target based on the sales 
target deviation in the current period (i.e. target ratcheting). It is documented that the 
firm ratchet targets in an asymmetric fashion, i.e. positive sales target deviations lead 
to a greater positive target update compared to the negative target update following 
negative sales target deviations. Moreover, I document that both current sales target 
deviations and information from subjective performance appraisals are used to set 
next-period sales targets. This enables the firm to set manager-specific sales targets, 
i.e. targets that are equally challenging for each manager in his or her own right. So, 
more or less equal incentives are imposed on all managers. The subjective appraisal 
scores are consistent with the sales potential of managers, i.e. appraisals contain 
information about the potential of each manager to improve performance given their 
past performance. The incentive system thus provides ncentives to managers to 
achieve the current sales target (bonus) and to consider future performance 
(compliance with directives). Finally, prior literature identified the ratchet effect (i.e. 
managers trade-off present gains against future losses from the assignment of higher 
targets) as an adverse effect of ratcheting. Despit limited leeway for managers to 
slow down performance (e.g. managers cannot tamper with accruals), I still find that 
managers who document a favorable intermediate performance slow down 
performance in the final months of the year.  
My second essay is entitled Managerial horizon and the choice for insiders versus 
outsiders: evidence of compensation structures of CEO successors. Here it is argued 
that outside CEO successors have a shorter manager horizon relative to inside CEO 
successors because of their greater outside employment opportunities (due to their 
more diversified human capital) and their tendency to quickly show results in an 
attempt to swiftly build reputation within their new firm. I examine, following 
contracting theory, to what extent firms use incentive compensation features to 
account for the potential distortion in the intertemporal decision-making with respect 
to the type of CEO succession (with efficient investment as benchmark). The results 
suggest that firms account for the horizon of CEO successors such that outside CEOs 
are subject to incentives that redirect attention t the long-term impact of their 
decisions. More specifically, firms aim to lengthen the horizon of these managers by 
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de-emphasizing bonuses (contingent on current earnings) while emphasizing long-
term compensation (contingent on future earnings and/or stock price) in the respective 
CEO incentive plans. 
My third essay is entitled Relative weights on nonfinancial performance measure  
and the incentive intensity of CEO bonus contracts: di entangling simultaneous 
cause-and-effect relations. This paper investigates the assertion from contracting 
theory that companies optimally provide weak incentives if they lack undistorted 
performance measures. Firms add nonfinancial measurs to their CEO bonus contracts 
when a sole reliance on financial measures would not be informative about the 
managerial effort. However, the inclusion of nonfinancial measures in the CEO bonus 
contract may possibly contribute little to the congruence of the overall performance 
measure due to the difficulty of adequately weighting the multiple financial and 
nonfinancial measures (e.g. due to the complex and ambiguous relation between 
nonfinancial measures and financial outcomes). Hence, this paper examines whether 
the potentially distortional nature of a bonus contract composed of both financial and 
nonfinancial measures prompt firms to decrease incentives provided through the 
bonus contract, or alternatively, whether firms wishing to provide stronger incentives 
decrease the relative weight of nonfinancial measures in the bonus contract. I find that 
firms that seek to provide strong incentives decrease the relative weight of 
nonfinancial measures in CEO bonus contracts. This coincides with prior literature 
that suggests that firms adjust for items in their r ported earnings to improve their 
financial summary performance measure. 
1.3 References 
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Chapter 2: The interplay between target setting and 
performance evaluation8 
2.1 Introduction 
This paper documents the target-updating process and the managers’ responses to this 
process for retail store managers over 4 successive accounting years. I find that the 
firm uses sales information and information from subjective performance appraisals to 
set next-period sales targets. I demonstrate that subjective performance appraisal 
outcomes are informative of future sales performance. I also find that target ratcheting 
leads managers to slow down their effort. 
Performance appraisals are essentially subjective in the firm I study. That is, there is 
no explicit target that determines performance apprisal outcome. The incentive 
literature maintains that subjective performance appr isal entails lenient and 
compressed performance ratings (e.g., Prendergast, 1999; Moers, 2005). This firm 
requires supervisors to apply a forced distribution of ‘good’, ‘mediocre’ and ‘bad’ in 
establishing performance appraisals. This feature provides us with a setting that 
controls for possible lenient and/or compressed performance appraisals. The evidence 
suggests that subjective assessments of managerial p formance (e.g. the extent to 
which managers provide timely performance-feedback to their employees) are used 
for target setting. That is, the firm combines prior sales information with subjective 
performance information to set sales targets. I also demonstrate that the subjective 
performance appraisal outcomes are associated with future sales performance. The 
analysis regarding subjective appraisals allows us to extend our understanding of 
Hayes and Schaefer (2000) who find a relation betwen current cash compensation 
and future performance. 
Indjejikian and Nanda (2002) point out that targets should contain all available 
information and that subsequent target deviations should not be correlated. However, 
in their sample they find evidence of serial correlation. Contrary to Indjejikian and 
Nanda (2002), I find no serial correlation between co secutive target deviations. I 
argue and demonstrate that this is because of target setting accuracy. The ability of 
managers to comply with prescribed directives aimed at increasing future sales levels 
                                               
8 This chapter is based on a working paper co-authored with Jan Bouwens (Tilburg University).  
 
8 The incentive effects of performance measures and trget setting 
is observed through the subjective performance appraisals. This approach enables the 
firm to set challenging manager-specific targets (Leone et al., 2004). Consistent with 
Indjejikian and Nanda (2002) and Merchant and Manzoni (1989), the performance 
appraisals are correlated over time. I argue that tis is because the future sales 
potential of managers is conveyed through the appraisals. Overall, the evidence 
suggests that all available information is impounded in the sales targets, motivating 
managers to exceed past sales performance in the curr nt period. Moreover, the 
subjective performance appraisals motivate managers to take measures in the current 
period that affect next-period financial performance. To my knowledge, the use of 
subjective appraisals to enhance target accuracy has not been documented in the 
literature before. I also believe that the distinct functions of bonus-determining targets 
(improve this year’s financial performance) and performance appraisals (increase 
next-period financial performance) have not been documented before.  
The managers in this firm acquire a bonus if they exce d their sales target. Next-
period sales targets are informed by past sales performance. The accounting literature 
has emphasized that target ratcheting leads managers to manipulate (measured) 
outcomes in order to mitigate the size of positive target updates (Leone and Rock, 
2002; Murphy, 2001). I study this phenomenon in a context where firm management 
makes it virtually impossible to manipulate measured outcomes, to find that managers 
resort to real activity manipulation (e.g. Roychowdhury, 2006; Eldenburg et al., 
2007). While managers can influence performance through price discounts, cutting 
back on expenditures (Roychowdhury, 2006), or through investment reductions 
(Eldenburg et al., 2007), here managers resort to effort reduction to impede target 
updating. Moreover, the access to monthly data enabl s me to ex-ante identify which 
particular manager has an interest in manipulating results. Prior research has 
identified ex-post conditions in which managers of a certain firm or unit may have 
benefited from result manipulation (e.g. Roychowdhury, 2006). Here, monthly sales 
target and target achievement data is collected to establish ex-ante whether managers 
have incentives for, and establish ex-post whether managers have actually engaged in, 
result manipulation. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the 
research setting and the firm’s theory on motivating store managers. Then I proceed to 
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discuss my observations of the target updating process that the firm deploys. The 
subsequent section describes how managers respond to the target-setting process. I 
then discuss the results and end with some concluding remarks. 
2.2 Research setting 
2.2.1 The firm and its stores 
The research site is a business unit of a Netherlands-based privately held retail firm 
under the name of Free Record Shop. They sell games, CD , DVDs and a range of 
goods and services associated with entertainment. The firm’s strategy is to maintain 
its market leadership within the Netherlands and also to strengthen its position as one 
of the major retailers in their branch in North-West Europe. In 2005 the firm ran about 
400 retail stores, employed 2500 people, and generated €400 million revenues. The 
business I study represents the firm’s main shop formula located in the Netherlands. 
The business unit comprises three geographical regions, and each region consists of a 
few clusters that each contain seven to nine stores. The empirical analyses in this 
study are based on nearly 200 retail stores that account for about 50% of total firm 
sales. Most retail stores are located in or near shopping centres, mostly in urban areas, 
and each outlet sells more or less the same merchandise. The firm’s accounting year 
differs from the calendar year and starts in October and ends in September. 
2.2.2 The target-setting process 
Sales play an important role in the firm’s target stting process. Targets are set on an 
annual basis, with the targets for the consecutive year set at the end of the prior 
accounting year. The overall sales target for the business unit is established on the 
basis of the actual sales and the financial goals for the coming period. The overall 
sales target is subsequently allocated over regions, clu ters, and stores in a top-down 
fashion. To enable close monitoring of store managers, the yearly sales target for each 
store is broken down into monthly sales targets. In this breakdown, the firm adjusts 
for seasonal patterns in sales (e.g. a busy Christmas season). This seasonal pattern is 
considered to be uniform across retail stores given that stores face similar economic 
conditions and have similar product lines.9 Senior management believes that this 
                                               
9 In order to test the assertion of uniformity of sea onal patterns across stores, I regress actual sales in 
the current month on actual sales in the previous month for each store while including year dummies 
and adjusting for clustered standard errors. The results substantiate the intuition provided by senior 
management regarding the homogeneity of seasonal patterns across stores. For instance, retail stores 
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target-setting process produces more or less equally accurate sales targets for all 
months.10 Finally, the sales target for each retail store serves as input for the budgeted 
number of labor hours  
2.2.3 The firm’s incentive system 
The firm’s incentive system is primarily based on two components. First, a quarterly 
bonus is awarded to store managers that is increasing in their sales performance and 
decreasing in their employment of labor hours. The bonus is a linear function of 
positive sales target deviations calculated by comparing actual sales and target sales 
aggregated over the respective three months. The quarterly bonus payout is reduced 
linearly by the amount that store managers exceed th ir quarterly labor hours budget, 
with a lower bound of zero bonus payout. Meeting the labor budget as such does not 
make a store manager eligible for variable pay.11 Under the quarterly bonus payout 
schedule, managers may therefore receive bonuses from 0 to 4 quarters. On average 
10 percent of a store manager’s total pay originates from bonus payouts. Second, store 
managers are eligible for a yearly salary rise. Managers’ supervisors base this decision 
on the subjective performance appraisal conducted annually at the end of the 
accounting year. The appraisal score consists of tw equally-weighted dimensions: i) 
the manager’s performance in terms of sales and use of labor hours; and ii) the 
manager’s compliance with directives (e.g. the extent to which store managers support 
sales assistants in solving day-to-day problems).12 Supervisors award managers with 
an A if they comply in excellent fashion with firm directives, while a B and a C 
represent sufficient and insufficient compliance with directives, respectively. The 
supervisor also ranks the manager’s performance in t rms of sales and use of labor 
hours on a scale from 1 to 3, where 1 denotes an excell nt performance. Supervisors 
                                                                                                                             
experience a busy Christmas season reflected by a 1.44 increase in sales in December relative to 
November with a corresponding t-statistic of 31.75. The 12 regressions of current monthly sales on 
prior monthly sales yield a mean (median) t-statistic of 64.51 (50.17) (not tabulated). 
10 I test the assertion whether target accuracy systematically varies between months by computing 
monthly target deviations defined as the absolute value of the difference between actual monthly sales 
and the monthly sales target divided by the monthly sales target. Next, one-sided paired t-tests are 
performed for each of the 12 individual months to determine whether the mean-difference between the 
target accuracy for each individual month and the av r ge target accuracy of the remaining 11 months 
is significantly smaller than zero. The results do not reveal significantly lower target accuracy for the 
majority of the individual months. 
11 Bonuses are paid according to the following formula: if sales – sales target > 0; €46 * [(quarter sales 
– sales target) / sales target] + 1% * (quarter sales – sales target). The bonus is discounted for labor 
hour overruns: -22 Euro * (actual hours – budgeted hours) / budgeted hours. It is not permitted to 
deviate from this formula.  
12 A complete list of directives is reproduced in Appendix 1. 
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are forced to distribute their evaluations over theA1-C3 categories. The overall 
appraisal outcome determines the salary increase.  
2.2.4 The theory firm managers apply and the tests 
Top management assumes that stores on average perform 20% below sales capacity. 
The firm’s CFO stated this assumption as follows.13 
 
“On average all stores are working at 80% of capacity. Therefore it is difficult for 
me to accept any sales drop.” 
In addition, firm management believes that sales capa ity increases each year with the 
introduction of new products. Consequently, the 20% slack would increase each year 
if store managers fail to increase sales. Firm management explicitly communicated 
that past sales performance plays an important role in the target setting process. This 
is consistent with economics literature that identifies three sources for target setting: 
past performance, technical study, and peer reviews (Murphy, 2001).  
The firm believes that exclusively providing (bonus) incentives through the sales 
performance measure may result in hard-selling (Thevaranjan et al., 2000), which 
could subsequently decrease customer satisfaction and future sales levels. The firm 
therefore maintains strong opinions on how to improve sales performance and 
translates these opinions into directives. For example, the firm emphasizes customer 
satisfaction, but acknowledges that merely rewarding customer satisfaction may not 
contribute to firm value, since there are simply too many ways to increase customer 
satisfaction without increasing profits (Baker, 200; Dikolli & Sedatole, 2007). The 
firm is convinced, for instance, that without managers providing timely performance 
feedback to sales assistants, sales levels and customer satisfaction levels are bound to 
deteriorate. Hence, providing feedback to assistant is a directive imposed on the store 
manager. While all directives are equal for each store manager in wording, it is up to 
the supervisor to decide on the extent to which each store manager complies with the 
directives. Merchant (1985) argues that prescribed behaviour is called for if the store 
manager is unaware or unwilling to ascertain how to affect firm performance. For this 
                                               
13 The results of my quantitative analyses are supported by qualitative information from interviews with 
senior management and an investigation of internal documents. Interview transcripts are approved. At 
three different stages during the analysis and write-up of the paper, the interpretation of the results has 
been discussed with, and approved by, senior management.  
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reason supervisors visit stores to ascertain that store managers actually comply with 
the directives. Thus, compliance with the prescribed directives is part of the annual 
subjective performance appraisal. This is consistent with literature that suggests that 
such measures are indicators of current and future pe formance (Hauser et al., 1994; 
Ittner et al., 1997; Ittner and Larcker 1998; Banker et al., 2000; Sedatole, 2003; 
Bryant et al., 2004; Ittner and Larcker 2005; Abernethy et al., 2008) and as such can 
improve contracting efficiency and motivate managers to undertake value-creating 
actions. Compliance with directives and the performance in terms of sales and use of 
labor hours each account for 50% of the overall subjective performance assessment.   
Consistent with findings of Leone et al. (2004), firm management maintains that 
targets should challenge each store manager individually. I investigate whether targets 
are geared to challenge specific managers and what comprises a challenging 
performance target. While the economics literature more or less ignores manager-
specific target levels, goal-setting literature hasestablished a large body of research 
that is primarily based on experiments (see Locke & Latham, 2002 for an excellent 
review of this literature). The main thrust of this literature is that managers are best 
motivated with targets that are challenging, meaning that managers qualify these 
targets as difficult but attainable (Fisher et al., 2003). However, the empirical 
evidence of Indjejikian and Nanda (2002) and Merchant and Manzoni (1989) suggests 
that targets are highly attainable in that managers attaining the current target are also 
likely to exceed the next period target. Both the goal-setting and the economic 
literature pay little attention to how management actu lly establishes the target at firm 
level. The literature has been particularly mute on what the information sources for 
target setting are. As the firm performs annual subjective appraisals partly contingent 
on the ability of store managers to comply with directives, I examine whether this 
information is incorporated during the target setting process. During the interviews, 
firm management was able to point out very good and poor performers. They asserted 
that in many cases store managers retained their relative position vis-à-vis their 
colleagues in terms of the performance appraisal and bo us. I test whether the control 
system in place produces the expected results, i.e. I valuate whether current 
compliance with directives is associated with future sales. This would be consistent 
with Hayes and Schaefer (2000), who found that bonuses that have no association 
with current performance are predictive of future performance.  
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2.2.5 Data collection and descriptive statistics 
I collected monthly sales data and quarterly labor h ur data over a period of 58 
months (16 quarters) starting from October 2000. Sales nd labor hours data were 
electronically obtained from corporate headquarters’ general ledgers. Each year 
consists of 200 individual store observations, with 12 observations excluded in each 
year because operations were discontinued. I omitted ncomplete observations from 
the sample (e.g. 10 monthly observations for actual sales and 12 monthly observations 
for target sales). I manually collected staffing data from HR-records from October 
2001 to March 2005. I excluded observations of retail s ores featuring more than one 
manager within an accounting year. I collected manager’s performance appraisals 
spanning three years, i.e. October 2001 to September 2004. Only retail store managers 
operating for a full year receive a subjective performance appraisal. Documents 
regarding general strategy, incentive compensation and performance evaluation and 
meetings with senior management and corporate staff provide qualitative data about 
research issues.14 Descriptive statistics on the main variables are presented in Table 1. 
In terms of store managers’ performance, the mean (median) sales target deviation is 
about zero (€5K), while 46% of the managers report a negative sales target deviation. 
The mean (median) sales target update is €54K (€52K), while in 17% of the cases the 
sales target is adjusted downward consistent with the assumption that on average 
retail stores exhibit slack. In addition, compared to last year the mean (median) sales 
change is €51K (€45K), while 16% of managers show negative sales changes. The 
vast majority of the store managers (70%) do not exce d constraints with respect to 
the maximum number of labor hours. The average negative labor hours target 
deviation amounts to 218 hours. The majority of the managers have a bonus payout 
(78%). The bonus is paid out on a quarterly basis. 20%, 17%, 20% and 21% of the 
managers earn a bonus over 4, 3, 2 and 1 quarter(s) r spectively (not tabulated). The 
mean bonus payout is about 10% of managers’ wages, while the mean career-specific 
salary increase equals 2% of managers’ wages. Finally, the fraction of managers who 
receive a bonus decreases throughout the year from 58% in the first quarter, 50% in 
the second quarter, 48% in the third quarter, and the s rongest decline in the fourth 
and final quarter (i.e. 35% of positive bonus payouts) (not tabulated).     
                                               
14
 We could only inspect these documents at the research site. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Sales target deviation denotes the actual sales minus target sales, % store managers with negative sales t rget 
deviation denotes the fraction of store managers with a sales target deviation < 0, sales target update enotes the 
sales target in period t+1 minus sales target in period t, % store managers with negative sales target update denotes 
the fraction of store managers with a sales target update < 0, sales change denotes the actual sales in p riod t minus 
actual sales in period t-1, % store managers with negative sales change denotes the fraction of store managers with a 
sales change < 0, labor hours target deviation denotes the actual labor hours minus target labor hours, % store 
managers who exceed maximum labor hours denotes the fraction of store managers with a labor hours target 
deviation > 0, bonus payout denotes the fraction of managers with bonus > 0, bonus as percentage of wage denotes 
the mean bonus expressed as percentage of yearly wage (excl. bonus), and salary rise denotes the career specific 
increase in salary.  
Measure Mean Median Std.dev. Min Max 
Target sales (€) 844968 760000 398835 183120 3565980 
Actual sales (€) 844939 763731 394689 226890 3000000 
Target labor hours 5925 5415 1800 2879 16466 
Actual labor hours 5712 5146 1886 3378 16358 
Sales target deviation (€) -29 5127 96956 -707769 565980 
% Store managers with negative 
sales target deviation  
46 -- -- -- -- 
Sales target update (€) 54212 52000 113059 -430071 1500000 
% Store managers with negative 
sales target update  
17 -- -- -- -- 
Sales change 51296 45132 114079 -713241 1601860 
% Store managers with negative 
sales change 
16 -- -- -- -- 
Labor hours target deviation -218 -223 676 -2611 5560 
% Store managers who exceed 
maximum labor hours (%) 
30 -- -- -- -- 
Bonus payout (%) 78 -- -- -- -- 
Bonus (% salary) 10 7 12 0 138 
Salary rise (% salary) 2 -- -- 0 5 
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Table 2: Store managers’ achievement and firm’s responses 
Performance appraisal scores on financial performance (vertical) and directive compliance (horizontal). 
Each entry provides information on the number of stre managers with the respective performance 
appraisal score, the number of store managers with a bonus payout > 0, the mean sales target deviation 
defined as actual sales minus target sales, the mean sales change defined as actual sales in period t 
minus actual sales in period t-1, labor hours target deviation defined as actual labor hours minus target 
labor hours, bonus (% salary) denotes the average bonus expressed as percentage of yearly salary (excl. 
bonus), salary rise denotes the career specific salary increase, and sales target update denotes sales 
target in period t+1 minus sales target in period t. C1 and A3 appraisal scores are notawarded. 
 Directive compliance score A B C 
Financial 
Score 
    
1 Number of obs. 23 28 0 
 Bonus pay outs (%) 95% 93%  
 Sales target deviation (%) 9.71 4.74  
 Sales change (%) 14.89 10.84  
 Labor hours target deviation (%) -6.39 -7.07  
 Bonus (% salary) 17.20 11.06  
 Salary rise (%) 5.1 3.4  
 Sales target update (%) 15.90 11  
_______ ________________________ ______ _______ _____ 
2 Number of obs. 57 172 12 
 Bonus pay outs (%) 89% 75% 50% 
 Sales target deviation (%) 3.52 11.88 -9.71 
 Sales change (%) 8.07 5.83 -3.42 
 Labor hours target deviation (%) -2.65 -3.40 -1.76 
 Bonus (% salary) 10.46 9.30 0.83 
 Salary rise (%) 3.4 1.7 0 
 Sales target update (%) 10.01 8.72 -4.11 
_______ ________________________ ______ _______ _____ 
3 Number of obs. 0 23 13 
 Bonus pay outs (%)  65% 54% 
 Sales target deviation (%)  -1.08 -6.27 
 Sales change (%)  4.27 -22.13 
 Labor hours target deviation (%)  2.03 -7.99 
 Bonus (% salary)  8.62 5.74 
 Salary rise (%)  0 0 
 Sales target update (%)  7.31 3.15 
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In Table 2, I summarize variable pay and performance appraisal data. It appears that 
in order to get a top-level appraisal on the financi l dimension, it does not require 
managers to substantially exceed targets. While the top financial performers’ 
deviations from sales targets are 9.71% and 4.74%, the deviations are 3.52% and 
11.88% for those managers that received a mediocre s ore on the subjective 
assessment of the financial dimension. However, the sal s changes are 14.89% and 
10.82% respectively for the top financial performers while the sales changes are 
8.07% and 5.83% for the second-ranked financial performers. Thus, sales targets that 
top financial performers face may be equally challenging as the targets facing the 
second ranked financial performers.  
In Table 3, I provide further details of performance appraisals (Panel A) and target 
achievement (Panel B). Panel B of Table 3 shows that there is no serial correlation of 
target deviations over time (ρ = 0.07, p<0.32). This implies that the likelihood f store 
managers attaining the target is independent of past target deviations. In other words, 
each store manager has equal probability of attaining his specific sales target. This 
suggests that the firm succeeds in setting targets tha  are challenging for each manager 
in their own right. While serial correlation in target achievement is absent, subjective 
performance appraisals are correlated over time (Table 3, panel A: ρ = 0.45, p<0.01). 
These results imply that talented managers are identified and rewarded for superior 
performance over subsequent periods. This begs the following questions: (1) how are 
targets updated, and (2) does this updating process work in the sense that managers 
perform activities that help the firm achieves its sales growth objective? That is, is it 
true that the best performers according to the performance appraisals system achieve 
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Table 3: Appraisal scores and target achievement over consecutive periods 
Persistence of appraisal scores and target deviations across consecutive periods. Appraisals in Panel A are the same over 
consecutive periods if the combination of sales and compliance scores are equal over two or three periods. Correlations 
in panel A are calculated over 5 appraisal scores: 1=A1, 2=(A2 or B1), 3=B2, 4=(B3 or C2) and 5=C3. Target deviations 
are considered the same if the store manager exceeded the target over two or three consecutive periods. Correlations in 
Panel B are calculated over dummy variables where the dummy equals one if actual sales ≥ ales target, zero otherwise. 
Panel A: Performance Appraisals  
  Comparison 
Appraisals:  t and t+1 
Comparison Appraisals: 
t+1 and t+2 
Comparison Appraisals:  
t, t+1 and t+2 
Equal appraisal 42% 54% 20% 
Different appraisal 58% 46% 80%  
Total 
  
100% 100% 100% 
Pearson correlations of consecutive appraisals: = 0.45 (p<0.01) 
Panel B: Sales target attainment (i.e. actual  sales ≥ sales target) 
 Comparison target 
attainment: 
 t and t+1 
Periods 
t+1 and t+2 
Periods 
t, t+1 and  t+2 
Attain (exceed) target 46% 50% 22% 
Sub target 54% 50% 78% 
Total 
 
100% 100% 100% 
Pearson correlations of consecutive sales target att inments: 0.07 (p=0.312) 
2.3 Target updates and store management appraisal 
In this section I examine how the firm uses the control system to motivate store 
managers. The firm uses financial targets to evaluate performance and to determine 
variable pay. The firm additionally imposes directives on retail store managers. In this 
section I establish how sales target deviations and compliance with directives affect 
future targets. I also aim to establish whether top management’s distinction between 
top, mediocre and bottom level retail store managers du ing the subjective appraisals 
is consistent with the sales potential of those store managers. 
2.3.1 Target ratcheting 
The firm identifies store managers’ sales talent through past sales performance and 
uses this information to set sales targets. Once a store sets a ‘store record’, firm 
management assumes this level to be the least performance the retail store can achieve 
(Murphy, 2001; Leone et al., 2004). The firm sets targets asymmetrically such that 
underperformance compared to the target will prompt to  management to decrease 
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next-year targets to a lesser extent than that the targ ts are ratcheted up subsequent to 
a favorable store performance.15 To examine the magnitude of asymmetric target 
ratcheting empirically, I use the following model: 
TARGET_UPDATEi,t = β0 + β1DEV_TARGETi,t + β2 ADV i,t*DEV_TARGETi,t  
+ β3 ADV i,t + ui,t,           (1) 
where TARGET_UPDATEi,t represents the change in target sales for store i from
period t+1 relative to period t (i.e. TARGETi,t+1 – TARGETi,t), DEV_TARGETi,t 
denotes the sales performance for store i in period t compared to the target (i.e. actual 
salesi,t – sales targeti,t),  and ADVi,t is an indicator variable equal to 1 if actual sale > 
target sales for year t for store i, zero otherwise. The impact of positive sales target 
deviations on subsequent target changes is represented by the coefficient β1. The 
impact of adverse target deviations on the subsequent target changes is represented by 
the sum of coefficients β1 and β2. Therefore, empirical tests for asymmetric target 
ratcheting imply testing for a statistically significant coefficient for β2. The regression 
equations are estimated through OLS using 48 months of actual and targeted sales 
data starting from October 2000.16 The results for the full sample are reported in Table 
4.17 The coefficient for positive target deviations (β1) is positive and significant 
(p<0.01). The coefficient that represents the asymmetry in target ratcheting between 
positive and negative target deviations (β2) is negative and significant (p<0.01). The 
sum of coefficients (β1+β2) representing the relation between negative sales t rget 
deviations and next period’s target change is significant at the p<0.01 level, based on 
an F-test of the sum of coefficients. The results are indicative of asymmetric target 
ratcheting. A positive deviation from the sales target of 100 is associated with a 
subsequent target increase of 117, while a negative deviation of 100 results in a 
subsequent target decrease of 92. Thus, targets are ratcheted up more following a 
positive sales target deviation than targets are ratcheted downward following negative 
sales target deviations. The high explanatory power and F-value indicate that the 
model is highly significant (p<0.01). The results remain significant if I employ a 
                                               
15
 The firm sets store level targets and does not disaggregate targets any further. 
16 Standard errors of observations from the same store may not be independent, i.e. residuals may be 
correlated across years (time series dependence) for a given retail outlet. For all the analyses, clustered 
standard errors are used that are unbiased as they account for residual dependence created by panel data 
structure (Petersen, 2009). Clustered standard errors account for general forms of heteroskedasticity.  
17
 For both models one influential observation (Cook’s D >1) is excluded from the regression analyses.  
 
19 Chapter 2: The interplay between target setting and performance evaluation
scaled model where both TARGET_UPDATE and DEV_TARGET are divided by the 
sales target in period t (not tabulated).  
Table 4 reports the results of our regression model for five portfolios partitioned on 
the magnitude of the sales target deviations. The five portfolios range from the 
smallest (positive and negative) sales target deviations to the largest (positive and 
negative) target deviations. We observe variation in ratcheting parameters across sales 
target deviation size. That is, both high and low positive sales target deviations result 
in positive adjustments of next-year sales targets, while only large negative target 
deviations result in downward adjustments of subsequent sales targets. Both small and 
large positive target deviations thus impact the next-y ar sales target, while only large 
negative deviations are impounded in subsequent sales t rgets. In Table 4, the sum of 
β1 and β2-coefficients are positive only from the > 60% portf lio (1.75 - 0.88 and 1.15 
- 0.21, respectively). In all other cases (low) negative target deviations are ignored. 
This is consistent with Leone et al. (2006) who argue that firms adjust targets upward 
following above-target performance from controllable (effort) or uncontrollable 
(exogenous shocks) factors, but firms only adjust targets downward following 
substandard performance to the extent that results can be attributed to uncontrollable 
factors. In this sample, small negative deviations are considered to result from 
substandard managerial effort while large negative target deviations are considered to 
result from factors extending beyond the manager’s influence. The β2-coefficient 
representing asymmetry in target setting is significant in all analyses.18 
                                               
18 It may be argued that, given how managers differ in terms of their ability to achieve sales growth, 
the firm bases target updates on sales growth rather than on target deviations. We assume that: (i) the 
current target is impacted by actual sales in the prior period such that current targets in most cases 
exceeds prior sales levels; and (ii) the degree to which sales targets exceeds prior sales depend on 
whether the store reports a positive or negative prior sales change. We test the following model:  
TARGET_UPDATEi,t = β0 + β1DEV_SALESi,t + β2ADV i,t*DEV_SALESi,t + β3ADV i,t + ui,t, where 
DEV_SALESi,t equals (salest - salest-1) and ADVi,t is an indicator variable equal to 1 if salest < salest-1 
for year t for store i, zero if not. The results show that positive changes of 100 prompt management to 
ratchet targets upward with 94, while negative sales changes of 100 lead to downward adjustments of 
117 (not tabulated). Both positive and negative sals changes ultimately lead to sales targets that do not 
exceed prior sales. Consistent with interviews with firm management that establish that sales target 
deviations are used as basis for target ratcheting, the explanatory power of this model is considerably 
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Table 4: Asymmetric target ratcheting for full sample/subsamples 
This table presents the analyses of the target updating process for the full sample and for five equal-size portfolios classified by absolute target deviation magnitude.  I run a 
pooled OLS regression of target updates. The model has the following specification: 
TARGET_UPDATEt = β0 + β1DEV_TARGETt + β2 ADV t*DEV_TARGETt+ β3 ADV t + ut   
TARGET_UPDATEt denotes the change in the sales target from period t+1 relative to period t, DEV_TARGETt-1 denotes the deviation from the sales target in period t, and 
ADV t is an indicator variable equal to one if the sales target deviation < 0 in period t, zero otherwise. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses based on clustered standard 




Portfolio’s Full sample 0-20% 20-40% 40-60% 60-80% 80-100% 
       





(-2.26) (-0.04) (-0.54) (1.72) 





(9.44) (7.07) (6.66) (12.76) 












       
ADV t -468 12798 4952 -35590**  21430 -5902 
 (-0.12) (1.31) (0.60) (-2.26) (1.50) (-0.38) 
       
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
F-test (β1 + β2 = 0) 406.80***  0.00 4.42**  1.12 85.93***  203.73***  
       
R2 0.83 0.35 0.82 0.78 0.89 0.94 
F-statistic 644.42***  9.98***  62.81***  92.43***  284.49***  541.23***  
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2.3.2 Compliance with directives and sales 
In addition to the sales targets, the firm deploys directives that are purportedly related 
to sales. I investigate in this section whether stoe managers who demonstrate greater 
compliance with directives are subjected to higher sales targets.  
Compliance with directives and target setting 
Indjejikian and Nanda (2002) suggest that managers take all available information 
into account when updating targets. While the firm does not set explicit targets for 
directives, firm management believes that directive compliance is informative about 
the manager’s ability to comply with prescribed directives and therefore to report 
higher future sales. This suggests that superiors take compliance scores into account 
when setting sales target for the subsequent period. I examine whether sales targets 
are informed by directive compliance using the following model: 
 
TARGET_UPDATEi,t = φ0 + φ1DEV_TARGETi,t + φ2COMPLIANCE_Gi,t  
+ φ 3COMPLIANCE_Mi,t  + wi,t,       (2) 
where COMPLIANCE_Gi,t is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the store manager of 
retail store i received a favorable evaluation on cmpliance with directives (i.e. A) at 
the end of period t, zero if not, and COMPLIANCE_Mi,t is an indicator variable equal 
to 1 if the manager of retail store i received a sufficient evaluation on compliance with 
directives (i.e. B) at the end of period t, zero otherwise. This analysis is restricted to 
observations that have the same manager for retail store i in the consecutive year. I 
expect: φ2 > 0 and φ3 > 0. Regression equations are estimated using OLS with 36 
months of actual and target sales data, data about ratings on compliance with 
directives, and store manager-staffing data starting from October 2001.19 Table 5 
reports the empirical results of model 2. The coefficient that reflects the association 
between a favorable evaluation score and subsequent target change (φ2) is positive 
and significant (p<0.07). A favorable compliance evaluation over period t is 
associated with a subsequent target change of €31K. This result suggests that top 
management takes compliance scores into account when updating targets. Firm 
management measures the talent of store managers to increase sales in compliance 
with directives. The results remain significant if I employ a scaled model where both 
                                               
19 We analyze this with 36 months because we have performance appraisal data over a 3-year period. 
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TARGET_UPDATE and DEV_TARGET are divided by the sales target in period t 
(not tabulated). Taken together, the results suggest that top management indeed takes 
subjective appraisal scores into account when setting next-period sales targets.  
The results suggest that subjectivity could be viewed from a different perspective than 
documented in earlier work. Prior studies show thatsuperiors are inclined to attach 
more weight to objective and common measures of performance than to subjective 
measures, leading to an underutilization of subjectiv  measures (e.g. Ittner et al., 
2003; Lipe & Salterio, 2000). Moreover, Lazear (1999) and Moers (2005) document 
that performance measure diversity ‘leads to more lenient performance ratings and 
less differentiation among employees.’ While it has been recognized that subjective 
performance measures may reduce measurement noise (Laz ar, 1999), I document 
that the subjective information is used to set the next-period target. The variation in 
targets evolving from this process expresses the pot ntial of each retail store manager 
to improve performance given their past performance. Firm management assumes that 
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Table 5: Impact of compliance with directives on target setting 
Table reports regression estimates from a pooled OLS regression of the following model: 
TARGET_UPDATEt = φ0 + φ1DEV_TARGETt + φ2COMPLIANCE_Gt + φ3 
COMPLIANCE_Mt  + wt 
TARGET_UPDATEt denotes the change in target sales from period t+1 relative to period t, 
DEV_TARGETt denotes sales target deviation in period t, COMPLIANCE_Gt is an indicator variable 
equal to one if the store manager received a favorable score in compliance on directives in period t, 
zero otherwise, and COMPLIANCE_Mt is an indicator variable equal to one if the store manager 
received a sufficient score in compliance on directv s in period t, zero otherwise. T-statistics are 
reported in parentheses based on clustered standard erro s that take into account heteroskedasticity and 




Model specification Prediction  
   
Intercept  41336***  
  (4.10) 
 
DEV_TARGETt  0.95***  
  (14.51) 
 
COMPLIANCE _Gt + 31117* 
  (1.84) 
 
COMPLIANCE _Mt + 15189 
  (1.51) 
   
Year dummies  Yes 
   
Number of obs.  152 
R2  0.77 
F-statistic  129.44***  
2.3.3 Stickiness in performance appraisals 
Recall that I compared sales target updates for top financial performers and second-
ranked financial performers in Table 2. I observed that sales target deviations (sales 
changes) differ hardly (substantially) among top financial performers and second-
ranked financial performers. Table 3, Panel A suggests that managers are likely to 
stay in the same performance appraisal bracket (ρ = 0.45; p<0.01) over consecutive 
periods. This implies that store managers are likely to receive a similar appraisal over 
consecutive periods. I now test this association through multivariate analysis, i.e. to 
what extent does prior period appraisal explain current appraisals if I control for the 
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objective measures of current performance (i.e. sales target deviation and labor hours 
target deviation).  I test this with the following equation:  
APPRAISALi,t = α 0 + α1DEV_TARGETi.t + α2DEV_LABORTARGETi,t  
+ α3APPRAISALi,t-1  + ei,t,        (3) 
 
where APPRAISALi,t denotes the appraisal score of the store manager of r tail store i 
in period t, APPRAISALi,t-1 denotes the appraisal score of the store manager of r tail 
store i in period t-1, and DEV_TARGETi,t and DEV_LABORTARGETi,t denote the 
sales target deviation and labor hours target deviation of the store manager in retail 
store i in period t. This analysis is restricted to observations that have the same store 
manager for store i as in the previous year. Regression equations are estimated using 
OLS with 36 months of actual and target sales data, actual and target labor hours data, 
data about ratings on compliance with directives, and store manager-staffing data 
starting from October 2001. I present the results of he analysis in Table 6. 
The results suggest that, controlling for target achievement on the objective measures, 
the past subjective performance appraisal is strongly associated with the current 
subjective appraisals (α3 = 0.41, p<0.01). This suggests that the performance ppraisal 
contains predictive information of future performance appraisals. This begs the 
question as to whether or not appraisals are informative of future sales performance.  
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Table 6: Persistence in performance appraisal scores 
Table reports regression estimates from a pooled OLS regression of the following model: 
APPRAISALt = α 0 + α1DEV_TARGETt + α2DEV_LABORTARGETt 
+ α3APPRAISALt-1 + et 
APPRAISALt denotes the performance appraisal score in period t, DEV_TARGETt denotes the 
deviation from the sales target in period t, and DEV_LABORTARGETt denotes the deviation from the 
targeted labor hours in period t. T-statistics are reported in parentheses based on clustered standard 
errors that take into account heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. *, ** , ***  is statistically significant at 




Model specification Prediction  
   
Intercept  1.58***  
  (5.41) 
 
DEV_TARGETt  0.00***  
  (4.23) 
 
DEV_LABORTARGETt  -0.00* 
  (-1.88) 
 
APPRAISALt-1 + 0.41***  
  (5.01) 
   
Year dummies  Yes 
   
Number of obs.  138 
R2  0.34 
F-statistic  13.44***  
Lagged effect of directive compliance on sales 
I examine whether compliance scores of store managers ar  positively associated with 
sales performance in the subsequent year. Because of limited data availability, I 
examine the predictive ability of directive compliance scores between one and six 
months after the last reporting period. Note that subjective appraisal outcomes are 
determined just after a new accounting period commences (i.e. before the end of 
October). The lag I examine is consistent with previous studies which argue that a 
frequent repurchase cycle and relatively low customer switching costs imply short 
time lags between the experience of customers and observed changes in purchase 
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behaviour and therefore economic performance (Ittner a d Larcker, 1998). I test the 
following levels model.20 
∆FSALESi,t+1 = λ0 + λ1COMPLIANCE_Gi,t + λ2COMPLIANCE_Mi,t + µi,t, (4) 
where ∆FSALESi,t+1 denotes the change in sales for store i from the first one up to six 













mti AA , where A denotes actual sales, t+1 and t denote budget 
year t+1 and budget year t respectively, and m denotes monthly periods in the 
respective budget year with m = 1, .., 12) for store i. This analysis is restricted to those 
observations that have the same store manager for store i in the subsequent year. I 
expect that λ1 > 0 and λ2 > 0. The regression equation (4) is estimated using OLS with 
42 months of actual and targeted sales and labor hou s data, data about ratings on 
compliance with directives, and store manager staffing data from October 2001. 
The results presented in Table 7 provide support for he conclusion that the talent of 
store managers to comply with directives is positively associated with future sales 
performance in their stores. Favorable appraisal score  (relative to unfavorable 
appraisals) are associated with sales increases of €11K, €18K, €24K, €26K, €32K, 
and €30K over the first up to six months following the subjective. While lower in 
magnitude, for store managers with sufficient evaluations I also document significant 
positive relations with future sales. Overall, I interpret this evidence consistent with 
the premise that the ability of store managers to comply with directives is positively 
associated with subsequent sales performance of retail stores. The results add to the 
findings reported by Hayes and Schaefer (2000) who find that managers are rewarded 
for good performance on measures observable only to contracting parties. Here, store 
managers are rewarded for compliance with directives by means of higher appraisal 
scores, where appraisal scores are positively associated with future sales performance.  
                                               
20 Since time series behaviour of sales can possibly be described by a random walk model, the resulting 
stochastic trend can cause some econometrical problems such as non-normal distributions of t-statistics 
and spurious regression (Verbeek, 2004). To address potential concerns, for the respective levels model 
we define the change in sales as the dependent variable instead of a specification with current sales s 
the dependent variable and lagged sales as an indepe nt variable.  
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Table 7: Impact of compliance of directives on subsequent sales 
Table reports regression estimates from a pooled OLS regression of the following model: 
∆FSALESt+1 = λ0 + λ1COMPLIANCE_Gt + λ2COMPLIANCE_Mt + µt  
∆FSALESt+1 represents sales change from the first one up to six month(s) of cumulative sales in period t+1 relative to the first one up to six month(s) of cumulative sales in 
period t, COMPLIANCE _Gt is an indicator variable equal to one if the store manager received a favorable score in compliance o directives in period t, zero otherwise, and 
COMPLIANCE_Mt is an indicator variable equal to one if the store manager received a sufficient score in the compliance in period t, zero otherwise. T-statistics are repo ted 
in parentheses based on clustered standard errors. *, ** , ***  is statistically significant at respectively 10%, 5%, and 1% level (two-tailed). 
Dependent variable  ∆FSALESt+1 for first 1 to 6 consecutive month(s) 
 
Model specification Prediction First month 
 
First 2 months First 3 months First 4 months First 5 months  First 6 months 
Intercept  -6153***  -19618***  -21153***  -31435 -49337***  -58027 
  (-3.15) (-5.15) (-3.49) (-4.07) (-5.29) 
 
(-5.44) 
COMPLIANCE _Gt + 10567***  17693***  23994***  26240***  32005***  30189**  
  (4.03) (3.88) (3.35) (3.00) (3.16) 
 
(2.54) 
COMPLIANCE _Mt + 8782***  14228***  20200***  22595***  27672***  28477***  
  (4.24) (3.53) (3.08) (2.76) (2.89) (2.64) 
        
Year dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
Number of obs.  218 218 218 218 218 218 
R2  0.16 0.31 0.19 0.22 0.31 0.30 
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Are appraisals rightly sticky? 
One remaining issue is whether the firm’s management rightly provides favorable, 
sufficient, and unfavorable appraisal scores that mintain over time.  That is, are the 
managers with high performance appraisals indeed th same managers that advance 
sales to the expected levels? I therefore test whether store managers who show good 
sales performance in one period continue to show relativ ly better (sales) performance 
over the subsequent periods. If this is the case, store managers retain their rank for 
good reasons in that they improve performance over consecutive periods of time. I 
test this by regressing sales changes on lagged sales changes (∆SALESi,t = δ0 + 
δ1∆SALESi,t-1 + zi,t), while including year dummies and employment of clustered 
standard errors. I test whether δ1>0. I find a significant relation (δ1=0.20; p<0.06) 
between sales changes over periods (not tabulated). So, compared to their colleagues, 
store managers who demonstrate large (small) sales increases in one period are likely 
to persist in achieving relative high (low) sales increases over time. This evidence 
confirms the rationale for managers staying in the same performance appraisal bracket 
and supports the idea that, despite the subjectivity nvolved in the performance 
appraisal process, the firm rightly discriminates btween ‘good’ and ‘bad’ performers.  
Taken together, the results suggest that the target is s t conditional on past effort so as 
to motivate managers to achieve increasing sales lev ls. Managers are best motivated 
if on average they are likely to exceed the target. 
Conclusion on the interplay of subjective appraisals nd targets 
Taken together, the results are related to the findings of Indjejikian and Nanda (2002) 
who find an association between current and future target attainment. However, Table 
3, panel B suggests that current and future target attainment are not associated in this 
setting. This finding is consistent with the intuition that Indjejikian and Nanda (2002) 
propose, i.e. that target updates contain all information allowing each store manager to 
have an equal probability of target attainment. Thefirm uses both information from 
prior sales performance and subjective appraisals to e  challenging targets for all 
managers. That is, managers who receive high appraisal scores report the highest sales 
changes, not the highest sales target deviations (Table 2). Moreover, I document 
significant associations between consecutive appraisal scores (Table 3, panel A and 
Table 6). The firm management’s distinction during the subjective appraisals between 
top, mediocre and bottom level managers is consistent with the sales potential of those 
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managers. That is, appraisals contain information about the potential of each manager 
to improve performance given their past performance. So the system simultaneously 
gives incentives for the store manager to attain the current sales target (bonus) and to 
consider future performance (i.e. directive compliance). In other words, managers 
have an equal probability of attaining the target and the target is set to be challenging 
for each individual manager, while the appraisals direct the store manager’s attention 
to the next-period sales. Hence, in terms of Indjejikian and Nanda (2002) next-period 
targets do indeed contain all information. However, the current year subjective 
appraisal of managers already values the expected next-year sales performance.  
2.4 Adverse effects of the target setting process 
The results so far suggest that the target updating nd performance appraisal process 
is consistent with the firm’s objective to enhance sales levels over time. In this section 
I examine potential adverse effects of this target updating process. I examine in 
particular whether managers slow down sales to manage future targets downwards. I 
find that managers engage in undesirable behaviour under target ratcheting. Store 
managers that perform particularly well during the first three quarters tend to slow 
down sales in the final quarter.  
Managerial effort reduction 
The use of past performance to determine future targe s is prevalent in many firms 
(Murphy, 2000; Leone & Rock, 2002: Leone et al., 2004). A possible effect of target 
ratcheting is that managers take measures to manager future targets down (Weitzman, 
1980; Murphy, 2001; Leone and Rock, 2002) That is, favorable current performance 
entails higher variable pay but it may also jeopardize future bonuses and performance 
appraisals. Hence managers face a trade-off between pr sent rewards and future losses 
because of higher targets. That is, bonuses contingent on ratcheted targets provide an 
incentive-based rationale for income smoothing (Holthausen et al., 1995). Murphy 
(2001) and Zimmerman (2004) refer to this as the perverse incentive effects of budget 
ratcheting. Leone and Rock (2002) show evidence of divisional managers using 
income-decreasing accruals to offset earnings improvements in a sample of firms that 
have adopted target ratcheting. Murphy (2000) found in firms that apply ratcheted 
standards that managers who do particularly well in the first three quarters produce 
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the lowest net income share in the final quarter compared to firms that use external 
standards (e.g. target based on peer performance).   
Here this research setting deviates in important aspect  from prior studies. That is, the 
firm makes it difficult for store managers to manipulate outcomes in that they are 
provided very limited leeway to manipulate results. First, the system does not allow 
store managers to create discretionary accruals. Store managers operate cash registers 
where sales are recorded and paid for instantaneously and store managers are not 
involved in bookkeeping. Murphy (2000) shows income smoothing for net income but 
not for sales and explains this through the stronger control that managers have over 
accounting phenomena (e.g. accruals) than they haveover the timing of cash flows. 
Second, the discretion of store managers is restricted to day-to-day operations within 
the retail store. Store managers have no discretion in terms of pricing and advertising. 
Oyer (1998) however identifies pricing as the most important means for sales people 
to directly influence customer purchase timing and therefore the distribution of sales 
across periods. The only viable way in which store managers can curtail sales is by 
means of slowing down real sales activities. However, even slowing down sales 
activities is curbed through the system. Store managers can e.g. decelerate the number 
of clients served per time unit or cross-sell fewer products. However, managers are 
closely monitored by their supervisors who pay visits to stores (sometimes without 
notice) on a regular basis and store-level sales ar tracked and compared with 
respective sales targets in a monthly fashion. In this way the firm makes it difficult for 
managers to manipulate outcomes, by leaving them very limited leeway to manipulate 
results.  
Store managers do slow down sales levels 
I examine whether or not store managers engage in ‘real sales management’ by 
slowing down sales at the end of the year if favorable sales performance occurred in 
the early months of the accounting year. I heed the argument developed by Brickley et 
al. (2004) who argue that adverse incentive effects of ratcheting could be mitigated 
through job rotation, since store managers will not be confronted with ratcheted-up 
standards in the subsequent year. Therefore, I make a distinction between: a) store 
managers who continue to operate as store manager in the current store; and b) store 
managers who leave the firm or transfer to another sto e as from the next period. 
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Potentially adverse incentive effects of asymmetric rat heting are tested empirically 
through the following model: 
SHAREi,t = γ0 + γ1DGYTDi,t + γ2DTRANSFi,t + γ3DGYTDi,t*DTRANSFi,t + vi,t,  (5)
  
where SHAREi,t denotes the final three, two and one month(s) share of yearly sales 











mti AA , where A denotes actual sales, t denotes 
the budget year t and m denotes monthly periods in the respective budget year t with 
m = 1, .., 12) for store i in year t. DGYTDi,t is an indicator variable equal to one if the 
sales performance relative to the sales target in the first nine, ten or eleven months of 












mti TA ) > 0 for store i in year t, zero 
otherwise, and DTRANSF is an indicator variable equal to one if the store manager 
transfers to another store, job or firm for store i in year t+1, zero otherwise. For the 
retail store managers that report favorable intermediat  performance and continue to 
operate as store manager (represented by γ1), I expect γ1 < 0. Relative to the reference 
category of managers that report unfavorable intermediate performance and continue 
to operate as store manager, the former group of store managers have an incentive to 
slow down sales in the final month(s). By giving up their bonus in the final quarter 
they increase the likelihood of earning positive bonuses in the four quarters of the 
successive budget year. Finally store managers that report favorable intermediate 
performance and do not continue to operate as storemanager do not have an incentive 
to slow down sales (since they will not be confronted with the target consequences of 
bonus-maximizing behaviour in the final quarter). Since I expect those managers to 
act in a similar vein relative to the reference category of managers that report 
unfavorable intermediate performance and continue to operate as store manager, I 
expect (γ1+ γ2+ γ3) = 0 and therefore γ3 > 0. Regression equation (4) is estimated 
through OLS using 36 months of actual and targeted sales data, and store manager 
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Table 8: Managerial effort reduction following target ratcheting 
Table reports regression estimates from a pooled OLS regression of the following model: 
SHAREt = γ0 + γ1DGYTDt + γ2DTRANSFt + γ3DGYTDt*DTRANSFt + vt   
SHARE denotes the final three, two and one month(s) share of yearly sales, DGYTD is an indicator 
variable equal to one if the cumulative sales target deviation over the first nine, ten or eleven months > 
0, zero otherwise, and DTRANSF is an indicator variable equal to one if the store manager transfers to 
another store/job/firm in the subsequent year, zero otherwise. T-statistics are reported in parentheses 
that are based on clustered standard errors that take into account heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. 
*, ** , ***  is statistically significant at respectively 10%, 5%, and 1% level (two-tailed). 
Dependent variable 
 
 Share of yearly sales 
Model specification Prediction For the final 
3 months 
For the final 
2 months 
For the final 
month   
     
Intercept  0.2366***  0.1566***  0.0737***  
  (103.98) (109.87) (78.87) 
 
DGYTD - - 0.0015 - 0.0027* - 0.0034***  
  (-0.64) (-1.75) (-3.52) 
 
DTRANSF  0.0004 -0.0009 -0.0025 
  (0.10) (-0.38) (-1.56) 
 
DGYTD* + 0.0078 0.0071**  0.0059***  
DTRANSF  (1.66) (2.36) (3.31) 
     
Year dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
     
F-test (γ1 + γ2 + γ3  = 0)  2.99* 2.04 0.00 
F-test (γ2 + γ3  = 0)  6.38**  8.63***  13.45***  
     
Number of obs.  311 311 311 
R2  0.10 0.17 0.07 
F-statistic  11.22***  19.74***  5.72***  
 
Table 8 reports the regression results for the final three, two, and one month(s) of the 
budget year.21 The findings generally show that managers that report favorable sales 
performance and continue to operate as store manager show relatively lower sales 
                                               
21 The analyses focus on the final quarter of the year for the following reason. Descriptive statistic 
show that the fraction of managers that has a positive bonus payout decreases throughout the budget 
year with an especially steep decline in the fourth quarter. This is consistent with intuition that store 
managers cash in on the first three bonus options, at that time have more information whether they will
meet the annual sales target (important for appraisal considerations) and well performing managers 
have an option to slow down sales in the fourth quarter (i.e. increase the likelihood to cash in on the
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toward the end of the accounting year period compared to those managers that report 
unfavorable intermediate sales performance and continued to operate in the same 
retail outlet. The coefficient on DGYTD is negative and significant for both the final 
two months (p<0.1) and the final month (p<0.01).22 Managers that report substandard 
sales performance and remain as the manager in the sam  store on average report 
15.66% (7.37%) of yearly sales in the final two months (month), as opposed to 
15.39% (7.03%) for managers that have a favorable sales performance and remain to 
operate as store manager in the same store. In terms of agnitude, store managers that 
report substandard sales performance report €132K (€62K) sales in the final two 
months (month) opposed to €130K (€59K) for managers with favorable intermediate 
sales performance.  
For the final month, stores are subsequently ranked on the basis of their intermediate 
performance ranging from very unfavorable to very favorable. Especially the portfolio 
of stores comprising small positive intermediate sale  target deviations exhibits the 
smallest magnitude of relative sales in the final month (not tabulated). This result is 
consistent with the findings in Table 4. I document i  Table 4 that the upward 
ratcheting parameter is strongest for small positive target deviations. That is, the 
benefits from slowing down sales in terms of mitigating potential upward adjustment 
of future targets are strongest for those stores exhibiting small positive target 
deviations. In addition, I expect the relative sale of store managers with favorable 
intermediate performance that do not continue to operate as manager to exceed the 
relative sales of managers with a favorable intermediat  performance that do continue 
as store manager. The former group of store managers does not have any incentives to 
slow down sales since they will not be confronted with target ratcheting in 
consecutive periods. The F-test for difference in coefficients for both groups (i.e. γ2+ 
γ3 = 0) yields statistically significant results for all the three periods under 
examination. Store managers that report favorable intermediate performance and do 
not continue to operate as manager report 24.33% (16.01) {7.37%} of yearly sales in 
the final three months (final two months) {final month}, as opposed to 23.51% 
                                               
22 An alternative explanation would be that the managers that report an unfavorable intermediate 
performance accelerate their sales in the final months for bonus and appraisal considerations. However 
only 11% of the managers that report an unfavorable intermediate performance after 11 months and 
continue to operate as manager have a positive bonus payout in the fourth quarter. This suggests that 
bonus and appraisal incentives are for the majority f poor performing managers ‘out-of-the-money’.  
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(15.39%) {7.03%} for managers with a favorable interm diate performance that do 
remain to operate as store manager in the same retail store. In terms of magnitude, 
store managers that report favorable sales report €206K (€135K) {€62K} sales in the 
final three months (final two months) {final month}, as opposed to €199K (€130K) 
{€59K} for managers with a favorable intermediate prformance. Therefore, as store 
managers in the sample have few alternatives other than varying effort levels, I find 
moderate but significant degrees of reduction of real sales performance.23 
Magnitude incentive effects 
I interpret the evidence as consistent with the incentive effects of target ratcheting.  
That is, negative effects are associated with targe ratcheting. However, elimination of 
the reported adverse incentive effects would result in a 4% increase in earnings before 
taxes for the respective business unit over the period 2001-2004 (€500,000). The 
decrease in the relative share of sales for the final month(s) for those respective store 
managers would result in a 7% bonus increase for the espective store managers. 
Robustness checks 
With respect to the means through which store managers slow down sales activities in 
the final periods of the budget year, I examine whether stores that report favorable 
sales after nine months have a relatively lower use of labor hours for the final three 
months. I do not find any significant results. As robustness analyses, I repeat the 
analyses adding fixed effects regression to control for unobserved heterogeneity at the 
store level. Results remain significant at conventional levels (not reported).  
2.5 Conclusions and limitations 
This paper documents the interplay between firm management setting targets and 
store managers’ response to target setting. Firm management is convinced that store 
managers’ sales performance can improve and looks for avenues that allow them to 
identify in which stores underutilization of sales capacity resides. In addition to these 
conditions firm management must deal with store managers who vary in terms of 
(sales) talent. To address both problems, the firm utilizes a target-setting and 
performance-appraisal system that takes issue of store management features and 
                                               
23 Interviews with senior management informed us about the probable means through which store 
managers can affect the timing of sales. Such illustrations include cutting back on the provision of 
information and advice concerning merchandise and merchandise usage/maintenance, less selling 
complementary products (e.g., extended guarantee).  
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observable performance. Store managers can earn a quarterly bonus to the extent that 
the quarterly sales exceed the quarterly sales target. In addition, the annual subjective 
performance appraisal depends on the assessments to wha  degree store managers 
comply with directives. Their performance appraisal core determines the salary 
increase. The results of this study support the idea that the firm updates sales targets 
based on sales target deviations. It does so asymmetrically in order to discriminate 
management effort from general economic conditions facing the store (Weitzman, 
1980; Leone and Rock, 2002; Leone et al., 2004). I demonstrate that both high and 
low positive target deviations do impact the next-year sales target, while only large 
negative deviations are impounded in subsequent sales t rgets.  
To ensure that all store managers are subject to challenging targets, managers with a 
favorable appraisal score face larger sales target updates than managers with a 
mediocre or unfavorable appraisal score. That is, sales target updates are higher for 
those managers that are better able to comply with directives. This suggests that the 
higher sales target that ‘good’ managers have to meet and the relatively lower targets 
that ‘mediocre’ managers have to meet serves the purpose of challenging all types of 
retail store managers. Discriminating between good’, ‘mediocre’ and ‘bad’ performers 
based on compliance with directives enables the firm to establish manager-specific 
targets. This motivates individual store managers to produce the best result in their 
own league. I do find that store managers are subject to sales targets consistent with 
the intuition of Indjejikian and Nanda (2002). That is, past sales target attainment is 
unrelated to future target attainment. Moreover, I document that past performance 
appraisals are predictive of current performance appraisals. The firm management’s 
distinction between top, mediocre and bottom level managers based on the subjective 
appraisals is consistent with the sales potential of those managers. That is, appraisals 
contain information about the potential of each manager to improve performance 
given their past performance. In this way, the system simultaneously gives incentives 
for the manager to attain the current sales target (bonus) and to consider future 
performance (i.e. directive compliance). 
The empirical findings of this study can place subjective performance appraisals in a 
new perspective. It has been argued that subjectivity can decrease the noise in the 
measure (e.g. Prendergast and Topel, 1993; Lazear, 1999). The results suggest that 
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subjective appraisals are informative of future performance and that they are therefore 
used in target setting. I observe in this sample that firm management cogently sets 
different targets to account for differences in store management talent. While this 
process may lead to some levels of lenience and failure to discriminate good from bad 
managers (Moers, 2005) I observe that for a considerabl  part of the sample, firm 
management does discriminate ‘good’ from ‘bad’ performers. The contemporaneous 
and future sales performance that the firm achieves with this process suggests that 
making this difference between retail store managers pays off in that each manager is 
motivated to increase effort.  
I document that store managers who do well during the course of the year slow down 
effort levels increasingly in the final months of the accounting year. To find this effect 
is remarkable in this setting as firm management has m de it virtually impossible to 
manage performance measure outcome through other means than effort reduction. 
This result suggests that the negative incentive eff ct that follows from target 
ratcheting is strong since they have limited means to mitigate target ratcheting. I also 
document that, consistent with the ratcheting theory (B ickley et al., 2004), managers 
that leave the store (and thus will not be confronted with the consequences of target 
updates following good sales performance) are less likely to reduce sales levels at the 
end of the year than managers that remain at their retail store.  
As with most research, this study is subject to limitations. One important caveat is that 
the external validity of the findings cannot be extended beyond this sample. This 
quantitative field study enables me to examine how target setting affects management 
responses in this retail setting. However, contextual findings limit the extent to which 
these findings can be generalized to different settings. For instance, I conduct this 
study in a centralized firm. The results may deviate for more decentralized settings 
(e.g. Bouwens and Van Lent, 2007). Notwithstanding these limitations, I believe that 
the findings advance knowledge into the working of target setting within firms. 
Especially in firms where local management’s decision rights are low and strict 
directives apply. Future research may cross-sectionally examine which firms benefit 
most from using information from subjective performance appraisals combined with 
past sales information to establish manager-specific challenging targets.      
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 Appendix 1: Directive areas 
Dimension Description 
Innovation • Identify relevant changes in the environment of your 
retail stores, think about creative ways to address 
challenges within retail stores, and provide ideas 
to/initiate discussion with your cluster manager.  
• Seek alternative ways to fulfill customers’ needs and
inform customers about new goods and services. 
Entrepreneurship • Communicate clearly (e.g. free of jargon) to 
customers and always keep the best interest of 
customers in mind. 
• Increase your availability for customers and sales 
assistants and address everyday problems (e.g. traffic
at cash registers) in a timely manner.   
Efficiency • Translate the impact of each decision in terms of costs 
and sales and act accordingly. 
• Prioritize operations within the sales team such that
arrangements with customers are always met.  
Responsibility • Display an active attitude and behavioral pattern that
is inspiring for your sales assistants.  
• Be able to explain the relationship between your 
actions and the targeted retail store results (and 
consider potential side effects that can follow from 
actions chosen).  
Cooperation • Provide timely and clear feedback to your sales 
assistants such that sales assistants know exactly what 
is expected from them. 
• Create an atmosphere where sales assistants provide 
feedback about each other’s performance, ensure that 
sales assistants remain confident about their own 
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Chapter 3: Managerial horizon and the choice for 
insiders versus outsiders24 
3.1 Introduction 
This paper investigates whether CEOs appointed from outside the firm are provided 
with different incentives than CEO successors select d from within the firm to 
address potential distortions in intertemporal decision-making. It is asserted that 
outside CEO successors are more short-term oriented compared to inside CEO 
successors because of two reasons. First, outside CEO successors are reported to have 
shorter (anticipated) tenure compared to inside CEO successors (e.g. Brady et al., 
1982). That is, the more diversified human capital of outside CEO successors 
enhances outside employment opportunities vis-à-vis inside CEO successors who 
possess more firm-specific knowledge that is characte ized by limited value outside 
the respective firm (Parent, 1999). The shorter a CEO expects to stay in position, the 
smaller the benefits from future cash flows and the greater the incentives to sacrifice 
long-term benefits for short-term benefits (Narayanan, 1985). So outside CEOs with a 
shorter employment horizon can be myopic with regard to the long-term effects of 
their decisions. Second, boards have superior knowledge of the abilities of inside 
candidates because of the opportunity to update their assessment more accurately over 
multiple periods relative to outside contestants (Zajac, 1990). Outside CEO successors 
who just assumed their position have yet to establish a reputation and will be focused 
on activities that produce quick wins. That is, they will be inclined to emphasize 
actions that yield short-term profits even at the expense of firms’ long-term interests 
in an attempt to quickly build a reputation within the firm (Narayanan, 1985).  
To examine whether firms account for the alleged short-termism of outside CEO 
successors through the incentive compensation packages, I distinguish between short-
term oriented and long-term oriented incentives. Short-term incentives are incentives 
tied to short-term backward looking measures such as current earnings that reward 
short-term oriented effort. Long-term incentives are tied to long-term backward 
looking measures such as future earnings or forward looking measures such as stock 
price that rewards long-term oriented effort (Dikolli, 2001). I argue that firms can use 
incentive package features to account for potential distortions in intertemporal 
                                               
24 This chapter is based on a working paper co-authored with Jan Bouwens (Tilburg University).  
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decision making entailing the type of succession. As outside CEOs are allegedly more 
short-term oriented than inside CEOs, I expect thatoutside CEOs are subjected to 
incentives that redirect their attention to decision  with long-term impact. I argue in 
particular that de-emphasizing current earnings while emphasizing future earnings 
and/or stock price in the respective CEO incentive plans lengthens the time 
orientation of these managers.   
To my knowledge this is the first study to explicity study whether or not firms 
account for short-termism that newly appointed managers possibly display.25 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that firms may not fully anticipate and account for short-
termism of outside CEO successors beforehand. Bower (2007) argues that the 
selection of outside successors should be discouraged because of their tendency to 
quickly change things upon arrival to rapidly show results. More specifically it is 
stated that: 
…the only way to change things fast is to cut costs - exactly what someone 
unfamiliar with the specifics of an industry and its markets, or the company 
and its people, is likely to do first…This short-term orientation destroys value  
in the medium and long-term. The seeds of growth are eliminated. (p.93)  
In their 2007 report, the Committee for Economic Development (CED) issued a set of 
recommendations to address the short-termism manifest in some corporations. One 
recommendation was the promotion of CEO succession plans that emphasize growth 
of internal management talent. Doing so may counter th  pressures to achieve short-
term performance. More particularly it was contended in the document that:  
                                               
25 Note that short-termism of outside successors may in some cases be an equilibrium outcome that 
reflects firms’ objectives. For example, outside succession may be driven by poor prior performance 
(Parrino, 1997) which could explain the need for short-term orientation. Still, most outside succession  
are not motivated by poor pre-turnover performance. Murphy & Zabojnek (2007) provide alternative 
explanations for - the increasing trend in – outside CEO succession. Moreover, strategy literature 
distinguishes two components in corporate turnaround: divestures of unproductive assets, and 
investment in positive NPV projects with cash flows materializing in the future (Robbins & Pearce, 
1992). In general, internal and external governance can work as mechanisms that mitigate a short-term 
orientation of outside successors. Elimination of myopic time preferences may be regarded as too 
costly. Time orientation of CEO successors is regarded as an equilibrium outcome that simultaneously 
reflects firm’s objectives, the mitigating effect of governance, and some personal potentially myopic 
preferences (Abernethy et al., 2007). In turn, firms design compensation packages that address 
incongruent time orientations of CEO successors.   
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…a CEO from another company…wants to be protected against the risk 
of being dismissed if expectations are not met quickly…By contrast, a 
CEO from an internal executive program already has a long-term view of 
the company when he or she takes office. (p.16)   
If inside CEOs differ so markedly in time orientation from outside CEOs it may be 
expected that firms take issue when designing incentive contracts for either type of 
CEO. I empirically investigate these differences. This enquiry is based on a UK 
sample of 171 CEO successions from 1998 to 2004 of firms listed on the main market 
of the London Stock Exchange.  
The results suggest that firms anticipate and account for short-termism of outside 
successors. That is, outside CEO successors are provided with less short-term 
incentives and more long-term incentives compared to inside successors. More 
specifically, outside successors are awarded less short-term incentives, measured by 
the cash bonus elasticity to accounting performance, compared to inside CEO 
successors. The results become insignificant when looking at the cash bonus elasticity 
to market performance. This is consistent with earli r findings of Lambert & Larcker 
(1987) who show that cash compensation is more closely tied to accounting 
performance than to stock market performance. Outside CEO successors are awarded 
more long-term incentives, measured by the elasticity of the value of the CEO equity 
portfolio wealth to market performance, relative to inside CEO successors. Therefore, 
the results suggest that firms anticipate short-termism of outside CEO successors, as 
outside successors face less short-term and more long-term incentives compared to 
inside CEO successors. In the robustness analyses, supplementary checks are 
performed that amongst others address the potential endogeneity of the choice for an 
outside vs. inside CEO successor. Inclusion of a broad range of proxies for loss-
making firms supplemental to the original control variable; matching firms that select 
outside successors to firms that select inside successors on the likelihood that the 
respective firm would select an outside CEO successor (referred to in the literature as 
propensity score matching); and application of a tre tment effects model all generate 
results similar to those I report in the main analysis. 
Following that a significant amount of the heterogeneity in investment, financial, and 
organizational practices in firms is explained by individual CEOs (Bertrand & Schoar, 
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2003), topics with respect to the pre- and post-turnover performance effects of CEO 
turnover have been relatively well-explored. I heed the advice of Brickley (2003) to 
decrease the emphasis on such topics and to consider other less-explored issues to 
increase the understanding of CEO replacement. More specifically, I examine to what 
extent firms anticipate and account for the short-termism of outside CEO successors 
through providing different incentives to outside vrsus inside CEO successors. In 
doing so, this paper fills up a void in the previous literature since most studies focus 
on documenting managerial opportunism (e.g. horizon problems) but few studies 
examine whether firms apply compensation design to prevent managerial opportunism 
(Cheng, 2004).26 Furthermore, the appointment of outside managers is positively 
associated with stock market returns and subsequent accounting performance (Huson 
et al., 2004). Still, the decision to appoint an outsider is the result of the firm weighing 
the net value of the outside versus inside appointme . An important part of costs 
entailing this trade off is in the type of manager: outside managers are arguably more 
short-term oriented than inside managers. The firm can improve the case for an 
outside appointment when it is able to mitigate this short-term orientation. This study 
demonstrates that outside appointments are indeed accompanied with incentive 
contracts designed to direct attention to the long term rather than to the short term. 
The UK data allows me to disentangle long-term contract features from short-term 
features. Most US firms feature long-term incentive plans with bonus awards 
contingent on three to five-year cumulative accounting performance (Murphy, 1998), 
and stock and stock options that typically vest irrespective of performance in 
approximately 30 months (Kole, 1997). US managers are therefore provided with 
incentives to select actions that maximize long-term accounting performance and 
medium-term market performance. The joint use of these accounting and stock based 
incentives in the US makes it difficult to tell whet r incentives are geared to affect 
long or medium-term performance.27 Since the theory predicts that new CEOs are 
                                               
26 Recently, some papers document that outside CEO succe sion is positively associated with ex-ante 
severance agreements. Here, risk-averse CEOs desire insurance in the firm of termination payments to 
compensate them for search and/or reputation costs which are likely to occur following termination 
(Sletten & Lys, 2006) and to induce the CEO to make relation-specific investments (Rusticus, 2006). 
Outside succession is argued to be associated with the ex-ante probability of turnover. Still, ex-ante 
severance agreements are costly as they weaken the costs associated with managerial dismissal.    
27 We acknowledge the difficulty of predicting the ext nt to which long-term incentive plans, restricted 
stock, and options lengthen CEO’s horizon, e.g. the forward looking characteristic of price depends on 
the extent to which it accurately projects future financial outcomes from CEO’s current decisions.    
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incentivized with short-term versus long-term incentives conditional on whether they 
originate from inside or outside the firm, testing these predictions requires making a 
clear distinction between short-term and long-term incentives. The UK setting 
provides me with this opportunity. Because of the Gr enbury report (1995), UK firms 
provide stock-based compensation that vests upon the a tainment of long-term 
accounting performance targets (Conyon & Murphy, 2000). While US managers can 
face a trade-off between meeting long-term accounting argets and medium-term 
stock price, UK performance requirements for stock and accounting performance are 
synchronized. That is, UK managers can only reap the benefits of stock returns 
conditional on them also having achieved the corresponding long-term accounting 
performance targets. This feature allows me to better disentangle short-term 
incentives from long-term incentives compared to the US setting. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section two refers to the 
literature review and hypotheses. Section three discusses the sample, empirical 
models and variable measurement, while section four describes empirical results. The 
main conclusions and limitations of this paper are off red in the final section.  
3.2 Literature review and hypotheses 
CEO successions are characterized by changes in firms’ operations in terms of 
divestures and capital expenditures (Weisbach, 1995). Newly appointed CEOs can 
take actions featuring short-term implications (e.g. a switch towards low-cost 
suppliers) and select actions that have more long-term effects on firm value (e.g. a 
new line of basic research). A focus on short-term actions such as switching to a low-
cost supplier may be beneficial in the short run, but it may turn out to be detrimental 
to firm value in its long-term consequences. In the prior literature, it is argued that 
outside CEOs are prone to short-termism compared to inside CEOs. Hence, 
appointing outsiders entails the danger of managers neglecting the long-term 
consequences of their decisions. 
The literature provides two main explanations for why outside CEOs comparatively 
emphasize the short term: their shorter employment horizon and their tendency to 
quickly build reputation in their new firm.  
First, the employment horizon of outside CEO successors is arguably shorter than that 
of inside CEOs because of the greater outside options of outside successors. Outside 
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CEOs possess demonstrably more diversified human capital than inside CEO 
successors which allows for greater outside employment opportunities compared to 
inside CEO successors. Inside CEO successors posses a larger amount of firm-
specific knowledge which is of limited value outside the focal firm (Parent, 1999). 
Fee & Hadlock (2004) explain the negative relation between an executive’s tenure 
and the probability of obtaining a position at another public firm by the limited 
outside value of firm-specific capital developed at the old employer. Brady et al. 
(1982) report a significantly lower anticipated tenure for outside CEO successors by 
corporate boards. This suggests that outside CEOs who face greater outside 
employability than inside CEO successors have a shorter employment horizon 
(Mortensen, 1999). The shorter a CEO expects to stay in position, the smaller the 
benefits from future cash flows and thus the greater th  incentive to sacrifice long-
term benefits for short-term benefits (Narayanan, 1985). So outside CEOs face greater 
incentives to neglect long-term effects of decision and to emphasize actions with 
effects that surface within the CEOs employment horizon. Palley (1997) analytically 
demonstrates that in a setting with management turnover where pay is tied to current 
earnings, managers select projects with intrinsically lower net present values, yielding 
higher returns at the beginning of the project’s life-t me. Mannix & Loewenstein 
(1993) find in their experiment that shorter employment horizon (i.e. an increase in 
job mobility) makes subjects less likely to invest in long-term projects. Dechow & 
Sloan (1991) report how CEOs in the final years of office improve short-term 
earnings performance at the expense of firm value by means of managing 
discretionary investments expenditures downward.  
The second argument for outside CEO successors to differ in time orientation from 
inside successors derives from the degree of adverse selection. That is, boards have 
superior knowledge about abilities of inside candidates because of the opportunity to 
update their assessment more accurately over multiple periods relative to outsiders 
(Zajac, 1990). Narayanan (1985) emphasizes how in a setting where the ability of the 
CEO is unknown to the firm, those CEOs are inclined to take on short-term projects 
that report rapid returns to quickly build reputation in the firm. Outside CEO 
successors who have yet to build a track record at their new firms can do so by 
focusing on projects that generate short-term benefits. Consistent with this, Dikolli et 
al. (2008) document that the relationship between ngative earnings surprises and 
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CEO turnover is stronger for CEOs with shorter tenur . That is, the weight that 
periodic accounting numbers receive in updating owners’ priors about the CEO’s 
uncertain ability decreases with tenure because the uncertainty about the CEO’s 
ability decreases with tenure. The focus on achieving short-term results in order to 
build reputation fast reinforces the predisposition of outside CEO successors to focus 
on short-term gains, originating from their short employment horizon relative to 
inside CEO successors. 
In the absence of distortions in intertemporal decision making I would expect 
managers to make efficient investments. This entails hat managers make investments 
to maximize firm value, regardless of the distributon of cash flows over the time 
horizon (Narayanan, 1996). To the extent that CEOs are inclined to favor projects 
with cash flows that accrue within the (first periods of the) prospected employment 
horizon, firms may counter this inclination with incentives that mitigate short-termism 
of managers through performance measures that encourage CEOs to consider the 
long-term effects of decision-making. Dikolli (2001) analytically demonstrates that, 
opposed to contracting on short-term backward-looking measures (e.g. current 
earnings), which motivates actions yielding short-te m consequences, contracting on 
long-term backward-looking measures (e.g. future earnings) or forward-looking 
measures (e.g. stock price) motivates managers to take actions yielding long-term 
performance effects. CEO bonus plans tied to annual earnings figures are typically 
classified as short-term incentives since bonus plans give managers incentives to 
reject positive net present value projects with long pay back periods (Smith & Watts, 
1982). Accounting regulation affects the way earnings reflect changes in firm value 
on a timely basis (Dechow & Sloan, 1991). Investments i  advertising, for example, 
are expensed in the period incurred, while expected future payoffs associated with 
these investments are recognized when realized. Thus executives whose compensation 
is tied to current earnings can boost their short-term performance (i.e. compensation) 
by reducing investments in advertising (Dechow & Sloan, 1991).  
Motivating current actions that yield long-term consequences requires contracting on 
long-term oriented backward-looking measures and/or on forward-looking measures 
(Dikolli, 2001). In general, long-term incentives pur ortedly encourage executives to 
pursue projects that produce the highest positive net present value, irrespective of 
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when cash flows accrue. Incentive plans where compensation is tied to long-term 
accounting performance targets (e.g. 3-year earnings per share target) incentivize 
managers to focus on the long-term consequences of current actions. Indeed, under 
such plans managers want to select actions that show earnings effects within the 3-
year window, provided that the manager intends to re ain his position over the three-
year window. Larcker (1983) documents that the adoption of long-term incentive 
plans in executive compensation packages leads to an increase in capital expenditures 
relative to similar non-adopting firms.  
In addition to long-term accounting performance measures, the use of stock price is 
appealing as share price impounds projected future financial outcomes resulting from 
current actions (Dutta & Reichelstein, 2003).28 Managers’ underinvestment in projects 
that yield long-term benefits is therefore mitigated by equity-based incentives as these 
become an instrument for matching future investment r turns with current investment 
expenditures (Dutta & Reichelstein, 2005). Note that awarding incentives tied to share 
prices rather than accounting measures also comes at a cost because of the inclusion 
of market-wide factors that are largely beyond the control of managers. The increased 
risk exposure that equity-based incentives entails makes contracting with risk-averse 
agents more costly (e.g., Keating, 1996). Restricted stock and stock options are both 
contingent on future stock price. Restricted stock awards endow managers with a 
fixed quantity of shares of corporate equity with rest ictions on resale or transfer and a 
forfeiture clause that invalidates the award if the ex cutive quits or is dismissed before 
the restriction period elapses. Stock option plans ward executives the right to 
purchase a fixed number of shares of common stock at a predetermined exercise price 
over some finite horizon. Vesting of this right generally takes place about 30 months 
after the award date (Kole, 1997). Restricted stock and stock options include 
multiyear components, as they not only provide incentiv s to take actions that 
increases current stock price to the extent that this also increases stock price at the end 
                                               
28 An opposing view is that even in efficient markets contracting on current price may also result in 
myopia where managers inflate current earnings at the expense of longer-term benefits (e.g. Stein, 
1989). However such models typically assume information asymmetry (stock market uses current 
earnings to forecast future value) and the absence of restrictions on selling stock. This myopia 
decreases with the sensitivity of future stock market projections on current earnings and longer 
holdings periods of equity.        
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of the restriction or vesting period (Bizjak et al., 1993).29 Farrell et al. (2008) find in 
their experiment that including forward-looking measures in incentive contracts 
encourages short-horizon employees to allocate current-period effort to actions that 
increase future profitability. Moreover, these benefits decrease as the employment 
horizons of employees converge with the firm’s profitability horizon. Regarding the 
question whether firms actively account for short-te mism of their executives, Cheng 
(2004) finds that for CEOs in the final years of office, firms prevent potential 
opportunistic reductions in R&D by strengthening the link between CEO 
compensation and R&D expenditures.  
In addition to motivational effects, stock-based ince tives also feature retention 
effects. Forfeitable equity compensation reduces voluntary turnover by imposing a 
cost on the executive to the extent that the prospective employer is not willing to fully 
reimburse these costs. Balsam & Miharjo (2007) find that the intrinsic value of 
unexercisable in-the-money options, the time value of unexercised stock options, and 
the value of restricted shares are inversely related to voluntary executive turnover. 
Therefore stock-based incentives and long-term incentiv  plans also alleviate the 
horizon problem by literally extending the expected employment horizon.  
To conclude, I argue that outside CEOs are more short-term oriented than inside 
CEOs because they have more outside employment opportunities than inside 
managers, and because they need to establish a reputation that inside managers 
already posses when they assume their position. To the extent that the time orientation 
of outside CEOs differs from the desired time orientation, firms want to ensure that 
the time orientation of the managers is aligned with the firm’s interests. The firm is 
therefore likely to draw the attention of outside CEO successors to the long-term 
effects of their decisions. To achieve this objective he firm can tie CEO wealth to the 
long-term effect of their decisions. I thus expect ou side CEOs’ wealth to be more 
(less) dependent on long-term (short-term) incentivs than the wealth of inside CEOs. 
                                               
29
 Motivating managers to maximize current stock price provides optimal investment incentives in 
perfect markets with homogeneous expectations. Thisneed not hold in the presence of asymmetric 
information. If the manager has private information about the value of investment opportunities and the 
market learns about those opportunities as cash flows materialize, managers can have incentives to 
manipulate the market’s inferences about firm prospects through observable, though suboptimal, 
investment choices. Optimal investment is motivated by structuring compensation such that the 
emphasis on current and future stock price performance is balanced. Future is defined here as the time 
it takes before the market is informed of cash flow implications of current investment decisions (Bizjak 
et al., 1993).     
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I propose to test the following hypotheses on whether the firm anticipates and 
accounts for the alleged short-term orientation of outside CEO successors: 
H1a: Outside CEO succession is negatively associated with the provision of short-
term incentives, relative to inside CEO succession. 
H1b: Outside CEO succession is positively associated with the provision of long-
term incentives, relative to inside CEO succession.  
3.3 Methodology 
3.3.1 Sample 
This study uses data from a sample of UK firms listed on the all share index of the 
London Stock Exchange (LSE) from 1998 to 2004. To identify CEO turnover, for 
each respective firm-year the identity of the top executive was inferred through 
Boardex and Worldscope CDs.30 CEO turnover is identified when the CEO identity 
changes from one to the next year for the respective firm. The CEO successions must 
satisfy the following criteria: i) the firm in question is not a financial institution31; ii) 
the CEO succession is unrelated to a take-over or merger; and iii) the CEO successor 
stays in office for at least two years (Huson et al., 2004). This yields an initial sample 
of 302 CEO turnover observations. 
CEO successor data is collected through annual reports and press announcements 
from LexisNexis. New CEOs are defined as an outside uccessor if, at the time of 
appointment as CEO successor, the CEO had been at the firm for one year or less 
(Huson et al., 2004). Post-turnover accounting performance data is collected from 
Compustat Global, data with regard to CEO characteristics is collected from Boardex, 
and governance variables and remaining control variables are collected from 
Amadeus, Datastream, Worldscope, and Boardex respectively. Observations with 
                                               
30 To identify the top executive, it is first assessed whether companies have executives with the job title 
chief executive officer, chief executive, or CEO. For companies that do not distinguish one of these job 
titles, the top executive is identified as the indivi ual with the title of managing director or executive 
chairman.  For those observations where th re is a joint top officer as defined above, I examined the 
annual reports to infer which executive holds respon ibility as the top executive within the firm 
(DeFond & Hung, 2004). 
31 All financial companies (SIC-codes 6000-6999) are excluded from the sample.  
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incomplete data are removed from the sample.32 The final sample consists of 171 
CEO turnover observations.33  
The empirical analyses are focused on year t+2, where the CEO successions take 
place in year t. Shortly after the CEO successor takes office, CEOs are typically 
awarded large initial hiring grants composed of restricted stock and options as a 
means to align interests. For outside CEO successions cash signing bonuses are 
typically supplemented (Fee & Hadlock, 2003). Subsequently CEOs are awarded 
equity grants at the end of each period to correct for optimal portfolio levels 
deviations due to changes in target incentive levels ( .g. changes in investment 
opportunity sets), CEO selling and purchasing transactions, and changes in the equity 
portfolio incentives due to fluctuations in price, return volatility, and time until 
expiration (Core & Guay, 1999). Since year t+1 is the first year that the CEO 
successor is operating for a full year, this year is the first year the CEO successor is 
awarded a full year of salary and bonus by the respective firm.   
Finally, considering possible differences in compensation practices across countries, 
the composition of executive compensation in terms of emphasizing equity 
compensation and de-emphasizing salary has been convergi g across the US and UK 
(Conyon et al., 2006).  
3.3.2 Empirical models 
This section describes the models used to empirically test the hypotheses as well as 
the main variables of interest.  
Two empirical models are used to examine the first hypothesis. The provision of 
short-term incentives is measured by means of the salary and bonus elasticity (Hall & 
Liebman, 1998), which can be described as follows: 
 
Ln(SBt / SBt-1) = β0 + β1PERFt + β2F_OUTSIDER*PERFt + β3F_OUTSIDER  
+ CONTROLS + ε         [1]. 
                                               
32 Observations are lost mostly due to missing and incomplete data in Boardex.  
33 This represents observations with complete data where the firm survives for at least two years after 
CEO succession and the CEO successor remains in office for at least two years. For an additional 21 
observations, the CEO leaves office within two years nd for an additional 15 observations, the 
respective firm does not survive the two year period following CEO succession.    
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The elasticity of salary and bonus with respect to market returns can be interpreted as 
the percentage increase in salary and bonus following a 1% increase in market 
returns.34 In order to calculate salary and bonus elasticities, the log difference of 
salary and bonus is regressed on two different measur s of firm performance. 
Ln(SBt/SBt-1) denotes the natural logarithm of the difference in salary and bonus for 
year t+2 relative to year t+1. PERFt represents both accounting and stock market 
performance. Accounting performance is measured as: i) change in accounting return 
defined as operating income divided by the book value of total assets (∆ROA) from 
year t+2 relative to year t+1; and ii) change in industry-adjusted accounting return 
defined as the industry-adjusted operating income divided by book value of total 
assets (∆IA_ROA) from year t+2 relative to year t+1. The choice for operating 
income as denominator is motivated by the fact that, since operating income 
encompasses sales minus costs of goods sold, selling, general and administrative 
expenses, it is exempted from special items that can be impacted by big bath behavior 
of incoming CEOs (e.g. Murphy & Zimmerman, 1993). Market performance is 
measured as the stock market return (TSR) in year t+2. In the first equation, the 
coefficient β1 denotes the salary and bonus elasticity for inside CEO successors, and 
the sum of coefficients (β1 + β2) represents salary and bonus elasticity for outside 
CEO successors. On the basis of the hypotheses, it is expected that β2 < 0. Cash 
compensation is expected beforehand to be more strongly associated with differences 
in accounting performance than with market returns (Lambert & Larcker, 1987).  
The provision of long-term incentives is measured through the elasticity of the 
unrealized value of the CEO equity portfolio wealth with respect to market returns 
and is described by the second equation as follows:  
                                               
34 Here, by measuring the change of cash compensation in logarithms instead of British pounds, the 
choice is made for an elasticity approach instead of a sensitivity approach. Main advantages of an 
elasticity approach is that it provides a better fit in the sense that rates of return explain more of the 
cross-sectional variation of the natural logarithm of ∆ cash pay compared to shareholder value 
explaining variation in ∆ cash pay, and that the elasticity approach has a straightforward interpretation. 
However, neither the sensitivity nor elasticity approach strictly dominates the other (Murphy, 1998). 
Moreover, the choice for measuring the independent variable of interest as the percentage change in 
firm value (Hall & Liebman, 1998) instead of dollar change in firm value (Murphy, 1990) boils down 
to measuring equity incentives from fractional ownership (i.e. higher fractional ownership implies 
stronger incentives) versus the acknowledgement that large dollar holdings of equity ownership can 
have powerful incentives despite small fractional ownership. Baker & Hall (2004) show that when 
actions of CEOs primarily affect dollar returns (e.g. perquisite consumption), the appropriate measure 
of CEO’s incentives is fractional ownership. When actions of CEOs primarily affect percentage returns 
(e.g. new strategy implementation), the appropriate measure of CEO’s incentives is the CEO’s dollar 
holdings in the firm.   
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Ln(EqHoldt / EqHoldt-1) = δ0 + δ1TSR + δ2F_OUTSIDER*TSR + δ3F_OUTSIDER  
+ CONTROLS + ε         [2].  
Prior research indicates that the majority of typical CEO incentives are driven by the 
variation in the value of the stock and stock option portfolio opposed to the CEO’s 
flow compensation (Hall & Liebman, 1998; Core et al., 2003). The elasticity of the 
value of the CEO equity portfolio wealth with respect to market returns can be 
interpreted as the percentage increase in the unrealized value of equity portfolio 
holdings following a 1% increase in market returns. Ln(EqHoldt / EqHoldt-1) denotes 
the natural logarithm of the difference in the unrealized holdings of stock and stock 
options for the end of year t+2 relative to the endof year t+1. TSR is the market-based 
performance measure and denotes the percentage change in shareholder value. In the 
second equation, the coefficient δ1 denotes the CEO portfolio wealth elasticity from 
stock and stock option revaluations for inside successors and the sum of coefficients 
(δ1 + δ2) represents the CEO portfolio wealth elasticity from stock and stock option 
revaluations for outside successors. Based on the hypot eses, it is expected that δ2 > 
0. Measurement of control variables is discussed more in detail in the next section.  
Besides the use of log-linear models as described aove, the conventional approach to 
dealing with potential outliers in the CEO compensation literature is to employ robust 
regressions supplemental to OLS regression (Jin, 2002). Robust regression excludes 
observations with Cook’s D > 1 and subsequently performs Huber iterations followed 
by biweight iterations.  
3.3.3 Measurement of control variables  
This section will briefly outline the firm-level vari bles and managerial characteristics 
included in the control function of the empirical models.   
Economic determinants 
Core et al. (1999) discern four main economic determinants that explain the design of 
compensation contracts. First, large firms require more talented managers who are 
more highly compensated (Smith & Watts, 1992) and are expected to be wealthier 
(Baker & Hall, 1998). If CEOs’ utility functions exhibit declining absolute risk-
aversion, CEOs of larger firms are expected to have greater dollar incentives from 
equity. Empirical studies indeed find that dollar incentives increase with firm size at a 
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decreasing rate (Baker & Hall, 1998; Himmelberg et al., 1999). SIZE represents firm 
size and is defined as the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets.  Second, 
existing growth opportunities are expected to be positively associated with equity 
incentives. Growth options increase monitoring difficulty (Smith & Watts, 1992), and 
providing equity compensation lowers monitoring costs by providing managers with 
incentives to maximize shareholder value. Moreover, marginal product of effort 
increases with the fraction of firm value represented by growth options (Smith & 
Watts, 1992). The more valuable a CEO’s effort, thehigher the provision of 
incentives should be, holding everything else equal (Jin, 2002). Some empirical 
studies find the predicted positive relation between xisting growth options and the 
degree to which firms use equity incentives to linktop managers’ wealth to firm value 
(Smith & Watts, 1992; Himmelberg et al., 1999). GROWTH denotes growth options 
and is defined as market value of equity divided by book value of equity. Third, 
Aggarwal & Samwick (1999) argue that firm risk is a main determinant of executive 
compensation. Firms that operate in less predictable or noisier environments display 
higher monitoring costs and so these CEOs will be awarded with relatively more 
incentives. However, risk-aversion of managers implies that the provision of 
incentives decreases with the noise in performance measures following standard 
agency predictions. RISK denotes firm total risk and is defined as the standard 
deviation of stock returns over five prior years (Core et al., 1999). The fourth 
economic determinant is firm performance which is included as a main variable of 
interest in the analyses. 
Corporate governance 
Some governance variables are included as control va iables since various monitoring 
mechanisms substitute for the provision of incentives as a means to mitigate moral 
hazard problems (e.g. Core & Guay, 1999; Engel et al., 2002). When direct 
monitoring is more effective, fewer incentives are needed to motivate CEOs to work 
in the interest of the shareholders. An important monitoring mechanism to reduce 
agency problems is through the board of directors. I proxy for the effectiveness of 
monitoring by the board through four different measure  that characterize the 
composition of the board. First, larger boards are assumed to be less effective (Jensen, 
1993). BSIZE represents board size and will be defined as total number of directors 
on the board (He & Conyon, 2004). Second, CEOs exert mo e influence over internal 
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directors relative to outside directors (Core et al., 1999). OUTSBOARD reflects the 
proportion of outside directors on the board. Third, prior literature suggests that many 
directors serve on too many boards to adequately fulfill their supervisory duties. 
BUSYB represents busy boards and is defined as the proportion of outside directors 
that serve on four boards or more. Fourth, the agency problems are greater when a 
CEO is also the chairman of the board (Yermack, 1996). CEOCHAIR is an indicator 
variable equal to one if the CEO is also chairman of the board, zero otherwise. An 
additional monitoring mechanism is the presence of large shareholders (i.e. 
blockholders). It is expected that blockholders signal better monitoring quality which 
serves as substitute for equity incentives to alleviat  moral hazard problems (He & 
Conyon, 2004). BLOCKLH represents the proportion of shares held by investors 
owning more than 5% of the firm’s outstanding shares. 
Other reasons for provision of incentive compensation 
Prior literature furthermore indicates that loss-making firms and firms in financial 
distress may have different compensation structures (Gilson & Vetsuypens, 1993; 
Matejka et al., 2005). LOSS is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm has a 
negative shareholder return, zero otherwise. Free cash flow problems refer to 
shareholder concerns regarding CEOs’ discretionary use of cash flows (e.g. 
consuming perquisites). Firms with high discretionary cash flows require incentive 
pay as a mitigating governance mechanism. FREECASH denotes the ratio of 
operating income to sales (Himmelberg et al., 1999).35 Corporate debt may provide an 
alternative mechanism to align the interests of owners and managers in firms with 
potential conflicts about cash flow payout policies. Contractual payout commitments 
may mitigate shareholder concerns regarding CEOs’ discretionary use of cash flows 
(Jensen, 1986). LEV denotes the firm’s leverage and is defined as the book value of 
liabilities divided by book value of assets. Finally, with respect to managerial 
characteristics, AGE refers to the age of the CEO successor and GENDER is an 
indicator variable equal to one if the CEO is male, zero otherwise. 
                                               
35 Free cash flow can be defined as the operating cash flow minus capital expenditures, i.e. the cash that
a firm is able to generate after cash outflows requir d to maintain or expand its asset base. The 
assumption is that free cash flow is correlated with operating income (Himmelberg et al., 1999). 
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Reasons for provision of stock-based compensation 
Here additional reasons are distinguished in favor of providing incentives in the form 
of stock-based compensation versus cash-based compensation. Since restricted stock 
and stock options require no contemporaneous cash payouts, firms with cash 
constraints are expected to compensate CEOs with equity as a substitute for cash 
(Core et al., 2003). Besides the variable FREECASH, as a robustness analyses the 
variable CASHCONSTR is included, defined as the aver g  over three years of 
[(common and preferred dividends + cash flow used in investing activities – cash flow 
from operations) / total assets] (Core & Guay, 1999; 2001). Moreover, two additional 
reasons are distinguished that explain the provision of stock-based compensation. 
First, stock and option grants can be due to tax motivations. US firms are not taxed 
upon granting the executive stock option, but at the exercise date. If tax rates are 
expected to be higher, future tax deduction from deferr d compensation can be 
favorable relative to the immediate tax deduction received from cash compensation. 
So the use of stock-based compensation is expected to be less costly for firms with a 
low marginal tax rates (Core et al., 2003). However, the exercise-date difference 
between market and exercise price was treated as deductible compensation expense in 
the US, but not in the UK (Conyon & Murphy, 2000). Second, firms may substitute 
option compensation for other forms of compensation because of financial accounting 
treatment of stock options. Unlike other forms of compensation like cash 
compensation or restricted stock which are expensed on the income statement, the 
value of stock option grants is disclosed in the footn tes of the financial statements 
(Core et al., 2003). Thus, firms with earnings constraints are expected to grant more 
stock options (Core & Guay, 1999). In response to the 1995 Greenbury report 
however, the UK government tightened the restrictions n option awards, reducing the 
amount that could be awarded (Conyon & Murphy, 2000). To the extent that UK 
firms indeed make use of the limited scope for awarding stock options to circumvent 
earnings constraints, the variable LOSS controls for such behavior of poorly 
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3.4 Empirical results 
3.4.1 Summary statistics 
Table 1, panel A and B reports descriptive statistics for both the full sample and by 
type of CEO succession (i.e. inside vs. outside CEO succession). Panel A shows that 
35% of CEO successions can be classified as outside successions. This is comparable 
with prior studies that documented outside succession rates of about 30% (e.g. Huson 
et al., 2001; Murphy & Zabojnek, 2007). Firm size indicates that this sample is 
composed of larger firms listed on the LSE. The mean (median) sum of salary and 
bonus is about £390K (£280K). The mean (median) equity holdings are about £2.7 
million (£1.6 million). These numbers are consistent with prior UK studies (e.g. 
Conyon & Murphy, 2000; Conyon et al., 2006).  
Panel B reports descriptive statistics for the subsample of inside and outside 
successions and performs difference-tests based on simple t-tests and Wilcoxon rank-
sum tests. First, outside successors receive slightly more salary and bonus, have 
significantly higher equity holdings, and are awarded higher total compensation 
relative to the inside successors. Second, outside successors show higher accounting 
performance changes and report lower free cash flows. This could imply that firms 
with deteriorating performance are more inclined to a tract outside successors who 
consequently demonstrate the desired performance improvements (Parrino, 1997). 
Third, firms with outside CEO successors have a higher proportion of outsiders on the 
board and a higher percentage of shares are held by relatively large shareholders (i.e. 
blockholders). Prior research documented that outsider-dominated boards are more 





58 The incentive effects of performance measures and trget setting 
Table 1: Summary statistics 
Panel A reports descriptive statistics for variables used in the analyses. Panel B reports descriptive 
statistics for those variables by the type of CEO succession. Panel C reports the composition of the 
sample over industries and years. Panel D reports the Pearson correlations for the variables used in the 
analyses. In panel B: a Significance levels based on t-test. b Significance levels based on Wilcoxon 
rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test. In panel D: Pearson crrelation coefficients are reported in the upper 
diagonal cells. The corresponding significance levels are reported in the lower diagonal cells. *** , ** , * 
corresponds to 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels (two-tailed).  
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics (full sample) 
Variable Mean Std.Dev. 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 
SB 393.4 333.3 108.0 172.0 281.0 516.0 803.0 
EquityHold. 2731.3 3171.6 375.0 682.0 1603.0 3482.0 6812.0 
Ln(Comp) 6.414 1.342 4.585 5.493 6.703 7.364 8.022 
F_Outsider 0.351 -- 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
∆ROA 0.009 0.040 -0.045 -0.014 0.008 0.037 0.057 
∆IA_ROA 0.021 0.109 -0.055 -0.022 0.002 0.023 0.106 
TSR 0.205 0.318 -0.202 0.037 0.207 0.391 0.542 
Size 13.549 1.715 11.384 12.329 13.394 14.956 15.774 
Growth 3.004 10.917 0.599 1.014 1.644 2.714 4.754 
Risk 0.592 0.943 0.179 0.247 0.329 0.565 1.067 
Bsize 8.901 2.366 6.000 7.000 9.000 10.000 12.000 
OutsBoard 0.571 0.131 0.430 0.500 0.570 0.670 0.730 
BusyB. 0.304 0.194 0.090 0.170 0.290 0.430 0.560 
CeoChair 0.023 -- 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Blockh. 0.206 0.167 0.000 0.080 0.160 0.320 0.410 
D_Loss 0.392 -- 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Leverage 0.595 0.224 0.331 0.468 0.589 0.702 0.859 
FreeCash 0.024 0.569 0.006 0.033 0.072 0.124 0.189 
Cashconstr. -0.150 1.704 -0.084 -0.043 -0.006 0.028 0.062 
Age 49.146 6.619 41.0 44.0 49.0 55.0 57.0 
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Panel B: descriptive statistics (by succession type) 
 
Inside CEO succession 
 
Outside CEO succession 
 
Difference tests 
Variable N Mean Median  N Mean Median  Meana Medianb 
SB 111 368.3 257.0  60 440.1 358.5   **  
EquityHold. 111 2400.7 1379.0  60 3342.8 2434.0  *  *  
Ln(Comp) 111 6.201 6.510  60 6.809 6.862  ***  **  
∆ROA 111 0.001 0.004  60 0.022 0.022  ***  *** 
∆IA_ROA 111 0.008 -0.004  60 0.042 0.013  *  *** 
TSR 111 0.216 0.245  60 0.183 0.159    
Size 111 13.563 13.394 60 13.523 13.451    
Growth 111 3.835 1.776  60 1.466 1.381   *  
Risk 111 0.575 0.331  60 0.625 0.324    
Bsize 111 9.108 9.000  60 8.517 9.000    
OutsBoard 111 0.555 0.570  60 0.599 6.000  **  **  
BusyB. 111 0.302 0.270  60 0.310 0.315    
CeoChair 111 0.000 0.000  60 0.000 0.000    
Blockh. 111 0.187 0.140  60 0.243 0.230  **  ***  
D_Loss 111 0.369 0.000  60 0.433 0.000    
Leverage 111 0.578 0.583  60 0.625 0.599    
FreeCash 111 0.092 0.078 60 -0.103 0.057   ***  
Cashconstr. 111 -0.249 -0.004  60 0.031 -0.019    
Age 111 49.306 50.0  60 48.850 49.0    
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Panel C: Sample composition over industries/years (full sample and by succession 
type) 
Frequency of sample observations over industries for the full sample and by succession type 
  Full 
sample 
 Inside CEO 
succession 
 Outside CEO 
succession 
Mining & Construction (SIC: 10-19)  18 (11%)  15 (13%)  3 (5%) 
Manufacturing (SIC: 20-39)  64 (37%)  38 (34%)  26 (43%) 
Transportation (SIC: 40-49)  20 (12%)  13 (12%)  7 (12%) 
Wholesale and retail trade (SIC: 50-59)  33 (19%)  18 (16%)  15 (25%) 
Services (SIC: 70-89)  36 (21%)  27 (24%)  9 (15%) 
Total  171 
(100%) 
 111 (100%)  60 (100%) 
Frequency of sample observations over y ars for the full sample and by succession type 
  Full sample  Inside CEO 
succession 
 Outside CEO 
succession 
1998  10 (6%)  9 (8%)  1 (2%) 
1999  10 (6%)  3 (3%)  7 (12%) 
2000  27 (16%)  21 (19%)  6 (10%) 
2001  41 (24%)  25 (23%)  16 (27%) 
2002  28 (16%)  20 (18%)  8 (13%) 
2003  36 (21%)  22 (20%)  14 (23%) 
2004  19 (11%)  11 (10%)  8 (13%) 
Total  171 (100%)  111 (100%)  60 (100%) 
Panel C reports the sample composition over industries and years. The sample seems 
to be somewhat concentrated in manufacturing (SIC: 20-39). Within manufacturing, 
the strongest concentrations defined at a 2-digit SIC level are: SIC: 20, Food & 
Kindred products (6%); SIC: 28, Chemicals and Allied Products (5%); and SIC: 36, 
Electronic, Electrical Equipment & Components, Except Computer Equipment (5%) 
(not tabulated). Also the sample composition is somewhat concentrated in the later 
years of the sample. 
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Panel D: Pearson correlation matrix   
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
1. SB 1.00 .56 .45 .10 .12 .02 .21 .50 .34 -.11 .38 .38 .38 -.03 -.11 -.11 .16 .08 -.07 .16 .02 
2. EquityHold. ***  1.00 .44 .16 .01 .15 .25 .51 .09 -.17 .35 .26 .35 -.08 -.08 -.05 .02 .09 -.12 .11 -.04 
3. Ln(Comp) ***  ***  1.00 .22 .08 -.03 .42 .25 .10 -.09 .17 .14 .18 -.05 -.07 -.04 .06 .04 -.09 .14 .05 
4. F_Outsider  **  ***  1.00 .25 .15 -.05 -.01 -.10 .03 -.12 .16 .02 .05 .16 .06 .10 -.16 .07 -.03 -.18 
5. ∆ROA *   ***  1.00 .21 -.03 -.14 -.20 .08 -.13 .01 -.00 -.01 .11 .01 .01 -.22 -.03 -.14 .05 
6. ∆IA_ROA   *   * ***  1.00 .00 -.01 -.04 .15 .11 .07 .04 -.01 -.07 -.04 -.06 -.17 -.08 -.01 -.11 
7. TSR ***  ***  ***     1.00 .10 -.02 -.05 .02 .02 .19 .01 -.03 .07 -.08 .08 -.08 .14 .08 
8. Size ***  ***  ***   *   1.00 .01 -.29 .64 .16 .32 -.11 -.15 -.07 .09 .23 -.12 .33 .01 
9. Growth ***     ***     1.00 .02 .24 .12 .05 -.11 .00 .03 .06 .03 -.00 -.06 .01 
10. Risk  **     **   ***   1.00 -.10 -.02 -.05 .05 -.04 -.05 -.22 -.55 .02 -.18 .04 
11. Bsize ***  ***  **   *   ***  **   1.00 .09 .21 -.07 -.09 -.04 .12 .05 -.13 .25 .11 
12. OutsBoard ***  ***  * **     **     1.00 .38 .01 -.06 .09 .22 -.11 -.04 -.08 0.02 
13. BusyB. ***  ***  **     **  ***    ***  ***  1.00 -.05 -.07 -.01 -.02 .02 -.09 -.03 -.01 
14. CeoChair              1.00 ..08 -.05 .10 .00 .00 .15 .02 
15. Blockh.    **     **        1.00 .03 -.10 .06 .10 -.10 -.14 
16. D_Loss                1.00 .02 -.02 -.10 .01 .11 
17. Leverage **          ***   ***      1.00 -.10 .18 .06 .05 
18. FreeCash    **  ***  **   ***   ***         1.00 -.07 .09 -.03 
19. Cashconstr.           *      **   1.00 -.03 -.01 
20. Age **   *  *  * ***   **  ***    **       1.00 .12 
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Panel D reports Pearson correlation coefficients. First, these univariate analyses 
suggest that board size, fraction of outsiders on the board, and the proportion of busy 
board members are positively and significantly associated with salary and bonus, 
value of equity holdings, and total CEO compensation awarded. Second, larger firms 
do award more salary and bonus, and total compensatio  to their CEOs, and their 
CEOs have larger equity holdings. Third, CEOs of firms with a higher stock market 
performance receive stronger incentives in the form f salary and bonus, the value of 
their equity holdings, and total compensation. Remarkably, growth options are not 
significantly associated with the provision of equity ncentives, but are positively 
related with the provision of salary and bonus. Consistent with prior literature 
however, the firm’s riskiness, measured as the standard deviation of stock returns, is 
negatively and significantly associated with the provision of equity incentives to 
CEOs.  
3.4.2 Provision of short-term incentives to outsiders vs. insiders 
Table 2 reports regression estimates for the empirical model described by equation 
(1). OLS and robust regression are performed where OLS t-statistics are based on 
clustered standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (Petersen, 
2008). The provision of short-term incentives is measured through the salary and 
bonus elasticities with respect to both stock market p rformance and accounting 
performance. Panel A examines the impact of market performance on the change in 
CEOs’ cash compensation. Overall it seems that stock market performance is not 
significantly associated with cash compensation. Only for the OLS regression, stock 
market performance is significantly associated with cash compensation. Here a 10% 
market return corresponds with a 3.5% increase in cash compensation for outside 
CEO successors. The lack of significant results coincides with prior evidence that 
suggests that cash compensation is commonly tied to earnings rather than market 
performance (Lambert & Larcker, 1987). Moreover, that cash compensation is tied to 
stock market performance only for outsiders coincides with findings of Dikolli et al. 
(2007) who document that firms make annual bonus contracts contingent on forward-
looking measures (price) to lengthen the decision hrizon of CEOs as they approach 
retirement (an alternative proxy for horizon concers). As robustness analysis, the 
analysis is repeated allowing the salary and bonus ela ticity with respect to market 
performance to vary across governance variables. This is consistent with previous 
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literature documenting variation in the implicit weight on performance measures 
across governance structures (Davila & Penalva, 2006). Market performance is again 
not significantly associated with cash compensation. With respect to control variables, 
the results suggest amongst others that monitoring by large shareholders can be 
regarded as substitute rather than complement for the provision of incentives tied to 
performance measure outcomes (Engel et al., 2002). The coefficient on the interaction 
between TSR and blockholders is negative and significa t for the robust regression 
(p<0.1). Moreover, the coefficient on the interaction between TSR and board size is 
negative and significant (p<0.1). This reduction in CEO performance incentives 
provided by the board through compensation can follow from the reduced ability of 
larger boards to resist CEO control (Eisenberg et al., 1998) 
Panel B of Table 2 describes the regression estimates of regressing the change in cash 
compensation on the change in accounting performance. Here, accounting 
performance is positive and more strongly associated to a change in CEO salary and 
bonus for inside successors, relative to outside successors. The coefficient that 
represents the relationship between the change in ROA and CEO salary and bonus for 
inside CEO successors (β1) is positive and significant for both the OLS regrssion and 
the robust regression. The coefficient is higher in comparison with prior studies. For 
his sample of US CEOs over the period 1981-1984, Kaplan (1994) reported 
coefficients of about 2. Since the median ROA for sample firms is about 6%, a 10% 
increase in ROA (i.e. an increase of the ROA with 0.6% towards 6.6%) results in a 
3% increase in salary and bonus for inside CEO successors. Formulated in absolutes, 
this implies a salary and bonus increase for inside CEO successors of about £8K 
(evaluated at the median salary and bonus for inside uccessors). The relationship 
between accounting performance and the sum of salary nd bonus is significantly 
smaller for outside CEO successors (β2). The relationship between the change in ROA 
and the change in salary and bonus for outside CEO successors is positive and 
significant for both the OLS and robust regression as suggested by the F-test of the 
sum of coefficients. Starting from a median ROA of 6%, an increase of ROA towards 
6.6% (i.e. a 10% increase in ROA) results in a 1% increase in CEO’s cash 
compensation. Formulated in absolute amounts, this implies an increase in salary and 
bonus for outside successors of almost £4K (evaluated  the median salary and bonus 
for outside CEO successors).  
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The analyses are repeated allowing the implicit weights on the performance measures 
to vary across governance structures (Davila & Penalva, 2006). This does not change 
the basic findings. Still the salary and bonus elasticity with respect to accounting 
performance is significantly greater for inside CEO successors compared to outside 
CEO successors. The results moreover suggest that moni oring by large shareholders 
acts as a substitute for the provision of incentives ti d to accounting measures since 
the coefficient on the interaction between ∆ROA and blockholders is negative and 
significant for the robust regression (p<0.05).    
I furthermore repeat the analyses using the change in operating income divided by 
total sales (ROS) as measure for accounting performance. The results are similar with 
respect to sign and magnitude of the coefficients and corresponding significance 
levels. Also, the change in industry-adjusted operating income divided by the book 
value of total assets is used as proxy for performance. Here the sign of coefficients 
remains unchanged, but the magnitude and corresponding significance levels of the 
coefficients decrease sharply (not tabulated). Thisco ncides with prior literature about 
CEOs being rewarded for industry-wide or market-wide factors beyond their control 
(Abowd & Kaplan, 1999). Overall, these analyses suggest that inside CEO successors 
are more strongly incentivized by means of salary and bonus tied to short-term 
oriented accounting measures compared to outside CEO successors. The goodness-of-
fit measure is about 32% and the regression models examining the relationship 
between accounting performance and compensation are highly significant (p<0.01).    
Table 2: Provision of short-term incentives to CEO successors 
This table reports the regression estimates of the following model: 
Ln(SBt/SBt-1) = β0 + β1PERFt + β2F_OUTSIDER*PERFt + β3F_OUTSIDER + CONTROLS + ε
PERF is represented by stock market performance (TSR) and accounting performance (∆ROA). The 
results of two regressions are reported: ordinary least squares (OLS) and robust regressions. The test-
statistics are reported in parentheses. Test-statistics for OLS regression are based on clustered standard 
errors taking into account heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. The goodness-of-fit measure that is 
reported is the R-squared (OLS). All regressions include indicator variables to capture both year- and
industry effects. *** , ** , * denotes 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels respectively (one-tailed when 
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Panel A: Stock market performance 
  Dependent variable: Ln(SBt/SBt-1) 
 
 
 OLS regression 
 
Robust regression 
Variables Pred. Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat.  Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. 
Intercept  0.67**  2.19 0.67**  2.11  0.47 1.44 0.63* 1.86 
TSRt + 0.12 1.15 0.34 0.87  -0.06 -0.83 0.50 1.19 
TSRt*F_Outsider –  0.24 1.38 0.24 1.31  0.27 1.28 0.22 1.01 
F_Outsider  -0.02 -0.30 -0.02 -0.26  0.00 0.06 0.03 0.41 
Size  -0.00 -0.20 -0.01 -0.31  -0.02 -0.86 -0.03 -1.43 
Growth  -0.00 -0.48 -0.00 -0.48  -0.02 -0.84 -0.00 -0.60 
Risk  -0.01 -0.30 -0.01 -0.48  -0.01 -0.32 -0.02 -0.55 
Bsize  0.01 0.30 0.02 1.15  0.02 1.43 0.04** 2.49 
OutsBoard  -0.34 -1.65 -0.37 -1.54  0.10 0.52 0.03 0.41 
BusyB.  0.00 0.03 -0.03 -0.16  0.02 0.14 -0.13 -0.78 
CeoChair  0.33**  2.09 0.12 0.91  0.09 0.56 -0.06 -0.26 
Blockh.  -0.07 -0.42 0.01 0.06  -0.11 -0.76 0.00 0.02 
D_Loss  -0.04 -0.59 -0.03 -0.38  -0.05 -0.95 -0.07 -1.27 
Leverage  0.12 1.02 0.12 1.06  0.03 0.30 0.01 0.008 
FreeCash  -0.07**  -2.02 -0.07**  -2.16  -0.04 -0.77 -0.04 -0.79 
Age  -0.01 -1.54 -0.01* -1.74  -0.00 -1.22 -0.01* -1.81 
Gender  -0.01 -0.11 0.00 0.01  -0.05 -0.28 -0.03 -0.18 
Cashconstr.  -0.00 -0.44 -0.01 -0.59  0.00 0.13 0.00 0.09 
TSRt*Bsize  -- -- -0.07
* -1.78  -- -- -0.06* -1.92 
TSRt*OutsBoard  -- -- 0.63 1.02  -- -- 0.07 0.12 
TSRt*BusyB  -- -- -0.02 -0.04  -- -- 0.65 1.50 
TSRt*CeoChair  -- -- 0.88 1.31  -- -- 1.43
* 2.02 
TSRt*Blockh.  -- -- 0.28 -0.49  -- -- -0.91
* -1.86 
           
Industry dummies  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year dummies  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
F-test (γ1 + γ2 = 0) + 5.76
** * 1.49  1.08 2.10* 
           
N  171 171  171 171 
Goodness-of-fit  0.15 0.18  -- -- 
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Panel B: Accounting performance  
  Dependent variable: Ln(SBt/SBt-1) 
 
 
 OLS regression 
 
Robust regression 
Variables Pred. Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. 
 
Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. 
Intercept  0.16 0.51 0.16 0.45  0.47 1.32 0.61* 1.68 
∆ROAt + 5.05
** * 4.80 4.44** * 3.13  4.25** * 5.24 7.26**  1.93 
∆ROAt*F_Outsider –  -3.04
***  -2.42 -2.47** -1.76  -2.56** -1.87 -2.11* -1.47 
F_Outsider  -0.02 -0.40 -0.01 -0.12  -0.05 -0.83 -0.05 -0.83 
Size  -0.00 -0.04 -0.00 -0.19  -0.02 -0.12 -0.02 -1.12 
Growth  0.00 1.23 -0.00 -0.09  0.00 0.25 -0.00 -0.09 
Risk  0.02 0.68 0.02 0.56  -0.01 -0.21 -0.02 -0.71 
Bsize  0.00 0.31 0.01 0.91  0.01 0.94 0.03* 1.66 
OutsBoard  -0.16 -0.75 -0.12 -0.51  0.01 0.03 0.01 0.05 
BusyB.  0.00 0.01 0.01 0.09  -0.02 -0.12 0.00 0.01 
CeoChair  0.24** 1.98 0.17 1.56  0.21 1.28 0.19 1.10 
Blockh.  -0.08 -0.53 -0.07 -0.52  -0.13 -0.85 -0.14 -0.92 
D_Loss  -0.04 -0.77 -0.05 -0.87  -0.03 -0.63 -0.04 -0.77 
Leverage  0.07 0.64 0.06 0.45  -0.05 -0.40 -0.12 -0.92 
FreeCash  -0.01 -0.22 -0.00 -0.02  -0.02 -0.44 -0.01 -0.27 
Age  0.00 0.004 -0.00 -0.23  -0.00 -0.60 -0.00 -0.68 
Gender  -0.04 -0.35 0.00 0.01  -0.05 -0.25 -0.07 -0.38 
Cashconstr.  0.01 1.17 0.01 1.11  0.01 0.93 0.02 1.28 
∆ROAt*Bsize  -- -- 0.05 0.23  -- -- 0.04 0.16 
∆ROAt*OutsBoard  -- -- -8.12 -1.23  -- -- -1.78 -0.28 
∆ROAt*BusyB  -- -- -3.04 -0.81  -- -- -2.33 -0.59 
∆ROAt*CeoChair  -- -- 1.59 0.49  -- -- 1.33 0.27 
∆ROAt*Blockh.  -- -- -3.16 -0.77  -- -- -6.72
**  -2.03 
           
Industry dummies  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year dummies  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
F-test (γ1 + γ2 = 0) + 9.39
***  5.89***   2.36* 1.51 
           
N  171 171  171 171 
Goodness-of-fit   0.32 0.35  -- -- 




67 Chapter 3: Managerial horizon and the choice for insiders versus outsiders
3.4.3 Provision of long-term incentives to outsiders vs. insiders 
Table 3 reports regression estimates for the empirical model represented by equation 
(2). Here the provision of long-term incentives is measured through the elasticity of 
the value of unrealized equity holdings with respect to market performance. For both 
regressions, the association between stock market performance and the change in the 
value of equity holdings for both inside and outside CEO successors are positive and 
significant. Also, the coefficient that represents the differential impact of market 
performance on the change in equity holdings for outside successors (δ2) is positive 
and significant. This implies that the compensation of outside CEO successors is more 
strongly tied to market performance compared to inside CEO successors. A 10% 
increase in stock market performance results in an increase in the value of CEO 
wealth of about 3% for inside CEO successors. In absolute amounts, a 10% increase 
in stock market performance results in an increase in the value of CEO wealth of 
about £42K for inside CEO successors (evaluated at the median portfolio of equity for 
inside successors). However, a 10% increase in market performance results in a 
portfolio wealth change for outside CEO successors of about 6%. Thus a 10% 
increase in stock market performance implies an increase in the equity portfolio of 
about £145K for outside successors (evaluated at the median value of equity 
incentives for outside CEO successors). As robustnes  analyses, the analyses are 
repeated allowing implicit weights on market performance to vary across governance 
structures (Davila & Penalva, 2006). Besides that, the magnitude of the elasticity for 
inside CEO successors becomes somewhat bigger, while the sign and magnitude of 
the coefficients of interest as well as corresponding significance levels remain similar.  
Table 3: Provision of long-term incentives to CEO successors 
This table reports the regression estimates of the following model: 
Ln(EqHoldt/EqHoldt-1) = δ0 + δ1TSR + δ2F_OUTSIDER*TSR + δ3F_OUTSIDER + CONTROLS + ε
  
Results of two regressions are reported: ordinary least squares (OLS) and robust regressions. The test-
statistics are reported in parentheses. Test-statistics for OLS regression are based on clustered standard 
error, taking into account heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. The goodness-of-fit measure reported 
is the R-squared (OLS). All regressions include indicator variables that capture both year- and industry 
effects. *** , ** , * denotes 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level respectively (one-tailed when coefficient 
sign is predicted, two-tailed otherwise). 
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Dependent variable: Ln(EqHoldt / EqHoldt-1) 
 
  OLS regression  Robust regression 
 
Variables Pred. Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat.  Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. 
Intercept  1.05***  2.69 1.07***  3.04  0.99**  2.33 1.07**  2.41 
TSRt + 0.32
***  4.30 0.61** 1.84  0.29***  5.93 0.59**  2.12 
TSRt*F_Outsider +   0.31
** 1.96 0.23**  2.29  0.34** * 2.46 0.35** * 2.46 
F_Outsider  -0.04 -0.51 -0.08 -1.03  -0.04 -0.46 -0.06 -0.71 
Size  -0.04* -1.87 -0.05**  -2.13  -0.04 -1.54 -0.05* -1.75 
Growth  -0.00 -0.76 -0.00 -0.85  -0.00 -0.95 -0.00 -0.78 
Risk  -0.02 -0.49 -0.02 -0.51  -0.03 -0.65 -0.02 -0.58 
Bsize  0.01 0.64 0.02 1.20  0.00 0.55 0.02 0.83 
OutsBoard  -0.11 -0.40 -0.21 -0.91  -0.13 -0.53 -0.20 -0.72 
BusyB.  -0.14 -0.90 0.06 0.31  -0.07 -0.42 0.05 0.24 
CeoChair  -0.26**  -2.17 -0.09 -0.85  -0.25 -1.14 -0.12 -0.42 
Blockh.  0.18 1.06 0.12 0.60  0.21 1.17 0.18 0.75 
D_Loss  0.00 0.13 0.04 0.50  -0.02 -0.24 0.00 0.10 
Leverage  -0.08 -0.58 -0.07 -0.54  -0.04 -0.30 -0.05 -0.32 
FreeCash  -0.08 -1.41 -0.09* -1.89  -0.09 -1.40 -0.09 -1.43 
Age  -0.00 -0.41 -0.00 -0.38  -0.00 -0.46 -0.00 -0.56 
Gender  0.06 0.54 0.03 0.26  0.06 0.29 0.06 0.27 
Cashconstr.  -0.00 -0.43 -0.01 -1.02  -0.00 -0.34 -0.01 -0.47 
TSRt*Bsize  -- -- -0.04
* -1.80  -- -- -0.04 -1.68* 
TSRt*OutsBoard  -- -- 0.27 0.57  -- -- 0.09 0.21 
TSRt*BusyB  -- -- -0.37 -1.21  -- -- -0.18 -0.63 
TSRt*CeoChair  -- -- -0.40
* -1.93  -- -- -0.36 -0.73 
TSRt*Blockh.  -- -- 0.20 0.72  -- -- 0.11 0.35 
           
Industry dummies  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year dummies   Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
F-test (δ1+δ2 = 0) + 20.63
***  6.90***   23.33***  8.26***  
           
N  171 171  171 171 
Goodness-of-fit  0.41 0.45  -- -- 
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The results furthermore suggest that larger boards are associated with smaller 
incentives tied to stock market outcomes (p<0.1). This is consistent with the intuition 
that the reduced ability of larger boards to resist CEO control leads to smaller CEO 
performance incentives provided by the board through compensation (Eisenberg et al., 
1998). The goodness-of-fit measure is about 41% and the regression models are 
highly significant (p<0.01).36    
In sum, one can conclude that the compensation of iside CEO successors is more 
strongly tied to short-term accounting measures (i.e. current earnings-based bonuses) 
while compensation of outside successors is more strongly tied to long-term oriented 
performance measures such as price and future earnings targets).  
3.4.4. Robustness analyses 
3.4.4.1. Incentive bounds as alternative explanatio for cash pay elasticity differential 
Table 2 shows that cash compensation for inside CEOsuccessors is more strongly tied 
to accounting performance relative to outside successors. However earnings-based 
bonus plans often contain lower and upper bounds suggesting a reduced elasticity of 
cash pay for either very good or very bad earnings performance (Leone et al., 2006). 
More specifically, in this setting the documented smaller elasticity for outside CEO 
successors could be due to very bad earnings performance by those successors in the 
prior year, very good earnings performance in the current year, or equivalently 
formulated, a very large increase in earnings performance for the current year. At first 
glance, the performance in terms of ROA for year t+1 and year t+2 is not significantly 
different between inside and outside CEO successors (not tabulated). However, as 
suggested by panel B of Table 2, outside CEO successors report a significantly higher 
∆ROA compared to inside successors. The analyses are repeated while: i) excluding 
all observations with prior year ROA < 0%, 0.5%, 1%, 1.5% and 2% successively; ii) 
excluding all observations with current year ROA > 20%, 18%, 17%, 16%, and 15% 
successively; and iii) excluding all observations with ∆ROA > 9%, 8.5%, 8%, 7.5%, 
and 7% successively. Results remain qualitatively similar with respect to sign, 
magnitude and significance levels for both the coeffici nts β1 and β2 (not tabulated). 
                                               
36 With respect to the control variables, significant coefficients for the variable ‘CeoChair’ indicate that 
the combination of the roles of CEO and chairman of the board is associated with decreased long-term 
incentives. However, these results must be interpreted with some caution because of limited variation 
in this variable. Moreover, the results do not appear to be significant for the robust regressions.  
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3.4.4.2. Equity valuation 
In the analyses, the Black-Scholes value of options s used. Hall & Murphy (2002) 
claim that for the benefits of stock options (i.e. s lection, retention, and provision of 
incentives) to materialize, the firm must set restrictions on actions of recipients such 
as short-selling company securities or otherwise hedging firm stock-price risk. 
However, restricting such trading and hedging activities creates a divergence between 
the (opportunity) cost of the option (i.e. foregone receipts of the sale of a tradable and 
hedge-able stock option to an outside investor) and the stock option value to a risk-
averse and undiversified executive who can neither sell the option nor hedge against 
its risks.37 Since options are routinely exercised relatively early in their term (Huddart 
& Lang, 1996), relaxing the assumption that executives hold their options until 
expiration date (i.e. early exercise provisions upon vesting) decreases the divergence 
between the economic cost and the value of the option to executives.38 Core & Guay 
(2001) argue that the discount on valuation is driven by the constraint for an executive 
to rebalance his portfolio following an equity grant, such that the equity grant 
permanently increases risk and incentives borne by the executive. If one assumes that 
firms contract with executives to hold a specific amount of equity incentives (i.e. 
agree upon a specified level of risk) and executives are required to rebalance 
portfolios when equity risk deviates from contractual levels, the equity grant - which 
now serves as compensation instead of serving as both incentive and compensation - 
does not increase risk and executives do not discount the value of the grant.39 Further, 
prior literature has reported subjective valuations f tock options by employees that 
                                               
37 The risk-neutrality assumption central to the Black-Scholes model assumes that since investors are 
able to hedge, options can be valued as if investors were risk-neutral and all assets appreciate at the 
risk-free rate. Then the value of options can be estimated by computing the expected option value upon 
exercise assuming that the expected stock return equals the risk-free rate. The expected option value to 
the grant date is then computed through discounting using the risk-free rate (Hall & Murphy, 2002).   
38 Allowing early exercise increases option values to undiversified executives since sufficiently high 
stock prices lead executives to lock in the gain (i.e. exercise and sell the shares) instead of holding the 
option for another period (i.e. sacrifice upside potential in stock prices and deferred payment of 
exercise prices). The economic cost of options decreases since executives’ exercise decisions are 
suboptimal from the point of view of outside investor  (i.e. early exercise essentially removes the right-
hand tail of payoffs).          
39 As illustration, Core & Guay (2001) use an example where an executive must hold $10 mio of his 
wealth in the firm’s stock. Assume the executive receives a $1 mio grant and that at the time of the 
grant portfolio holdings cannot be rebalanced. Now he has $11 mio in firm equity, which imposes 
additional risk and incentives on the executive andmoves him away from preferred holdings. So, he 
discounts the value of this $1 mio grant. Now assume that a contract between executive and firm 
requires him to hold exactly $10 mio of equity incetives. If the executive receives a $1 million grant 
and if he can rebalance his portfolio, he will not discount the value of the grant (since the executive can 
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contrast conventional wisdom about employees putting a discount to the Black-
Scholes value of an option (e.g. Devers et al., 2007). One reason for the documented 
subjective overvaluation compared to the Black-Scholes benchmark is employee 
optimism regarding stock price expectations, consistent with the view that stock 
options serve to attract optimistic employees from the labor pool (Arya & Mittendorf, 
2005).    
Moreover, since option vesting and other forms of equity compensation are 
conditional on achieving longer-term performance targets, the probability of stock 
option vesting, the vesting of restricted stock grants, etc., is strictly smaller than one. 
Conyon et al. (2006) report a vesting probability of performance-based equity 
compensation of about 80%. To address aforementioned issues, different discount 
rates are applied to: i) the valuation of options;40 and ii) the valuation of equity 
compensation where vesting is made conditional on achieving longer-term 
performance targets. Re-estimating the regressions specified in equation (2) while 
applying discount rates of 60%, 70%, 80%, and 90% respectively yields qualitatively 
similar results with respect to sign, magnitude andsignificance levels for the main 
coefficients of interest. 
3.4.4.3 Potential endogeneity of choice regarding CEO successor 
That the decision to select an inside versus outside CEO successor represents a choice 
variable is itself not sufficient to warrant concerns for endogeneity (Chenhall & 
Moers, 2007). From an econometric point of view endogeneity can be defined as the 
correlation between the disturbance term in the structu al equation and one or more 
explanatory variables, potentially caused by omitted variables (Nikolaev & van Lent, 
2005). This results in biased coefficients if an omitted variable is correlated with both 
the explanatory variable of interest as well as with the explained variable (Chenhall & 
Moers, 2007). One source of econometric endogeneity is self-selection, where an 
omitted unobservable variable may for instance affect the way in which observations 
are categorized within the sample (Nikolaev & van Lent, 2005). Since firms that 
select outside CEO successors may differ from firms that select inside CEO 
successors in more respects than their CEO successor preference, the focus is on 
                                               
40 Assuming risk aversion parameters between two and three; and investments of their wealth in the 
firm’s stock between 50% and 67%, Hall & Murphy (200 ) find discount rates ranging between 63% 
and 84%.  
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omitted variables causing firms to self-select into a tracting outside successors also 
potentially associated with the provision of incentives. 
3.4.4.3.1. The control function approach 
The control function approach addresses selection on observables, i.e. the possibility 
that an observable variable z that determines the treatment dummy D (here the choice 
to select an insider or outsider as CEO successor) may be correlated with the outcome. 
The control function approach implies expanding theoriginal set of explanatory 
variables x with z to expunge the possible correlation between the error term in the 
outcome equation and z (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005). So when prior theory is used to 
assess whether endogeneity warrants concern (Chenhall & Moers, 2007), poor pre-
turnover performance is identified as an important determinant for outside succession 
(Parrino, 1997; Engel et al., 2003; Farrell & Whidbee, 2003). First, F_OUTSIDER is 
regressed on pre-turnover accounting performance and stock market performance 
respectively. The results indicate that poor ROA, negative changes in ROA, and 
negative market returns are associated with outside CEO succession (not tabulated). 
To examine the potential impact on regression results, first note that regression 
equations 1 and 2 include a proxy for loss-making firms to control for potentially 
different executive compensation structures in loss-making firms. Moreover, prior 
research indicates that loss-making firms decrease their emphasis on providing 
explicit incentives (Leone et al., 2006; Matejka et al., 2005).41 This biases against 
finding significant results for Table 3, but provides an alternative explanation for the 
results reported in Table 2. Thus, the model specified in equation (1) is re-estimated 
while controlling for: i) negative ROA for the two years prior to CEO succession; ii) 
negative industry-adjusted ROA for the two years prior to CEO succession; iii) 
negative changes in ROA for the two years prior to CEO succession; and iv) negative 
changes in industry-adjusted ROA for the two years p ior to CEO succession 
respectively. For both OLS with clustered standard errors and robust regressions, the 
results remain qualitatively similar with respect to sign, magnitude and significance 
levels for both the coefficients β1 and β2 (not tabulated). Previous literature also 
identified that insider-dominated boards are less likely to recruit from outside the firm 
(Borkohovich et al., 1996) and that large firms characterized by greater management 
                                               
41 Prior research reported no significant link between cash compensation and earnings when earnings 
are negative (Leone et al., 2006), and a decreased emphasis on earnings and a greater use of 
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depth and business unit structures (opposed to functional structures) are less inclined 
to select outside CEO successors. Proxies for firm size and board composition are 
already included in the control function, however.  
3.4.4.3.2. Propensity score matching 
An alternative method to address any potential selection on (un)observables is 
propensity score matching. Propensity score matching is said to mimic the random 
assignment in an experimental setting through the ex-post construction of a control 
group, i.e. identifying a comparison group that is similar to the treatment group with 
only one key difference: the comparison group did not participate in the treatment (i.e. 
did not select an outside CEO successor). To address potential endogeneity 
originating from selection on observables (also referr d to as ‘overt bias’),42 a full-
dimensional matching is employed where each firm that attracts an outside CEO is 
matched to one or more firms that are selected from the pool of sample firms that 
attract inside CEO successors. If firms that attract inside or outside CEO successors 
share the same pre-treatment characteristics, any difference in outcome can be 
attributed to the treatment (i.e. the selection of an insider or outsider as CEO 
successor). As it is difficult to match on a high-dimensional vector of covariates, 
matching occurs on the propensity scores defined as the probability of selecting an 
inside versus outside CEO successor conditional on the observed covariates. So for 
each firm that attracts an outside CEO successor, one or more firms compose a control 
group that has a similar distribution of observed variables and thus a similar 
probability of attracting an outside CEO successor.   
The first step is to estimate the propensity score model by means of a logit model.43 
The control variables used in prior analyses are supplemented with an indicator 
variable equal to one if in the year prior to CEO succession the ROA of the respective 
firm < 0, zero otherwise (D_ROA_-1).44 Here it is necessary to assume that: i) 
selection into treatment is on observables only such that unobservables play no role in 
the treatment assignment and outcome determination (an assumption that is relaxed 
                                               
42 Rosenbaum (2002) defines overt bias as the bias that is related to observable variables. This can 
either result from omitting some variables or from specifying an improper functional form for the 
relationship (Armstrong et al., 2008).  
43 Estimating the propensity score model through a probit model results in similar inferences.   
44 In this way the propensity score model contains a rich set of variables identified by previous 
literature as  relevant for modeling the treatment-participation decision (Smith & Todd, 2001).   
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later); and ii) the common support condition which states that firms with similar 
covariates have positive probability of being both participants and non-participants 
into the treatment (i.e. perfect predictability of treatment given the observed 
covariates is ruled out). This common support condition is implemented by removing 
all observations in the treatment group where the propensity score is smaller than the 
minimum and larger than the maximum in the control g up.45 The results reported in 
panel A of Table 4 for both models are generally consistent with previous studies. 
Outside CEO succession follows poor pre-turnover performance (e.g. Parrino, 1997) 
and subsequently leads to post-turnover performance improvements (Huson et al., 
2004). Prior literature furthermore argues that insider-dominated boards are less likely 
to recruit from outside (Borokhovich et al., 1996). Likewise, the results indicate that 
firms with larger boards and firms characterized by monitoring by large shareholders 
are more inclined to select outside CEO successors. However, in contrast to prior 
literature reasoning that larger firms characterized by greater management depth and 
business unit structures (opposed to a functional structure) are less inclined to attract 
from outside the firm (Agrawal et al., 2005), these results indicate that firm size is 
positively associated with outside CEO succession. 
The second step is to match individual treatment firms to one or more firms selected 
from the pool of sample firms that attract inside CEO successors. To improve 
robustness of the findings, two different matching al orithms are employed. The first 
matching algorithm is nearest-neighbor matching with a radius caliper of 0.4. Here, 
each observation from the treatment group is matched with all observations from the 
control group where the propensity scores are within e predetermined tolerance 
region (i.e. the caliper) such that ‘bad matches’ are avoided.46 The second matching 
algorithm is a kernel-based matching where each individual observation from the 
treatment group is matched to a weighted sum of observations from the control group 
with similar propensity scores, where the greatest weight is given to the observation 
with a propensity score closest to the score of the respective observations from the 
treatment group.  
                                               
45 Imposing common support can reduce bias of propensity score matching (measured against a 
benchmark of randomized experiments) (Smith & Todd, 2001). 
46 We use a caliper size of one quarter of the standard eviation of propensity scores (Rosenbaum & 
Rubin, 1985). Moreover, Smith & Todd (2001) demonstrate that increasing the number of nearest-
neighbors can reduce bias of propensity score matching (measured against the benchmark of a 
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Table 4: Robustness analyses – Propensity score matching 
Panel A reports the regression estimates of two propensity score models where the propensity score is 
defined as the conditional probability of receiving treatment (i.e. selecting an outsider or insider as the 
CEO successor) given the observable covariates. The propensity score model is estimated by means of 
a logit model. Panel B provides insight into the quality of matching through a two-sample t-test of the
observable covariates between the treatment and control group. Panel C reports the outcomes for both 
the treatment (outside CEO succession) and control group (inside CEO succession) and the sensitivity 
of the outcomes for hidden bias. *** , ** , * denotes 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level respectively 
(two-tailed). 
  
Panel A: Propensity score model 
 Dependent variable: F_Outsider 
 Short-term incentives  
(equation 1) 
 Long-term incentives  
(equation 2) 
Variables Coeff. z-statistic  Coeff. z-statistic 
Intercept -6.28***  -2.62  -6.05**  -2.51 
∆ROA 11.50**  2.35  -- -- 
TSR -- --  -0.06 -0.19 
Size 0.36**  2.11  0.33* 1.95 
Growth -0.00 -0.20  -0.02 -0.75 
Risk -0.19 -0.62  -0.25 -0.79 
Bsize -0.24**  -2.14  -0.25**  -2.24 
OutsBoard 2.07 1.29  2.27 1.43 
BusyB. -0.87 -0.78  -0.84 -0.76 
Blockh.  2.15* 1.92  2.61**  2.30 
D_Loss 0.29 0.78  0.34 0.92 
Leverage 0.95 0.98  1.26 1.27 
FreeCash -0.69 -0.97  -1.04 -1.12 
Age 0.01 0.32  0.01 0.46 
D_ROA_-1 1.60***  2.85  1.56***  2.82 
      
N 171  171 
Pseudo-R2 0.17  0.16 
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Panel B: Two-sample t-test between treatment and cotrol group 
 Short-term incentives 
(equation 1) 
















∆ROA 0.02 0.02 0.84  -- -- -- 
TSR -- -- --  0.19 0.18 0.92 
Size 13.62 13.88 0.43  13.60 13.53 0.85 
Growth 2.32 2.20 0.92  2.27 2.88 0.54 
Risk 0.51 0.53 0.85  0.50 0.52 0.83 
Bsize 8.47 8.63 0.72  8.49 8.49 0.99 
OutsBoard 0.59 0.58 0.69  0.59 0.61 0.51 
BusyB. 0.31 0.31 0.88  0.31 0.32 0.75 
Blockh.  0.25 0.29 0.28  0.25 0.27 0.54 
D_Loss 0.42 0.37 0.58  0.42 0.41 0.91 
Leverage 0.61 0.60 0.89  0.60 0.57 0.43 
FreeCash 0.07 0.08 0.54  0.06 0.06 0.97 
Age 48.92 49.10 0.87  49.01 48.77 0.79 
D_ROA_-1 0.25 0.17 0.30  0.26 0.26 0.94 
An Epanechikov kernel is used that only uses observations from the control group 
within a predetermined tolerance region in order to av id bad matches. All matching 
is done with replacement. The third step is to assess the quality of the matching. 
Covariate balance is achieved if both the treatment and control group appear similar 
along their observed dimensions except for the origin of the CEO successor (i.e. 
inside or outside CEO successor). In this respect, a two-sample t-test is performed to 
assess whether there are significant differences in the covariate means for both groups 
(Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1985). After matching, covariates should be balanced between 
both groups and therefore no significant differences should be found. Panel B of 
Table 4 reports results for nearest-neighbor matching (kernel-based matching leads to 
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The p-values (two-tailed) indicate that the matching algorithm was successful in 
achieving balance, i.e. subsequent to the matching no significant differences exist 
between the treatment and control group for all incuded covariates. 
Panel C of Table 4 presents the main results for the elationship between performance 
and pay for outside versus inside successors.47 The dependent variables (natural 
logarithm of cash ratio and the natural logarithm of the ratio of unrealized equity 
holdings) can now be compared between treatment (outside CEO succession) and 
control group (inside CEO succession) while keeping in mind that the treatment and 
control group are similar with regard to the other remaining covariates. Although tests 
suffer from a loss in power due to the decreased number of observations, the results 
show that a similar change in ROA leads to significantly smaller change in the CEO 
cash compensation for outside CEO successors relative to inside CEO successors 
(p<.05). Furthermore, a similar change in stock market performance results in a 
significantly greater change in CEO wealth for outside CEO successors compared to 
inside successors (p<.06). Both results are based on nearest-neighbor matching. The 
use of kernel-based matching leads to similar results in terms of sign and significance 
levels. Therefore the results of this robustness analysis are consistent with the prior 
results in the sense that outsiders seem to be provided less short-term oriented 
incentives and more long-term oriented incentives relative to inside CEO successors. 
Finally, the assumption is relaxed that selection into treatment is on observables only. 
The hidden bias is present if two units with the same observed covariates x have a 
different probability of receiving the treatment (π), i.e. if xj = xk, but πj ≠ πk for some j 
and k. The sensitivity analysis provides insight into the question how large these 
hidden biases should be to alter the inferences about treatment effects. More 
specifically, let us assume two units j and k characterized by xj = xk, but πj ≠ πk. The 
odds that units j and k receive treatment is πj / (1 - πj) and πk / (1 - πk) respectively, 
and the odds ratio is the ratio of these odds.  
 
                                               
47 Propensity score matching was implemented through the Stata module psmatch2 (E. Leuven & B. 
Sianesi. (2003). “PSMATCH2: Stata module to perform full Mahalanobis and propensity score 
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Panel C: Outcomes for treatment and control group 
Dependent variable:  
Ln(SBt/SBt-1) 














0.23 0.36 -1.98 1.75  0.40 0.24 1.89 1.25 
If the odds ratio (denoted Ґ ) equals one, then πj = πk when xj = xk, so the study would 
be free of hidden bias. If Ґ = 2, this implies that two units that appear to be similar 
(i.e. who have the same x) could differ in their odds of receiving treatment by as much 
as a factor 2 (i.e. one could be twice as likely to receive treatment as the other). So Ґ 
measures the extent of departure from a benchmark situation that is free of hidden 
bias (Rosenbaum, 2002). The sensitivity of the observed statistically significant 
results is assessed by estimating the boundary Ґ values where significance levels from 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Statistic exceed p-values of 0.1. The results are reported in 
Table 5, panel C. Despite the absence of an absolute benchmark, the computed values 
for Ґ range between 1.25 and 2, suggesting some sensitivity of the results to 
unobservables.          
3.4.4.3.3 Heckman selection model 
To further address potential selection on unobservables, remaining differences 
between firms selecting insiders versus outsiders as CEO successors not currently 
identified in the literature are also addressed by means of a treatment-effects model 
that controls for self-selection bias (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005). The first-stage 
selection equation is defined as iiii zd εγ +=
'  where id  is a latent variable such that 
1=id  if and only if ,0
* >id  and 0=id  if and only if .0
* ≤id  The effect of 
unobservable information is consequently included in the second-stage outcome 
equation by means of the inverse Mills ratio (Li & Prabhala, 2006).48 The second-
stage results for all the main variables of interest (i.e. β1 and β2; and δ1 and δ2 from 
equation 1 and 2 respectively) are qualitatively similar. All models are highly 
                                               
48 The set of variables included in z coincide with the set of explanatory variables specified in the 
equations 1 to 3. Strictly speaking, exclusion restrictions are not necessary in Heckman selection 
models because the models are identified by non-linear ty. Nonetheless multicollinearity concerns may 
arise not mitigated by merely including instruments i  z however. The inclusion of weak instruments 
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significant (p<0.1). The inverse Mills ratios are insignificant in all regressions, 
indicative of a lack of endogeneity bias in the regressions (not tabulated). 
3.5 Conclusions and limitations 
This paper argues that outside CEO successors are pron  to short-termism due to 
greater outside employment alternatives and an inclination to quickly show results in 
an attempt to build reputation in their new firm. The question addressed in this paper 
is to what extent firms anticipate and account for short-termism of outside CEO 
successors by granting them less short-term incentives and more long-term incentives. 
Empirical results show that outside CEO successors report smaller salary and bonus 
elasticities which signify that inside CEO successor  are awarded relatively more 
short-term oriented cash compensation contingent on current earnings compared to 
outside CEO successors. In addition, outside CEO successors report greater equity 
portfolio elasticities. This implies that outside successors are provided greater long-
term oriented incentives contingent on both future earnings targets and future stock 
price. From this evidence I conclude that CEO successors that are attracted from 
outside the firm are provided less (more) short-term (long-term) incentives relative to 
inside CEO successors. 
A caveat is the limited sample size. Although the sample size of empirical studies that 
focus on relatively rare phenomena such as CEO succesions is relatively limited, my 
choice for investigating this research question in a UK setting does not alleviate any 
sample size concerns. However, I believe that this UK setting, where a major part of 
stock-based incentives is simultaneously tied to future stock price and future 
accounting targets, enables me to research the question of interest in a straightforward 
manner. That is, the UK setting enables me to make a cle ner distinction between 
short-term and long-term incentives than would have be n possible in a US setting. In 
making this trade-off, I believe that the results can be better attributed than would be 
possible with a larger US sample. Further, although I document that firms address 
potential distortions in intertemporal decision-making, it is still unclear whether it is 
economically rational for firms to design CEO compensation such that the short-term 
orientation of executives is completely mitigated. Future research could therefore 
explore the extent to which executives that are prone to short-termism indeed act 
accordingly.    
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Appendix 1: Variable definitions 
Variable name Description 
Dependent variables:  
Ln(SBt/SBt-1)  Natural logarithm of the difference in salary and bonus for year t+2 
relative to the year t+1. 
Ln(EqHoldt /EqHoldt-1)   
 
Natural logarithm of the difference in the unrealized value of the 
CEO’s portfolio of stock and stock options for the end of year t+2 
relative to the beginning of year t+2. 
Independent variables:  
F_OUTSIDER Indicator variable equal to one if the CEO successor is from outside 
the firm, zero otherwise.  
 
TSR Stock market-based performance measure which denotes the 
percentage change in shareholder value. 
∆ROA Change in the ratio of operating income divided by the book value of 
total assets. 
∆IA_ROA Change in the ratio of operating income divied by book value of total 
assets minus the mean change in the ratio of operating income divided 
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Control variables:  
Size Natural logarithm of the book value of total assets. 
Growth Ratio of market value of equity divided by the book value of equity. 
Risk Standard deviation of stock returns over the five years prior to CEO 
turnover. 
Bsize Number of internal and external board members. 
OutsBoard Proportion of outside directors on the board. 
BusyB. Proportion of outside directors that serve on four or more boards. 
CeoChair Indicator variable equal to one if the CEO is also chairman of the 
board, zero otherwise. 
Blockh. Total ownership of external blockholders (i.e. value of shares owned 
by shareholders owning ≥ 5% of outstanding shares divided by total 
value of outstanding shares). 
D_Loss Indicator variable equal to one if the firm has a negative shareholder 
return, zero otherwise. 
Leverage Ratio of the book value of liabilities divi ed by the book value of total 
assets. 
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Cashconstr. Three year average of common and preferred dividend + cash flow 
used in investing activities – cash flow from operations divided by the 
book value of total assets. 
Age Age of the CEO successor in years. 
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Chapter 4: Nonfinancials and the incentive intensity of 
CEO bonus contracts 
4.1 Introduction 
This paper documents that the weights that firms assign to nonfinancial performance 
measures is negatively associated with pay for performance. In multi-task settings, it 
is argued that nonfinancial performance measures ar informative of the allocation of 
effort to dimensions that are associated with long-term value (e.g. Ittner & Larcker, 
1998; Banker et al., 2001). I argue that adding nonfi a cial measures to CEO bonus 
contracts may not completely resolve the congruence problems that would originate 
from a sole reliance on financial measures. This is because various nonfinancial 
performance measures are not available for contracting (Budde, 2007), weights used 
to elicit effort in all important performance dimensions will most probably not 
coincide with the weights that bring about value cration across all performance 
dimensions (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992; Baker, 2002), nonfinancial measures are 
imperfect proxies of firm value (Baker, 2002), and because of the difficulty of 
assigning weights to each of the multiple performance measures due to the complex 
and ambiguous relation between nonfinancial measures and financial outcomes (Ittner 
et al., 2003; Sedatole et al., 2007). This paper theefore examines whether the 
probable inadequate contribution of nonfinancial measures to the congruence of the 
overall performance measure prompts firms to decrease incentives provided through 
the bonus contract, or alternatively, whether firms that want to provide strong 
incentives decrease their weight on the nonfinancial measures in the bonus contract.  
An exclusive reliance on financial performance measure  can be appropriate for 
companies where, for instance, earnings are informative of managerial effort. Ittner et 
al. (1997) show that earnings are informative of performance in terms of increasing 
operating efficiencies for those companies that adopt defender-oriented strategies. 
Bushman et al. (1996) document that earnings are informative of managerial effort for 
firms that are characterized by relatively short product development and product life 
cycles. For the sample examined by Ittner et al. (1997), 203 of the 317 firms 
exclusively relied on summary financial measures in their respective CEO bonus 
contracts. However, other firms face conditions such that earnings may not capture all 
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important dimensions of managerial effort and thus nonfinancials may provide 
incremental information beyond summary financial measures (Banker & Datar, 1989).  
Besides the potential benefits that nonfinancial measures provide in such settings, 
distinctive difficulties are associated with adding onfinancial measures to CEO 
bonus contracts. For firms where a sole reliance on financial measures leads to an 
incongruent incentive scheme, assigning a non-zero w ight to nonfinancial measures 
may not resolve the incongruity concerns because various nonfinancial measures are 
not available for contracting (Ittner et al., 1997; Budde, 2007). The resulting incentive 
scheme comprising financial measures and an incomplete set of nonfinancial 
measures would still be incongruent, i.e. an unbalanced provision of effort is elicited 
(Budde, 2007).  
Furthermore, contrary to financial measures that summarize actions in one single 
performance metric, nonfinancial measures are ‘specific’ measures that provide 
information about a subset of actions executed within an organizational unit 
(Abernethy et al., 2004; Moers, 2006). Since nonfinancial measures do not capture all 
benefits and corresponding costs related with specific managerial actions (e.g. quality 
initiatives), nonfinancial measures are imperfect proxies of firm value by nature. 
Compared to measures that are more closely related to conomic profit (e.g. residual 
income), nonfinancial measures in itself are more lik ly to contribute to distortion. 
The potential incongruity that may stem from adding nonfinancial measures to bonus 
contracts is amplified by the complex nature of the relationship between nonfinancials 
and measures of future financial performance, which ex ibits many non-uniformities 
(Dikolli & Sedatole, 2007). For instance, Ittner & Larcker (1998) document 
diminishing economic returns to investments in customer satisfaction, such that a 
strong emphasis on e.g. quality may result in costly quality initiatives even though 
these actions may fail to be sufficiently reflected in future sales numbers. Likewise, 
Baker (2002) points out the hazards of including customer satisfaction in bonus plans 
since there are simply too many ways to increase customer satisfaction without 
increasing profits. Datar et al. (2001) argue that in determining the weights for 
performance measures, one should not only take into acc unt the congruity of each 
individual measure, but also how each measure interacts with other measures in the 
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Therefore, assigning relative weights to multiple financial and nonfinancial measures 
in bonus contracts will most likely lead to situations where bonuses are paid even 
though the performance is unbalanced in the sense of overachieving some objectives 
and underachieving other objectives (Ittner et al., 2003). The established weights can 
easily disconnect the performance achievements in each measure with the value that 
should be created through those achievements. Hodak (2005) indeed suggests that 
achievement on nonfinancial performance measures often does not translate into 
shareholder returns and documents that firms that adopted executive bonus plans 
composed of multiple financial and nonfinancial measures underperform their peers 
by 3.2% annually.  
Firms facing inherently incongruent incentive schemes can alleviate concerns about 
incentivizing an unbalanced provision of effort by muting the provision of incentives 
(Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1991). Reduction of the incentive intensity mitigates the risk 
that misdirected effort is provided in response to a given set of incentives (Bouwens 
& van Lent, 2006). Consistent with this, Baker (200) explains the (optimally) weak 
incentives in some organizations from the fact that these organizations often lack 
undistorted performance measures. Thus firms that add nonfinancial measures to the 
financial summary measures in their bonus contracts can mitigate the concerns about 
misdirected effort by lowering the corresponding bonus incentive intensity. 
Alternatively, firms that seek to provide increased incentives may reduce the explicit 
weight assigned to nonfinancial measures and improve the congruence of the overall 
performance measure in alternative ways (e.g. by shielding the income numbers from 
the impact of strategic expenditures as documented by Duru et al. (2002)).         
I examine the association between the relative weights assigned to nonfinancial 
performance measures and the bonus incentive intensty u ing a sample of 164 
observations of Dutch firms listed on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange. Since the prior 
literature has clearly established the joint nature of firms’ performance measurement 
and incentive compensation decisions (Jensen & Meckling, 1992; Milgrom & 
Roberts, 1992), I account for the possibility that firms’ decision to assign some weight 
to nonfinancial measures in the CEO bonus contract and the choice regarding the 
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intensity of the bonus incentives will be jointly determined.49 Given this joint nature, I 
employ a simultaneous equations model. To address concerns regarding 2SLS 
models, I heed the advice of Larcker & Rusticus (2008) and execute a wide range of 
sensitivity analyses to infer: i) the extent to which assumptions of relevance and 
exogeneity of the proposed instruments apply in my setting; and ii) the sensitivity of 
the results to potential violations of these assumptions. The analyses provide 
conclusive evidence on the question whether firms that seek to provide increased 
incentives lower their bonus incentive intensity. Here I find that firms that want to 
provide increased incentives lower the relative emphasis on nonfinancial measures in 
their CEO bonus contracts for both the OLS and 2SLS analyses. However, regarding 
the question to what extent firms that assign a non-zero weight to nonfinancial 
measures in their CEO bonus contracts adjust their bonus incentive intensity, the 
evidence is inconclusive. Where the OLS analyses suggest that firms lower their 
incentive intensity, this is not substantiated by the 2SLS analyses. The results are 
similar when I, amongst others, explicitly account for the use of weak instruments 
through employing Moreira’s instead of 2SLS, and usebias-corrected bootstrapped 
confidence intervals instead of normal theory test sta istics.   
The contribution is twofold. First, this study explicitly addresses the drawbacks of the 
use of nonfinancial performance measures. Where much of the prior literature has 
focused on the potential of nonfinancial measures for improving congruence, I 
elaborate on the potentially limited contribution of nonfinancial measures in 
improving the congruence problems that would arise if those firms solely relied on 
financial measures. I document that firms anticipate for this by lowering their bonus 
incentive intensity. Second, I account for the joint nature of firms’ decisions to assign 
weights to nonfinancial measures and the decision regarding the incentive intensity 
through employment of a 2SLS model. This approach has provided me with the 
opportunity to apply to an empirical study the methodological improvements 
suggested by, among others, Murray (2006) and Larcker & Rusticus (2008).     
                                               
49 However, organizational design is not limited to these two choices (e.g. Jensen & Meckling (1992) 
elaborate on the interrelations between delegation of decision rights, performance measurement, and 
incentive compensation design). As such, this study represents a simplified partial equilibrium analysis 
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4.2 Literature review and hypotheses 
Milgrom & Roberts (1992) argue that the provision of incentives and the ability to 
monitor managerial actions through performance measur s can be regarded as 
complementary. Thus firms that want to increase the provision of incentives need to 
increase the quality of the performance measures in order to facilitate the increased 
incentive intensity. The informativeness principle suggests that firms should include 
performance measures such as nonfinancials in contracts as long as each measure 
allows for a reduction of the error with which the agent’s choices are estimated 
(Milgrom & Roberts, 1992). However, adding nonfinancial measures can also 
contribute to distortion since paying for customer satisfaction, for instance, may 
encourage employees to exploit non-profit-maximizing ways to curry favor with 
customers, which in turn drives profit numbers down (Baker, 2002). As including 
nonfinancial measures in contracts can thus potentially decrease the quality of the 
performance measures, in this study I examine the association between the weight 
assigned to nonfinancial measures and the extent to which firms use performance pay. 
As the decisions regarding performance measurement and provision of incentives are 
jointly determined (Jensen & Meckling, 1992; Milgrom & Roberts, 1992), I treat the 
weight assigned to nonfinancial measures and incentive intensity as endogenous. 
Figure 1 outlines the focal structural model of this paper. 
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Determinants of incentive intensity 
Prior research distinguished a wide range of firm-specific variables explaining the 
provision of incentives within firms. I expand on the existing literature by also 
including the relative weight assigned to nonfinanci l performance measures as an 
additional determinant of the bonus incentive intensity. The bonus incentive intensity 
is thus modeled as follows: 
Incentive intensity = ƒ (weight on nonfinancial measures, control variables). (1) 
While financial measures such as earnings may sufficiently convey underlying action 
choices in some firms, at other companies financial measures may not sufficiently 
convey pivotal performance dimensions while nonfinanci l measures may be 
incrementally informative about effort allocated to dimensions associated with long-
term firm value (Ittner et al., 1997; Ittner et al., 1998; Banker et al., 2001).50,51 
However, there are distinctive costs associated with adding nonfinancial measures to 
the financial measures in bonus contracts.  
First, for firms where a sole reliance on financial measures would lead to an 
incongruent incentive scheme, putting a non-zero weight to additional nonfinancial 
performance measures in CEO bonus contracts may not res lve the incongruity 
concerns because various nonfinancial measures are non-verifiable and therefore 
cannot be used in contracting.52 Given that some nonfinancial measures are not 
available for contracting, Budde (2007) analytically demonstrates that the resulting 
incentive scheme is incongruent, i.e. an unbalanced provision of effort is elicited. 
                                               
50 More specifically, a sole reliance on financial summary performance measures in bonus contracts 
may be appropriate for firms adopting defender-oriented strategies since short-term backward-looking 
measures such as operating income are relatively informative measures of the performance in terms of 
increasing operating efficiencies (Ittner et al., 1997). Likewise, in firms characterized by short product 
development and product life cycles, summary accounting measures such as earnings represents 
relatively informative measures of managerial effort (Bushman et al., 1996). However for firms 
characterized by adoption of prospector-oriented strategies and/or long product development and 
product life cycles, earnings may be not informative about the managerial effort allocated to 
dimensions of effort associated with long-term value and thus nonfinancial measures may be 
incrementally informative (Bushman et al., 1996; Ittner et al., 1997).   
51 Consistent with the informativeness principle, prior studies by Amir & Lev (1996) and Rajgopal et 
al. (2003) documented for firms where accounting earnings did not adequately reflect investments in 
intangible assets, the information incorporated in no financial measures contributes in explaining stock 
price. So these nonfinancial measures have the potential to improve the congruence of the overall 
performance measurement system.  
52 Likewise, Ittner et al. (1997) refer to nonfinancial performance measures as potentially more prone to 
managerial manipulation and rarely subject to public verification, and Lambert (2001) classifies the 
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Therefore, the introduction of compensation contracts with an incomplete set of 
performance measures leads to distorted incentives (Baker, 2002).53  
Second, multiple performance measures are weighted in contracts such that effort is 
elicited in all relevant dimensions of effort. It is however unlikely that these weights 
are perfectly congruent with the weights that bring about value creation across all 
performance dimensions (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992). That is, putting more weight on 
a performance measure to take advantage of an improved signal-to-noise ratio makes 
the overall performance measure less congruent (Datar et al., 2001).  
Third, the incongruity will most likely not be resolved for those companies that add 
nonfinancial measures in their bonus contracts because nonfinancials (opposed to 
financial measures that are more encompassing) are ‘specific’ measures that provide 
information about a subset of actions carried out within an organizational unit 
(Abernethy et al., 2004; Moers, 2006). Since the majority of nonfinancial measures do 
not encompass all benefits and corresponding costs as ociated with certain managerial 
actions (e.g. quality initiatives), nonfinancial measures are imperfect proxies of firm 
value. The potential incongruity that may stem from adding nonfinancial measures to 
CEO bonus contracts is amplified by the complex nature of the relation between the 
nonfinancial measure outcomes and future financial performance (Bushman, 1996; 
Dikolli & Sedatole, 2007). That is, there may be considerable variation across 
different firms and products in how long it takes for a nonfinancial measure to begin 
to affect financial performance and for how long this beneficial effect is likely to 
persist (Dikolli & Sedatole, 2007). The relation betw en nonfinancial measures and 
financial outcomes may be influenced by moderating variables. Sedatole (2003) for 
instance documents that the relation between a quality-re ated nonfinancial measure 
and future warranty expenses is moderated by customer expectations. Most 
importantly, there may exist nonlinearities in the relationship between a nonfinancial 
performance measure and future financial performance (Dikolli & Sedatole, 2007). 
Ittner & Larcker (1998) document diminishing economic returns to investments in 
customer satisfaction such that at a certain point the costs of additional quality 
improvements outweigh the benefits. Furthermore, Ittner & Larcker (1998) document 
performance threshold such that customer satisfaction thresholds must be met before 
                                               
53 Baker (2002) refers to the fact that the agent can take many more actions than the firm can measure. 
Datar et al. (2001) refer to the difficulty of achiev ng congruity because firms have fewer slope 
coefficients than actions.  
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customers start changing their purchasing behavior. Sedatole (2003) provides 
evidence of asymmetry in the sense that increases in financial performance following 
increased levels of a given nonfinancial measure diff r in magnitude from declines in 
financial performance due to decreased levels of a given nonfinancial measure. That 
is, the negative response of dissatisfied customers (i. . decline in repurchase intent) is 
stronger than the positive response of satisfied customers. This complex and 
ambiguous relation between nonfinancial measures and financial outcomes thus 
severely complicates the task of optimally weighting the performance measures in the 
bonus contract. That is, establishing the optimal weights requires not only taking into 
account how much each individual measure is congruet with firm value but also 
taking into account the carryover effects, i.e. how it will interact with the other 
measures in the contract (Datar et al., 2001).  
Kaplan & Norton (1996) were therefore cautious about assigning explicit weights to 
multiple financial and nonfinancial performance measures in contracts because of the 
probable emergence of unintended or unexpected consequences. Ittner et al. (2003) 
recognized the difficulty of determining the relative weights when multiple 
performance measures are included in CEO bonus contracts, and they explicitly 
referred to situations where bonuses will be paid even when the performance is 
unbalanced (i.e. overachievement on some objectives and underachievement on other 
objectives). An unbalanced provision of effort is thus elicited. Nonetheless, firms that 
are facing concerns about incongruent incentive schmes can alleviate those concerns 
through muting the provision of incentives within the bonus contract (Holmstrom & 
Milgrom, 1991). Reducing the intensity of incentives mitigates the risk that agents 
will provide misdirected effort in response to a given set of incentives (Baker, 2002; 
Bouwens & van Lent, 2006).    
Determinants of nonfinancial performance measures 
The prior literature on performance measurement has ex mined the decision of firms 
to assign non-zero weight to nonfinancial performance measures in CEO bonus 
contracts. I add to the prior literature by including the bonus incentive intensity as the 
main explanatory variable of interest. Thus, the relative weight assigned to the 
nonfinancial performance measures in CEO bonus contracts is modeled as follows: 
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The prior literature established that large firms in particular (Smith & Watts, 1992), 
which employ high-ability managers (Jin, 2002), face large growth options (Smith & 
Watts, 2002), and have relatively weak governance (Engel, 2002) provide strong 
incentives. Firms that seek to provide increased incentives desire performance 
measures that are more or less congruent (Baker, 2000; 02). However, nonfinancial 
performance measures are imperfect proxies of firm value and can potentially impair 
the congruence of the overall performance measure (Baker, 2002). The prior literature 
nevertheless distinguished three alternatives to improve the quality of the overall 
performance measure for firms that want to provide significant incentives as well as to 
emphasize dimensions of managerial effort associated with long-term value (e.g. 
quality). This enables firms to lower their emphasis on ‘specific’ nonfinancial 
measures in contracts.  
First, firms can decide to improve the financial summary performance measure. Prior 
literature documents how firms adjust for items in reported earnings to ensure that 
executives are deterred from selecting value-decreasing activities and/or are not 
deterred from taking value-enhancing activities. Firms are reported to adjust for 
restructuring charges (Dechow et al., 1994), (low) earnings persistence (Baber et al., 
1998), losses (Gaver & Gaver, 1998), and discretionary accounting accruals in the 
CEO’s terminal year (Huson et al., 2003).54 Duru et al. (2002) report how firms shield 
executive compensation from the impact of strategic expenditures (i.e. research & 
development and advertising expenditures) to make the shielded income number more 
congruent with firms’ objectives. Cheng (2004) documents how firms prevent 
reductions in R&D expenditures when CEOs approach retirement and/or face small 
earnings declines or losses by adjusting for R&D spending in CEO compensation. 
Second, firms can use stock price for contracting as stock price represents an 
aggregate measure of future value that impounds all existing publicly available 
information including information contained in nonfinancial measures (Davila & 
Venkatachalam, 2004). However recent findings suggest that price does not 
efficiently incorporate the implications of nonfinancial measures (e.g. Rajgopal et al., 
                                               
54 That is, executives are not deterred from undertaking value-enhancing restructurings (Dechow et al., 
1994), or from undertaking actions that result in current period losses yet improve the firm’s long-term 
prospects (Gaver & Gaver, 1998), but are deterred fom taking actions that sacrifice long-term 
profitability for short-term profit gains (Baber etal., 1998), and are deterred from taking actions that
result in aggressive positive accruals and failing to take necessary negative accruals in the CEO’s 
terminal year (Huson et al., 2003).  
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2003). Further, even if price efficiently incorporates information in accounting and 
nonfinancial measures, it would still be difficult to replace nonfinancial measures by 
stock price. Stock price may suffer from high levels of noise which makes contracting 
more costly. Furthermore, stock price is likely to be an incongruent measure, i.e. the 
weights on different signals that are implicit in determining stock price is based on 
their implications for future cash flows, instead of their informativeness about action 
choices of agents (Feltham & Xie, 1994). Third, Dikolli (2001) demonstrates that 
firms can motivate agents to select actions associated with long-term value through 
contracting on long-term backward-looking summary measures. For example, 
incentive plans where compensation is tied to long-term accounting performance 
targets (e.g. 3-year EPS targets) are informative of, and incentivize managers towards, 
acceptance of positive NPV projects where expenditures are incurred shortly and the 
corresponding positive earnings effects materialize within the three-year window. 
However, the extent to which firms that want high-powered incentives and want to 
emphasize dimensions of managerial effort associated with long-term value decrease 
their relative weight on nonfinancial measures in CEO bonus contracts (to avoid 
strongly incentivizing an unbalanced supply of effort) depends on the trade-off 
between the costs and benefits of relying on an inherently incongruent CEO bonus 
plan composed of multiple measures versus the costs and benefits of each of the 
different alternatives, making this an empirical question.  
To conclude, I argue that firms that seek to provide increased incentives could lower 
the weight assigned to nonfinancial measures and/or conversely, that firms that assign 
larger relative weights to nonfinancial measures could lower the incentive intensity. 
Based on these arguments, the hypothesis concerning the two variables of interest is 
described as follows (stated in the null-form):  
H1: The use of nonfinancial performance measures is not associated with the 
incentive intensity.  
4.3 Methodology 
4.3.1. Sample 
The sample was drawn from firms listed on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange from 
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those firms are retained that disclose information in their annual reports about the 
explicit weights allocated to financial versus nonfinancial performance measures in 
their CEO annual bonus plan. So this sample consists of: i) companies that solely rely 
on financial performance measures for their annual CEO bonus; and ii) companies 
that assign specific weights to financial and nonfinancial performance measures.55 
Data on CEO cash compensation is retrieved from annu l reports and Boardex, while 
data on balance sheet items, accounting and stock mar et performance is retrieved 
from Compustat Global, Worldscope, and Datastream respectively. Governance and 
ownership data is collected from Boardex and Amadeus, and data on CEO 
characteristics is retrieved from the annual reports and Boardex. This yields a final 
sample of 164 observations.  
4.3.2 Variable measurement 
INC_INT denotes incentive intensity (i.e. the degree to which CEO cash 
compensation depends on performance) and is measured as the ratio of cash bonus to 
the sum of salary and cash bonus (Roulstone, 2003). NONFIN denotes the relative 
weight of nonfinancial performance measures in CEO annual bonus contracts (Ittner 
et al., 1997; Said et al., 2003). 
The following exogenous control variables are included as determinants of the relative 
emphasis on nonfinancial performance measures in CEO annual bonus contracts. 
STRAT denotes firms that adopt a prospector strategy (opposed to a defender 
strategy) and is measured as a composite measure of: i) the ratio of research and 
                                               
55 For example, TNT specified for 2005 that “the short te m incentive scheme for the members of the 
Board of Management reflects the accountability for ou  mission by rewarding for both financial and 
non-financial performance as required for sustainable results. Therefore financial and non-financial 
targets are set. The financial targets for the chief ex cutive officer are set in terms of earnings from 
continuing operations (earnings and economic profit). Non-financial targets are related to the elements 
of our mission that do not directly impact our financial performance in the short term but are crucial to 
the continued success of our company in the long term. For each member of the management board 
specific non-financial targets are agreed with the supervisory board relating to elements of our mission. 
Instilling pride in our people: continuous improvemnt in engaging our people, which can be measured 
through employee satisfaction surveys. Exceeding customers’ expectations: continued improvements in 
our relations with customers, which can be measured through customer satisfaction surveys. The “at 
target” bonus level of 60% of the base salary consists for 80% of reward for achieving financial targets 
and 20% of reward for achieving non-financial targets.” Overall, a wide range of accounting-based 
performance measures is used such as earnings per share, net income, operating income, return on 
capital employed, economic value added, sales, and other summary accounting performance measures. 
Specific targets of nonfinancial performance measure  are in the area of customer satisfaction, research 
& development, intellectual property, strategic objectives, operational excellence, leadership, corporate 
sustainability, and so on. Specific performance measures and corresponding target levels are in the 
majority of the cases classified as proprietary information and therefore not disclosed in detail.   
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development to sales; ii) the market-to-book ratio; and iii) the ratio of employees to 
sales as an average over the prior three years using principal component analysis (Said 
et al., 2003).56 Prospector firms are more involved in innovative actions and thus 
should allocate more resources to research and developm nt (relative to their 
respective sales levels), prospector firms are expected to have greater growth 
opportunities represented by greater market-to-book ratios, and prospectors should be 
less focused on achieving optimal efficiency relative to defender firms, which should 
be reflected in a greater number of employees per unit of sales (Ittner et al., 1997; 
Said et al., 2003). Since the financial performance measures are less informative about 
the managerial effort allocated to e.g. innovative activities, it is expected that 
prospector firms assign greater relative weight to nonfinancial measures. PRODDEV 
and PRODLIFE denote length of the product development cycle and length of the 
product life cycle respectively. Shorter length of product development cycle and 
product life cycle both indicate a greater importance of innovative activities and a 
greater informativeness of financial measures to such dimensions of managerial effort 
(Bushman et al., 1996). Firms are classified as having a short versus long product 
development cycle and product life cycle on the basis of their two-digit SIC code and 
business description in their annual report according to the classification scheme from 
the National Academy of Engineering (1992) (Bushman et al., 1996; Said et al., 
2003). Prior research also suggested that financial distress is associated with the use 
of nonfinancial measures in CEO bonus contracts (Itner et al., 1997; Said et al., 
2003). Two proxies are used for financial distress. D_LOSS is an indicator variable 
equal to one if the company reports negative profit in the prior year, zero otherwise 
(Matejka et al., 2005). LEV denotes the leverage and is measured as a three-year 
average of the ratio of total liabilities to total assets (Said et al., 2003). RISK denotes 
the noise in the accounting performance measures and is measured as the standard 
deviation in return on assets over the five prior years (Ittner et al., 1997). CEO_TEN 
proxies for the power of the incumbent CEO and is measured as the number of years 
                                               
56 Principal component analysis is used to measure latent characteristic of a firm’s strategy choice. 
Thus, the principal component is an exact linear combination (i.e. weighted sum) of the original 
variables. Consistent with the interpretation of a prospective strategy, the component has positive 
loadings on the ratio of research and development to sales, and the market-to-book ratio, and a negative 
loading on the ratio of number of employees to sales. Bartlett’s test of sphericity (χ2 = 38.82, p < 0.01 
with H0: all correlations are zero) suggests that the correlations are sufficient to infer a probable 
underlying factor structure. Also the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy of 
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the CEO is in position (Bushman et al., 1996; Davila & Venkatachalam, 2004). SIZE 
denotes firm size and is measured as the natural log rithm of the three-year average of 
total assets. DIVERS denotes the extent to which the firm has diversified in different 
activities. A greater degree of diversification can be associated with organizational 
complexity and thus monitoring difficulty (Bushman et al., 2004), delegation of 
decision rights (Christie et al., 2003), and to theextent that nonfinancial measures 
differ across different business segments, with a tendency to evaluate and reward 
managers less on the unique nonfinancial performance measures and instead evaluate 
and reward more on common accounting performance measur s (Lipe & Salterio, 
2000). DIVERS is measured as the number of reported segments (Denis et al., 1997). 
Finally, EQ_INC denotes the CEO’s equity incentives and is measured as the change 
in the value of the CEO’s equity portfolio for a 1% change in stock price (Core & 
Guay, 1999; Baker & Hall, 2004). Stock price may substitute for nonfinancial 
measures as an alternative forward-looking performance measure to motivate CEOs to 
select actions aligned with owners’ long-term interests (Ittner et al., 1997; Dikolli, 
2001).    
The following exogenous control variables are included as determinants of the 
incentive intensity of the CEO annual bonus contracts. Core et al. (1999) discern four 
main economic determinants that explain the provisin of incentives through CEO 
compensation contracts. First, larger firms are associated with greater monitoring 
difficulty and require more highly talented managers who are more highly 
compensated (Smith & Watts, 1992) and are expected to be wealthier (Baker & Hall, 
1998). If CEOs’ utility functions exhibit declining absolute risk-aversion, CEOs of 
larger firms are expected to be provided greater incentives (Baker & Hall, 1998). 
Second, the presence of growth opportunities proxy f r monitoring difficulty (Smith 
& Watts, 1992), which could be addressed through ex-ante interest alignment through 
the provision of (equity) incentives. Also, monitorng difficulty increases with the 
extent to which firms operate in noisy and unpredictable environments. This can be 
addressed through ex-ante interest alignment throug the provision of incentives. 
However, the risk-averse nature of CEOs implies that t e provision of incentives will 
decrease with the noise in performance measures following standard agency 
predictions (Aggarwal & Samwick, 1999). Fourth, firm performance is expected to 
explain the actual provision of incentives. Firm performance is measured as stock-
 
 104 
104 The incentive effects of performance measures and trget setting 
market performance (TSR) and return on assets (ROA). So SIZE, GRWTH, RISK, 
TSR, and ROA are included as exogenous control variables. Furthermore, corporate 
governance mechanisms are claimed to substitute for the provision of incentives as a 
means to mitigate moral hazard concerns (Engel et al., 2002). Three variables are 
included to proxy for the effectiveness of board monitoring.57 BSIZE denotes board 
size and is measured as the total number of directors on both the management board 
and the supervisory board (de Jong et al., 2005). OUTSB denotes size of the 
supervisory board relative to the size of the management board (Core et al., 1999; de 
Jong et al., 2005). Following prior literature whic laims that many directors serve 
on too many boards to adequately fulfill their supervisory duties, BUSYB denotes 
busy boards and is defined as the proportion of directors that serve on four or more 
boards. To proxy for the presence of large shareholders, BLOCKH denotes the 
fraction of shares held by large shareholders defined as shareholders owning ≥ 5% of 
the firm’s outstanding shares. LEV and D_LOSS refer to the notion that firms in 
financial distress may have different compensation structures (Matejka et al., 2005). 
CEO_TEN addresses the idea that more powerful CEOs can have different incentive 
compensation structures (Ittner et al., 1997). The organizational complexity that is 
associated with diversification (DIVERS) can result in strengthened corporate 
governance and/or a higher degree of ex-ante interest alignment through the provision 
of incentive compensation (Bushman et al., 2004). Finally, EQ_INC represents equity 
incentives imposed on the CEO that can substitute or complement with the cash-
bonus incentives faced by the respective CEO (Dikolli, 2001). 
4.3 Empirical models 
The hypothesis is tested through a simultaneous equations model that describes the 
determinants of each of the endogenous variables and their respective interrelation. 
The system of equations can be described as follows: 
INC_INT = β0 + β1NONFIN + β2SIZE + β3GRWTH + β4RISK + β5TSR + β6ROA 
+ β7BSIZE + β8OUTSB + β9BYSYB + β10BLOCKH + β11LEV + β12D_LOSS  
+ β13CEO_TEN + β14DIVERS + β15EQ_INC + ε1     (3)  
                                               
57 Dutch companies operate under a two-tier management structure consisting of a supervisory board 
comprised entirely of outside directors and a management board. In the Netherlands, there is a close 
relationship between management and supervisory boards as for example illustrated by the influence of 
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NONFIN = γ0 + γ1INC_INT + γ2STRAT + γ3PRODDEV + γ4 PRODLIFE + γ5SIZE + 
γ6RISK + γ7LEV + γ8D_LOSS + γ9CEO_TEN + γ10DIVERS + γ11EQ_INC +ε2 (4). 
Regarding the choice to estimate this system of equations by OLS or 2SLS, the 
approach was to use OLS unless the exogeneity of the explanatory variables has to be 
rejected (Wooldrige, 2002, p. 104).58 So after having verified that the proposed 
instruments satisfy the exogeneity condition (Larcke & Rusticus, 2008),59 a Durbin-
Wu-Hausman test provides mixed evidence (NONFIN: χ2 = 4.84 with p = 0.03; 
INC_INT: χ2 = 0.02 with p = 0.90) on the exogeneity of the variables of interest. By 
reporting both OLS and 2SLS estimates, I heed the advice of Larcker & Rusticus 
(2008) to report OLS results supplemental to IV estima es as a means to address the 
potential shortcomings of IV estimation in the case of some semi-endogenous 
instruments (i.e. instruments that are somewhat correlated with the unexplained part 
of the dependent variable of interest) and weak instruments (i.e. instruments that have 
weak correlation with the endogenous explanatory vaiable of interest).60 To enable 
                                               
58 As opposed to the case where explanatory variables are exogenous and OLS estimates are typically 
characterized as efficient and unbiased estimators, OLS estimation generally results in inconsistent 
estimators of all coefficients when one or more explanatory variables are endogenous. However, the 
cost of using instrumental variables for estimation is an inevitable loss of efficiency if the explanatory 
variable is exogenous, i.e. the asymptotic variance of the IV estimator is (much) larger compared to the
asymptotic variance of the OLS estimator (Wooldridge, 2002). 
59 A typical setup contains an endogenous y that is a function of an endogenous x variable, a set of 
exogenous control variables (z1), and error term u. There are multiple instruments (z2) not included in 
the equation explaining y. In most cases the test for exogeneity of x employs a regression-based 
procedure where it is assumed that the set of variables z (z = z1+z2) is not correlated with error term u. 
If one specifies a linear projection of x on z, i.e. x = λz + v with E(zv)=0, then x is endogenous if and 
only if E(uv)≠0. Intuitively one could say that considering the exogenous nature of z, v should capture 
the possible endogenous component of x. So this procedure tests for significance of residuals v in a 
regression of y on z1, x, and v (Wooldridge, 2002). Thus the exogeneity of the instruments z2 should be 
tested before testing for exogeneity of the potentially endogenous explanatory variable x (Larcker & 
Rusticus, 2008). The regression-based procedure for testing for overidentifying restrictions (i.e. 
exogeneity of instruments) follows two steps: i) regress y on all exogenous variables z using 2SLS; and 
ii) regress the computed residuals on all exogenous variables z. The test-statistic follows a chi-squared 
distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number of available instruments minus the number of 
suspect endogenous variables) and a null hypothesis that the proposed instruments are exogenous. The 
test-statistics do not reject the null for the instruments of NONFIN and INC-INT respectively.        
60 Larcker & Rusticus (2008) emphasize that when an instrument is even slightly endogenous and the 
instrument is weakly correlated with the regressor, IV-methods produce highly biased estimates. 
Moreover in those cases, it is likely that IV-estimates are more biased and more likely to result in 
wrong statistical inferences relative to simple OLS estimates that do not correct for endogeneity. More 
specifically, the probability limit of the OLS estimator can be written as: plim bols = β + cov(x,u) / 
var(x) = β + σu /σx corr(x,u). So if x is exogenous (i.e. uncorrelated with u), the OLS estimator is a 
consistent estimator of the true coefficient. However, if instrumental variables z are used for an 
endogenous x variable, the probability limit of the IV estimator can be written as: plim bIV = β + 
cov(z,u)/cov(x,z) = β + σu /σx  corr(z,u)/corr(x,z). If the instrument z is exogenous, the IV estimator is a 
consistent estimator of the true coefficient. On the other hand, if the instrument is not exogenous, the 
consistency result is no longer obtained. Note thatin the case of semi-endogenous instruments (i.e. 
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2SLS estimation of equations (3) and (4), exclusion restrictions are needed for both 
equations. For instance, the key restriction for 2SLS estimation of equation (3) is that 
STRAT, PRODDEV and PRODLIFE are correlated with NONFIN, but have no direct 
effect on INC_INT after partialling out the impact of the respective exogenous control 
variables.61 The extent to which the company follows a prospector strategy (STRAT), 
the length of product development (PRODDEV) and the length of product life cycle 
(PRODLIFE) impact both the importance of those dimensions of managerial effort 
associated with long-term value (e.g. innovation) ad the extent to which accounting 
performance measures are informative about such actions. Hence prior studies found 
that firms using a prospector strategy assign higher weight to nonfinancial measures 
in bonus contracts (Ittner et al., 1997; Said et al., 2003) and that firms facing longer 
product development cycles and product life cycles assign higher weight to 
nonfinancial measures (Bushman et al., 1996; Said et al., 2003). Taking into account 
that the proposed instruments may redistribute incentiv s across different dimensions 
of managerial effort, it is however not a priori clear that these proposed instruments 
also impact the provision of incentives as a whole (after netting out the impact of the 
control variables). This economic intuition about the expected exogeneity of the 
proposed instruments for NONFIN is consistent with the results for the test of the 
over-identifying restrictions. Here the residuals of the 2SLS regression are regressed 
on exogenous variables (i.e. the exogenous control variables and the proposed 
instruments) where the R2 of the model should be close to zero for the instruments to 
be exogenous. The resultant test-statistic of 0.28 with a corresponding p-value of 0.87 
implies that the null-hypothesis of exogenous instruments cannot be rejected (see 
footnote 6).  
The exclusion restriction for 2SLS estimation of equation (4) is that BSIZE, OUTSB, 
BUSYB, BLOCKH, GRWTH, and PERF are correlated with INC_INT, but have no 
direct effect on NONFIN after partialling out the impact of the respective exogenous 
                                                                                                                             
instruments with some correlation with u), the incosistency grows larger as the corr(x,z) approaches 
zero. Thus seemingly small correlations between z ad u can cause severe inconsistency if z is only 
weakly correlated with x (Wooldridge, 2002).  
61 The exogeneity condition implies that proposed instrument z2 is uncorrelated with the dependent 
variable of interest y after taking into account the set of exogenous control variables z1, i.e. cov(z2,u) = 
0. The rank condition implies that if we take a linear projection of the endogenous variable x on all 
exogenous variables: x = α0 + α1z1 + α2z2 + v, then the coefficient on z2 should be nonzero, i.e. α2 ≠ 0. 
Note that the loose description that z2 should be correlated with x is not entirely correct (Wooldridge, 




107 Chapter 4: Nonfinancials and the incentive intensity of CEO bonus contracts
control variables. The first variables represent governance variables where BSIZE, 
OUTSB, and BUSYB reflect board composition (i.e. size, proportion of outsiders, and 
fraction of busy directors) and BLOCKH denotes monit ring by large shareholders. 
Prior literature established that these alternative monitoring mechanisms can 
substitute for the provision of incentives as a means to mitigate moral hazard concerns 
(e.g. Core & Guay, 1999; Engel et al., 2002). It is not a priori clear, however, whether 
these alternative monitoring mechanisms are associated with emphasizing certain 
dimensions of managerial effort predictive of long term value (e.g. innovation). 
Further, PERF and GRWTH denote performance and growth which are typified as 
main economic determinants for the provision of incentives (Core et al., 2003). Note 
that prior research documented that firms in financi l distress and firms that adopt 
growth-oriented strategies (Ittner et al., 1997; Said et al., 2003) are more inclined to 
emphasize nonfinancial performance measures in CEO annual bonus contracts, which 
is explicitly controlled for through D_LOSS, LEV and STRAT. This economic 
intuition about the exogeneity of proposed instruments for INC_INT is consistent 
with the results of the test of the over-identifying restrictions, where a test-statistic of 
8.47 with a corresponding p-value of 0.21 implies that the null-hypothesis of 
exogenous instruments cannot be rejected (see footnote 6). The aforementioned tests 
for exogeneity of the instruments are supplemented by a sensitivity analysis which 
examines whether the application of different instruments yields very different results. 
More specifically, this test compares coefficients on the possible endogenous 
explanatory variables (i.e. NONFIN and INC_INT) when using one single instrument 
at a time (Larcker & Rusticus, 2008). Here the resultant coefficients on NONFIN are 
not significantly different when evaluated at the 10% significance level. The resultant 
coefficients on INC_INT are in all - but one case - not significantly different, 
evaluated at the 10% level.62 Overall, this bolsters confidence in the exogeneity of the 
proposed instruments.    
                                               
62 When using the instruments TSR and OUTSB, the coeffi ient on INC_INT is significantly different 
(p=0.06). Still, the removal of TSR and/or OUTSB from the set of proposed instruments leads to 
similar results with regard to sign, magnitude, andsignificance level of the coefficient INC_INT. 
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The relevance of the proposed instruments also has to be statistically assessed.63 Here 
the partial F-statistic and partial R2 for the first-stage regression are reported for the 
variables NONFIN and INC_INT.64 For NONFIN (INC_INT), the partial F-statistic is 
3.09 (1.57) with corresponding p-values of 0.03 (0.16).65 Furthermore, the partial R2 
equals about 8.5% (7.5%) for the instruments which altogether provides evidence of 
the at best moderate relevance of the instruments for NONFIN and INC_INT. 
Therefore, supplemental to regular OLS and 2SLS test-statistics, the results of 
Moreira’s are also reported as the critical values of the test statistic are adjusted such 
that the significance tests have correct size even in the presence of weak instruments 
(Larcker & Rusticus, 2008).66 Finally, emphasizing robustness over efficiency, 
equations (3) and (4) are estimated by 2SLS equation-by-equation.67  
                                               
63 This is especially important considering earlier remarks reported in footnote 6. In short, in the case of 
some semi-endogenous instrument even small correlations between the proposed instrument z2 and the 
error term u can lead to severe inconsistency in the case of weak instruments (i.e. small correlation 
between the endogenous variable x and proposed instrument z2). Starting from the bias of OLS and IV 
estimators as described in footnote 6, Larcker & Rustic s (2008) develop the condition in which IV 
estimation is preferable (i.e. has a smaller absolute bias): σu /σx |corr(z,u)/corr(x,z)| < σu /σx |corr(x,u)| = 
2 2 2
R < R × R
zu xz xu
. Therefore since the partial R2, indicative of the strength of the instruments is near 10%, 
this implies that the correlation between z and u can be no more than 10% of the correlation between x 
and u for IV estimation to still be preferable to OLS estimation. Further, the asymptotic distribution of 
the IV estimator is a poor approximation to the finite sample distribution in the presence of weak 
instruments. So in finite samples standard test-statistics become misspecified in the sense that 
inferences on such statistics can lead to over- or under-rejection of the null (Larcker & Rusticus, 2008).   
64 The partial F-statistic represents a test of the null-hypothesis that all instruments are insignificant 
against the alternative that at least one of the instruments is significant in a first stage regression of the 
endogenous variable x on the exogenous control variables z1 and the instruments z2. The partial R
2 
compares the explained variance of a first-stage model f the endogenous variable x on the exogenous 
control variables z1 with a first-stage model of the endogenous variable x on both the exogenous 
control variables z1 and the proposed instruments z2.   
65 Reported F-values are below the critical values of 12.83 (15.09) as suggested by Stock et al., (2002).  
66 Moreira’s (2003) conditional likelihood ratio (CLR) addresses weak instrument problems by 
conditioning critical values to overcome distortions caused by weak instruments. Moreira’s CLR is 
argued to be the most powerful test, as resulting confidence intervals are nearly optimal, its power does 
not deteriorate significantly with the addition of irrelevant instruments, and samples sizes of about 100-
200 are sufficient (Andrews et al., 2006).  
67 More efficient estimators are obtained when the estimators for both equations are estimated jointly. 
However this is at the expense of robustness since using system procedures, all equations have to be 
properly specified, i.e. their respective instruments have to be exogenous. In contrast, using 2SLS 
equation-by-equation, an equation can be consistently s imated as long as the instruments for that 
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4.4. Empirical results 
4.4.1. Summary statistics 
Table 1, panel A report descriptive statistics for the full sample. Here 61 percent of 
the sample firms incorporate nonfinancial performance measures in the respective 
CEO bonus contracts, where the mean (median) weight of those measures in the 
bonus contracts is 21% (25%). About one third of total cash compensation of the 
CEOs originates from the annual bonus. Furthermore, the mean (median) increase in 
CEO wealth due to a 1% increase in stock price is €90K (€24K).  
In panel B of Table 1, descriptive statistics are repo ted for both the subsamples that 
either put a non-zero weight or a zero weight on nofi ancial performance measures 
in their CEO bonus contracts. When difference-tests ba ed on simple t-tests and 
Wilcoxon rank-sum tests are used, some significant differences between the 
subsamples emerge. First, note that the firms that use nonfinancials in their bonus 
contracts have lower incentive intensity as expected, but that this difference is not 
significant. Second, firms that use nonfinancial performance measures have 
significantly higher scores on the proxy for a prosector-oriented strategy, and have 
longer product development and product life cycles relative to firms that solely rely 
on financials. This is consistent with prior research that indicates that adoption of 
prospector strategies, and longer product development and product life cycles make 
earnings less informative about managerial effort alloc ted towards long-term 
dimensions (Ittner et al., 1997; Said et al., 2003). Third, firms using nonfinancial 
measures are significantly larger, have fewer growth options, have smaller leverage, 
have larger boards and relatively fewer supervisory executives on the board, are less 
diversified, and have CEOs with on average lower tenur , relative to firms that solely 
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Table 1: Summary statistics 
Panel A reports descriptive statistics for variables used in the analyses. Panel B reports descriptive 
statistics for those variables by the type of CEO succession. Panel C reports the composition of the 
sample over industries. Panel D reports the Pearson correlations for the variables used in the analyses. 
In panel B: a Significance levels based on t-test. b Significance levels based on Wilcoxon rank-sum 
(Mann-Whitney) test. In panel D: Pearson correlation c efficients are reported in the upper diagonal 
cells. The corresponding significance levels are repo ted in the lower diagonal cells. *** , ** , * 
corresponds to 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels (two-tailed).  
Panel A: descriptive statistics (full sample) 
Variable Mean St.Dev 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 
INC_INT 0.35 0.13 0.19 0.27 0.33 0.45 0.52 
D_NONFIN 0.61 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
NONFIN 0.21 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.33 0.50 
STRAT 0.00 0.75 -0.96 -0.45 -0.01 0.57 0.86 
PRODDEV 0.35 0.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
PRODLIFE 0.64 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
SIZE 6.94 2.28 3.78 5.40 6.94 8.19 9.89 
GRWTH 1.56 0.93 0.93 1.03 1.25 1.69 2.46 
RISK 0.06 0.12 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.13 
TSR 0.35 0.65 -0.03 0.05 0.23 0.45 0.84 
ROA 0.06 0.07 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.13 
BSIZE 8.00 3.37 4.00 5.00 8.00 10.00 13.00 
OUTSB 0.64 0.10 0.50 0.57 0.64 0.71 0.77 
BUSYB 0.60 0.26 0.25 0.40 0.67 0.80 0.90 
BLOCKH 0.36 0.22 0.11 0.19 0.35 0.53 0.69 
LEV 0.62 0.22 0.31 0.49 0.62 0.73 0.94 
D_LOSS 0.16 0.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
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Panel B: descriptive statistics (by D_NONFIN) 
 D_NONFIN=0  D_NONFIN=1  Difference tests 
Variable N Mean Median  N Mean Median  Mean a Median b 
INC_INT 63 0.36 0.33  101 0.33 0.33    
STRAT 63 -0.25 -0.15  101 0.15 0.07  ***  ***  
PRODDEV 63 0.22 0.00  101 0.42 0.00  ***  ***  
PRODLIFE 63 0.51 1.00  101 0.72 1.00  ***  ***  
SIZE 63 6.10 6.18  101 7.47 7.41  ***  ***  
GRWTH 63 1.72 1.41  101 1.46 1.13  * ***  
RISK 63 0.08 0.03  101 0.05 0.02    
TSR 63 0.45 0.19  101 0.29 0.23    
ROA 63 0.06 0.06  101 0.07 0.06    
BSIZE 63 6.76 6.00  101 8.77 8.00  ***  ***  
OUTSB 63 0.66 0.67  101 0.63 0.63   **  
BUSYB 63 0.58 0.67  101 0.61 0.60    
BLOCKH 63 0.38 0.35  101 0.35 0.33    
LEV 63 0.66 0.65  101 0.59 0.59  **  **  
D_LOSS 63 0.16 0.00  101 0.16 0.00    
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Panel C: Sample composition over industries (full sample and by D_NONFIN) 
 Full sample  D_NONFIN=0  D_NONFIN=1 
Mining & Construction  16 (10%)  4 (6%)  12 (12%) 
Manufacturing 84 (51%)  28 (44%)  56 (55%) 
Transportation, 
Communications, Electric, 
Gas and Sanitary Services 
11 (7%)  1 (2%)  10 (10%) 
Wholesale trade and retail 
trade  
10 (6%)  6 (10%)  4 (4%) 
Finance, Insurance, and Real 
Estate 
8 (5%)  0 (0%)  8 (8%) 
Services 35 (21%)  24 (38%)  11 (11%) 
Total 164 (100%)  63 (100%)  101 (100%) 
Panel C of Table 1 reports the composition of the sample over the different industries. 
There is a strong concentration of manufacturing firms in the full sample. Within the 
subsamples, it seems that manufacturing firms are somewhat more inclined to adopt 
nonfinancial measures in their bonus contracts. For firms that operate within the 
service industry the opposite seems to hold, i.e. service firms seem to more 
exclusively rely on financial measures in the bonus contracts. Panel D reports Pearson 
correlations. From these univariate analyses, the following points deserve attention. 
First, the relative emphasis on nonfinancial performance measures in bonus contracts 
is significantly and negatively associated with the incentive intensity (p< 0.1). 
Second, the relative emphasis on nonfinancial measur s in bonus contracts is 
positively and significantly associated with: the adoption of a prospector-oriented 
strategy, the length of product development and product life cycles, firm size, and 
board size. The relative emphasis on nonfinancial measures is negatively and 
significantly associated with: the fraction of supervisory directors on the board, firm 
leverage, CEO tenure, the degree of diversification, a d the extent of equity 
incentives.  
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Panel D: Pearson correlations  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
1.INC_INT 1.00 -.13* .20***  .02 .09 .34***  .21***  -.01 .02 .00 .36***  .04 .20**  -.29***  .05 .01 -.21***  .25***  .15* 
2.NONFIN  1.00 .37***  .21***  .20**  .17**  -.08 -.07 -.06 .02 .23***  -.14* -.05 -.05 -.19**  .01 -.21***  -.22** * -.16**  
3.STRAT   1.00 .06 .25***  .12 .40***  .08 -.06 .10 .27***  -.22***  -.00 -.30***  -.16**  .04 -.00 -.03 .09 
4.PRODDEV    1.00 .46***  .08 -.23***  -.08 -.02 -.11 .04 .18**  .01 .06 -.15* .03 -.11 .00 -.11 
5.PRODLIFE     1.00 .22***  -.14* -.17**  -.09 .01 .14* .06 .07 -.13 .17**  -.06 -.23***  -.08 .14* 
6.SIZE      1.00 -.22***  -.31***  -.13 -.11 .81***  -.19**  .51***  -.47***  .16**  -.09 -.20**  .12 .12 
7.GRWTH       1.00 .35***  .23***  .08 .09 -.01 .07 -.14* -.13* .08 .18**  .07 .18**  
8.RISK        1.00 .08 -.00 -.19**  .21***  -.13**  -.08 .20***  .22***  -.01 .02 -.02 
9.TSR         1.00 -.14* -.02 .13* .00 -.05 .06 .02 .12 .03 .01 
10.ROA          1.00 -.07 -.05 -.01 -.03 .00 -.31***  .06 -.03 .03 
11.BSIZE           1.00 -.24** * .43***  -.47***  .16**  -.06 -.15* .09 .09 
12.OUTSB            1.00 -.22***  .15* -.12 .04 -.02 -.13 -.06 
13.BUSYB             1.00 -.38***  .07 -.04 .10 .12 .12 
14.BLOCKH              1.00 -.09 .05 .04 -.06 -.25***  
15.LEV               1.00 -.08 -.00 .27***  .00 
16.D_LOSS                1.00 -.08 -.03 -.05 
17.CEO_TEN                 1.00 -.07 .36***  
18.DIVERS                  1.00 -.08 
19. EQ_INC                   1.00 
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Third, the incentive intensity stemming from the annual bonus is positively and 
significantly associated with: the adoption of a prospector-oriented strategy, firm size, 
the presence of growth options, board size, the fraction of busy directors on the board, 
the degree of diversification, and the extent of equity incentives. The incentive 
intensity is negatively and significantly associated with the presence of blockholders 
and CEO tenure. So from these findings, one could conclude that firms that seek to 
provide stronger incentives do this by providing both stronger bonus incentives and 
equity incentives (i.e. holdings of stock and stock ptions), but that providing equity 
incentives can be regarded as a substitute for the inclusion of nonfinancial 
performance measures in CEO bonus contracts as a means to redirect managerial 
effort towards the long-term dimensions of effort (Dikolli, 2001). Fourth, fairly strong 
positive correlations exist between: the length of the product development and product 
life cycles, firm size and board size, and board size and the fraction of supervisory 
directors on the board respectively. Some strong negative correlations exist between 
firm size and the presence of blockholders, and betwe n board size and the 
blockholders.   
 
4.4.2 Multivariate analyses 
Table 2 reports the regression estimates for equations (3) and (4).68 The OLS and 
2SLS regressions explaining the relative emphasis on nonfinancial measures in CEO 
                                               
68 The first-stage regression results that represent reduced form equations for each dependent variable 
(NONFIN and INC_INT) that include the original control variables as well as the proposed instruments 
are reported in appendix 2. So in the case of e.g. NONFIN as dependent variable, both the control 
variables included additional to the explanatory variable of interest (INC_INT) and the proposed 
instruments for INC_INT are included. The results of reduced form equations for NONFIN are 
consistent with prior findings. The adoption of a prospector-oriented strategy is positively associated 
with the relative emphasis on nonfinancial measures (Ittner et al., 1997; Said et al., 2003), and financi l 
distress measured by the firm’s leverage is negatively associated with the relative weight on 
nonfinancial performance measures (Said et al., 2003). Moreover and surprisingly, the presence of 
growth options is negatively associated with the relative weight on nonfinancial measures and the 
fraction of supervisory directors on the board is weakly negatively associated with the relative weight 
on nonfinancial measures. If one looks at the three proposed instruments for NONFIN, only the proxy 
for adoption of a prospector-oriented strategy is po itive and significant. This confirms earlier findgs 
that already indicated that the strength of the instruments for NONFIN is relatively weak. Overall, a 
similar picture applies if we look at reduced form equations for INC_INT. Regarding the proposed 
instruments, the fraction of supervisory directors n the board serves as complement to the provision of 
bonus incentives considering the positive and weakly significant association. The weak significance of 
some proposed instruments together with the non-sigificance of other instruments for INC_INT is 
consistent with prior findings that suggested weak instruments. Thus as noted earlier, 2SLS findings are 
substantiated by Moreira’s where critical values of test statistics are adjusted in the presence of weak 
instruments (Murray, 2006; Larcker & Rusticus, 2008). Finally, three control variables are also 
significantly associated with INC_INT. CEO tenure is negatively associated with the provision of 
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bonus contracts (NONFIN) are reported in the four left columns. Dummy variables 
are included for years and industries and the t-statistics are based on clustered 
standard errors that are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (Petersen, 
2008). The results are fairly consistent across the OLS and 2SLS analyses.69 For the 
2SLS (OLS) model, the incentive intensity is negatively associated with the relative 
emphasis on nonfinancial performance measures at the p<0.01 (p<0.05) level. Thus, 
firms that seek to provide increased bonus incentivs to their CEOs reduce the relative 
weight on the nonfinancial measures in the respectiv  bonus contracts. Moreover and 
consistent with prior research, the adoption of a pros ector-oriented strategy is 
positively associated with the relative emphasis on n financial measures (Ittner et al, 
1997; Said et al., 2003), and CEO tenure is negatively associated with the relative 
weight on nonfinancials (Ittner et al., 1997; Davil & Venkatachalam, 2004). To 
improve the robustness of these findings, some sensitivity analyses are employed (not 
tabulated). First, to address concerns about weak instruments, I repeated the analyses 
using Moreira’s where critical values of test statistics are adjusted in the presence of 
weak instruments (Murray, 2006; Larcker & Rusticus, 2008). The results are similar 
with respect to the magnitude of the coefficients and the corresponding significance 
level (i.e. the coefficient on INC_INT (γ1) = -0.99, p< 0.04). Second, the 2SLS 
analysis is repeated using a Tobit model that accounts for censoring of observations 
(Cameron & Trivedi, 2005). Here the coefficient of interest (γ1) is slightly more 
negative and the significance level remains similar (γ1 = -1.67, p<0.04).  
Third, robust regression is employed to address the pot ntial impact of outliers. 
Robust regression first excludes observations with Cook’s D > 1 and subsequently 
                                                                                                                             
bonus incentives (possibly due to a greater degree of power for the incumbent, risk-averse CEO or due 
to the firm anticipating potential horizon problems), diversification is weakly positively associated with 
bonus incentives (where diversification could proxy for monitoring difficulty (Bushman et al., 2004) or 
delegation of decision rights), and equity incentives is positively associated with bonus incentives.    
69 It must however be emphasized that similar results across OLS and 2SLS models should not 
automatically bolster confidence in the regression estimates (Larcker & Rusticus, 2008). First, using 
weak instruments in finite samples can yield bias in IV estimators in the same direction as OLS 
estimators, even in the case of perfectly exogenous instruments. Second, if an explanatory variable is 
correlated with the error term (i.e. an endogenous explanatory variable), its determinants may also be 
correlated with the error term in the same direction (i.e. instruments that do not satisfy the exogeneity 
criterion). So 2SLS estimates may be biased in the same direction as OLS estimates (Larcker & 
Rusticus, 2008). Note however that the use of Moreira’s that specifically adjusts for weak instruments 
leads to similar inferences relative to the 2SLS estimates. Further, tests for over-identifying restrictions 
do not lead to rejection of the null of exogeneity for our proposed instruments. Re-estimating the 2SLS 
analyses using one single instrument each time and comparing the primary coefficients of interest 
across the 2SLS models does not lead to significantly different coefficients (except in one case). Re-
estimating the 2SLS model excluding the suspect instruments leads to a statistically similar coefficient 
for INC_INT.             
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performs Huber iterations followed by biweight iterations. The coefficient of interest 
is smaller, but significance levels remains similar (γ1 = -0.37, p<0.01). Fourth, the 
2SLS analysis is repeated using bias-corrected bootstrapped confidence intervals 
instead of statistical inference relying on standard normal distributions (e.g. 
Holthausen et al., 1995; Moers, 2005).70 A nonparametric bootstrap using 1,000 
iterations with replacement is used. The coefficient for INC_INT (γ1 = -0.99) is 
significant at p<0.05 level. Fifth, the analyses are repeated using D_NONFIN instead 
of NONFIN as the dependent variable. Note that I now examine the impact of e.g. 
seeking increased incentives on the decision to include nonfinancial measures in CEO 
bonus contracts, rather than determining the appropriate weight on nonfinancials in 
the respective CEO bonus contracts. The standard probit m del yields a negative and 
significant coefficient for INC_INT (p<0.01) whereas the 2SLS probit model yields a 
weakly significant and negative coefficient for INC_INT (p<0.11).  
The results thus suggest that firms that seek to provide increased incentives to CEOs 
assign a low weight to nonfinancial measures in their bonus contracts even up to a 
point where the bonus contract solely consists of summary financial measures. 
Table 2: OLS and 2SLS estimation for NONFIN and INC_INT 
This table reports the regression estimates of the following two models: 
NONFIN = γ0 + γ1INC_INT + CONTROLS + ε,  
and 
INC_INT = β0 + β1NONFIN + + CONTROLS + ε.   
Results of two regressions are reported: ordinary least squares (OLS) and two-stage least squares 
(2SLS). The test-statistics are reported in parentheses. Test-statistics for OLS regression are based on 
clustered standard error, taking into account heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. The goodness-of-fit 
measure reported is the R-squared (OLS). All regression  include indicator variables that capture both 
year- and industry effects. *** , ** , *, † correspond to 1%, 5%, 10% and 15% significance levls (two-
tailed). 
    
                                               
70 Standard errors are computed on the basis of coeffi ient estimates across B bootstraps and the mean 
estimated coefficient across B bootstrap samples. Bias denotes the difference between the estimated 
coefficient for the full sample and the mean estimaed coefficient across B bootstrap samples (Cameron 
& Trivedi, 2005). It is argued that the finite sample properties of 2SLS are somewhat unclear and 
therefore reliance on normal theory test statistics is questionable (e.g. Holthausen et al., 1995).        
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Dependent variable NONFIN  INC_INT 
 OLS  2SLS  OLS  2SLS 
 Coeff. t-stat.  Coeff. t-stat.  Coeff. t-stat.  Coeff. t-stat. 
INTERCEPT 0.54***  4.51  0.76***  3.58  0.13 0.71  -0.20 -0.71 
INC_INT -0.34***  -3.00  -0.99**  -2.01  -- --  -- -- 
NONFIN -- --  -- --  -0.11* -1.76  0.34 1.17 
STRAT 0.11***  3.83  0.14***  3.84  -- --  -- -- 
PRODDEV 0.01 0.19  0.02 0.39  -- --  -- -- 
PRODLIFE -0.05 -0.96  -0.07 -1.42  -- --  -- -- 
SIZE 0.01 0.40  0.02 1.26  0.01 0.85  0.03† 1.45 
GRWTH -- --  -- --  0.04**  2.05  0.04**  2.27 
RISK -0.03 -0.27  -0.03 -0.22  -0.05 -0.54  -0.11 -1.16 
TSR -- --  -- --  -0.00 -0.14  -0.01 -0.62 
ROA -- --  -- --  0.12 0.49  0.07 0.34 
BSIZE -- --  -- --  0.01 0.81  -0.00 -0.23 
OUTSB -- --  -- --  0.19 1.20  0.38* 1.72 
BUSYB -- --  -- --  -0.03 -0.51  0.00 0.05 
BLOCKH -- --  -- --  -0.00 -0.39  0.00 0.03 
LEV -0.08 -0.98  -0.07 -0.88  -0.01 -0.30  0.08 1.09 
D_LOSS 0.01 0.31  0.02 0.44  0.02 0.60  0.01 0.29 
CEO_TEN -0.01† -1.57  -0.01**  -2.15  -0.01***  -2.74  -0.00† -1.53 
DIVERS -0.01 -1.06  -0.00 -0.07  0.01† 1.50  0.02* 1.69 
EQ_INC -0.00 -0.96  0.00 0.10  0.00 1.42  0.00† 1.50 









N 164  164  164  164 
Goodness-of-fit 0.41  --  0.37  -- 
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The right four columns of Table 2 report the regression estimates of OLS and 2SLS 
regressions explaining the degree of annual bonus icentives (INC_INT). Year and 
industry dummies are included and t-statistics are based on clustered standard errors 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (Petersen, 2008). Here the 
regression estimates for the OLS and 2SLS model do not coincide. Considering the 
OLS model, the weight on nonfinancial measures is negatively and significantly 
associated with the bonus incentive intensity (β1 = -0.11, p<0.10), while the 2SLS 
model yields an insignificant coefficient for NONFIN. Furthermore, growth options 
are positively associated with the bonus incentives for both models (p<0.05), CEO 
tenure is negatively related with bonus incentives (p<0.01 and p<0.15 for the OLS 
and 2SLS model respectively), the degree of diversificat on is positively associated 
with bonus incentives (p<0.15 and p<0.10 for the OLS and 2SLS model respectively), 
firm size is positively associated with bonus incentives for the 2SLS model (p<0.15), 
the fraction of supervisory directors on the board is positively associated with bonus 
incentives for the 2SLS model (p<0.10), and the provisi n of equity incentives can be 
regarded as a complement to bonus incentives considering the positive association (p< 
0.15). To improve the robustness of these findings, some sensitivity analyses are 
employed (not tabulated). First, to address any concerns about weak instruments, the 
analyses are repeated using Moreira’s where critical values of test statistics are 
adjusted in the presence of weak instruments (Murray, 2006; Larcker & Rusticus, 
2008). The coefficient on NONFIN is similar to the 2SLS estimate but insignificant. 
Second, since information on actual performance of n nfinancial performance 
measures is not available for those observations that put a non-zero weight on 
nonfinancials in the CEO bonus contracts, the 2SLS analysis is repeated with two 
additional control variables, i.e. the performance on ROA and TSR in the consecutive 
period t+1.71 The coefficient on NONFIN however remains insignificant. Third, 
robust regression is employed to address the potential impact of outliers. Here the 
coefficient on INC_INT is both negative and significant (β1 = -0.11, p<0.10). Fourth, 
the 2SLS analysis is repeated using the nonparametric bootstrap using 1,000 iterations 
with replacement where statistical inferences are bsed on bias-corrected bootstrapped 
confidence intervals. The coefficient for NONFIN (β1 = -0.34) is insignificant at 
                                               
71 Here it is assumed that, to the extent that both ROA and TSR of period t do not fully incorporate the
information about performance on the nonfinancial performance measures included in bonus contracts 
in period t, ROA and TSR for period t+1 will incorprate this information.  
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conventional significance levels. Fifth, the analyses are repeated using D_NONFIN as 
the main explanatory variable of interest instead of NONFIN. So now I examine the 
impact of the decision to either include or to not include nonfinancial performance 
measures (instead of the relative weight on nonfinacials) on the bonus incentive 
intensity. Consistent with the previous findings, the OLS model yields a negative and 
significant coefficient for D_NONFIN (p<0.10), whereas the 2SLS model yields an 
insignificant coefficient for D_NONFIN. Thus, from the latter set of analyses I 
conclude that OLS models suggest a negative and sigificant association between the 
relative weight on nonfinancials and the bonus incentiv  intensity, but that this 
relationship disappears when I explicitly address the potential endogeneity of 
NONFIN through 2SLS procedures.  
Overall, the results suggest that it is not so much the decision to put more or less 
weight on the nonfinancial performance measures in the CEO bonus contract that 
affects the extent to which incentives are provided, but that firms that seek to provide 
increased incentives are inclined to decrease the weight on nonfinancial performance 
measures (and even rely solely on summary financial measures) in their CEO bonus 
contracts. Prior research shed some light on how firms can do this and still attain 
congruence in their executive compensation package. For example, Duru et al. (2002) 
documented that some firms shield executive compensation from the impact of 
strategic expenditures such as R&D and/or advertising expenditures in order to make 
the shielded income numbers more congruent with firm’s objectives.        
4.5 Conclusions and limitations 
In contrast to much of the prior literature that has focused on the potential beneficial 
role of nonfinancial measures in contracting, in this paper I have adopted an opposite 
stance by focusing on the drawbacks of adding nonfia cial performance measures to 
summary financial measures in CEO bonus contracts. That is, nonfinancial measures 
most likely have a limited contribution to the congruence of the overall performance 
measure and may even be detrimental for the congruity of the overall measure. While 
employing a simultaneous equations approach that explicitly addresses the joint 
nature of the decisions regarding the choice of performance measures and the 
provision of incentives (Jensen & Meckling, 1992; Milgrom & Roberts, 1992), I 
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weight on nonfinancial performance measures in the respective CEO bonus contracts. 
If I repeat the analyses using an indicator variable indicative of whether or not firms 
assign a non-zero weight to nonfinancial measures instead of the relative weight 
assigned to nonfinancials, I find similar results (not reported). This could suggest that 
companies that want to provide increased incentives d crease their weight on the 
nonfinancial measures up to a point where the bonus contract is solely comprised of 
financial measures. One explanation for this finding builds on the prior literature that 
documents how firms adjust for items in reported earnings to ensure that executives 
are deterred from selecting value-decreasing activities and/or are not deterred from 
undertaking value-enhancing activities (e.g. Dechow et al., 1994; Gaver & Gaver, 
1998; Duru et al., 2002). This could imply that firms that want to provide strong 
incentives, but shy away from weighting multiple financial and nonfinancial 
measures, adjust for items in the summary financial measure as a means to improve 
the congruence of the overall performance measurement system. I do not find 
conclusive evidence on the impact of using nonfinancial performance measures on the 
incentive intensity. This could be due to the limited sample size of my study. This 
power issue might prevent me from significantly detecting phenomena present in the 
population and is therefore one major limitation of this study.         
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Appendix 1: Variable definitions 
Variable name Description 
INC_INT Ratio of annual bonus to the sum of salary and bonus. 
D_NONFIN Indicator variable equal to one if the firm puts non-zero 
weight on nonfinancial performance measures in its CEO 
annual bonus contract, zero otherwise. 
NONFIN The explicit weight assigned to nonfinancial performance 
measures in CEO annual bonus contracts.  
STRAT 
Firm’s prospective strategy measured as a composite f: i) the 
ratio of research and development to sales; ii) the market-to-
book ratio; and iii) the ratio of the number of employees to 
sales.   
PRODDEV Indicator variable equal to one if the firm is classified as 
having a long product development cycle, zero otherwise. 
PRODLIFE Indicator variable equal to one if the firm is classified as 
having a long product life cycle, zero otherwise. 
SIZE Natural logarithm of book value of total assets.  
GRWTH The ratio of the market value of equity divided by the book 
value of equity.  
RISK Standard deviation of return on assets of the prior five years.  
TSR Total shareholder return.  
ROA Net income divided by the book value of total asset.   
 
BSIZE The total number of directors on both the managing a d 
supervisory board.  
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OUTSB The proportion of total directors that serve on the supervisory 
board.  
BUSYB The proportion of the total directors that serve on four or more 
boards.  
BLOCKH The proportion of total outstanding shares that are owned by 
shareholders owning more than 5% of the outstanding shares.  
LEV The ratio of total liabilities to the book value of t tal assets.  
D_LOSS Indicator variable equal to one if the firm has neti come < 0 
in the prior year, zero otherwise.  





The number of reported segments in the annual report.  
 
The change in the value of the CEO’s portfolio of st ck and 
stock options following a 1% change in stock price. 
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Appendix 2: Reduced form equations for NONFIN and INC_INT  
(1st stage results) 
Dependent variable: NONFIN  INC_INT 
 Coeff. t-stat.  Coeff. t-stat. 
INTERCEPT 0.78***  4.17  0.06 0.36 
STRAT 0.09***  2.83  0.03 1.35 
PRODDEV -0.01 -0.11  0.02 0.50 
PRODLIFE -0.04 -0.87  -0.02 -0.73 
SIZE -0.02 -0.76  0.02 1.24 
GRWTH -0.05**  -2.19  0.03 1.38 
RISK 0.09 0.59  -0.08 -0.91 
TSR 0.03 1.22  0.00 0.00 
ROA 0.08 0.42  0.10 0.45 
BSIZE 0.01 1.21  0.00 0.23 
OUTSB -0.34† -1.63  0.26† 1.62 
BUSYB -0.03 -0.48  -0.01 -0.09 
BLOCKH -0.00 -0.17  -0.00 -0.01 
LEV -0.15**  -2.00  0.03 0.60 
D_LOSS 0.02 0.45  0.02 0.41 
CEO_TEN -0.01 -1.10  -0.01**  -2.62 
DIVERS -0.01 -1.26  0.02† 1.54 
EQ_INC -0.00 -0.81  0.00* 1.68 
      
Year and industry dummies Yes  Yes 
N 164  164 
Goodness-of-fit 0.43  0.37 
F-value 6.62***   6.59***  
*** . ** , *, † correspond to 1%, 5%, 10% and 15% significance levls (two-tailed).   
